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Recent theories in the field of computational psychiatry regard schizophrenia
(SCZ) and autistic spectrum disorders (ASD) as impairments in Bayesian in-
ference performed by the brain. In Bayesian terms, perception is a result of
optimal real-time integration of sensory information (’likelihood’), which is in-
trinsically noisy and ambiguous, and prior expectations about the states of the
world (‘prior’), which serve to disambiguate the meaning of the sensory informa-
tion. Priors capture statistical regularities in the environment and are constantly
updated to keep up with any changes in these regularities. The extent to which
prior or likelihood dominate perception depends on the uncertainty with which
they are represented, with less uncertainty resulting in more influence. Individu-
als with ASD and SCZ might show impairments in how they update their priors
and/or how much uncertainty there is ascribed to prior and likelihood represen-
tations, leading to differences in inference. While this Bayesian account can be
argued to be consistent with many previous experimental findings and symptoms
of SCZ and ASD, recent experimental work inspired by these ideas has produced
mixed results.
In this work, we investigated possible Bayesian impairments in SCZ and ASD
experimentally by addressing some of the methodological limitations of the pre-
vious work. Most notably, we used an experimental design that allows to disen-
tangle and quantify separate influences of priors and likelihoods, and we tested
both SCZ and ASD patient groups as well as autistic and schizotypy traits in
the general population. We administered a visual motion perception task that
rapidly induces prior expectations about the stimulus motion direction, leading
to biases and occasional hallucinations that can be well described by a Bayesian
model. In this task, autistic traits were found to be associated with reduced
biases, which was underlied by more precise sensory representations, while the
acquired priors were not affected by autistic traits. Patients with ASD, however,
showed no evidence of increased sensory precision, while there also were no im-
pairments in the acquisition of priors. We also found no effects in the acquisition
of priors or sensory representations along schizotypy traits and in patients with
SCZ. However, under conditions of high ambiguity SCZ patients were less likely
to hallucinate the stimulus than controls.
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The second part of the thesis is focused on further exploratory analyses con-
ducted using these same datasets. First, we investigated post-perceptual repul-
sion effects in our task and whether they were related to trait or group differences.
We found clear evidence of repulsion from the cardinal directions. In addition to
that, we found evidence for a repulsion from the central reference angle, which
was randomly selected for each participant and which could only be inferred from
the stimulus statistics. Furthermore, we found the repulsion from the central ref-
erence angle to be reduced along schizotypy traits. Interestingly, in both SCZ
and ASD groups this repulsion was also found to be negligible. While these re-
sults are exploratory, they might point to a trans-diagnostic features of ASD and
SCZ. Second, we investigated within-trial dynamics of evidence accumulation by
constructing a Continuous Choice Drift Diffusion Model (CDM) – an extension
of the classical binary choice drift diffusion model. The results of this model
showed that increased sensory precision along AQ found in a Bayesian model was
underlied by faster drift rates, while slower responses and reduced hallucinations
in SCZ were explained by a larger decision threshold. In addition, this model
provided a more complete characterization of the performance in this task (by
including reaction times) and it serves to emphasize the importance of accounting
for exposure to stimulus duration and judgement time in future studies investi-
gating Bayesian inference.
Together, this work provides novel experimental evidence that speaks to the
hypothesis of impaired Bayesian inference in ASD and SCZ. Furthermore, the
analysis of reference repulsion effects and within-trial dynamics provide additional




Mental disorders are not well understood. The field of computational psychi-
atry aims to improve our understanding of mental disorders by studying them
through the prism of normative computational models of the brain. One of the
fundamental challenges for the brain is to infer its surroundings from the lim-
ited and noisy sensory information. To perform this inference, the brain has to
rely on accumulated knowledge and expectations about the environment. Such
knowledge often derives from statistical regularities in the environment. It has
been proposed that the way people with schizophrenia (SCZ) and autism spec-
trum disorders (ASD) accumulate such knowledge and how they integrate it with
sensory information is imbalanced, forming the basis of these disorders.
In this thesis, we perform experiments to investigate this hypothesis. We use a
computerized visual motion estimation task, where participants have to estimate
the direction of motion of ambiguous stimuli. Unbeknownst to participants, two
of the motion directions are presented more frequently, inducing subconscious
expectations that lead to biases in perception. Using this task, we study peo-
ple with SCZ and ASD diagnosis as well as schizotypy and autistic traits in the
general population. Across all of these groups we find no impairments in the
acquisition of statistical knowledge about the stimulus distribution. We nonethe-
less find increased precision in sensory representations along autistic traits, which
leads to reduced biases in our task. However, in patients diagnosed with ASD
we find no evidence of increased sensory precision. Moreover, while patients with
SCZ showed similar biases in estimating motion direction of the stimulus, they
were less likely to falsely perceive it when it was not presented. Our modelling
analysis suggested this was due to patients being more conservative and waiting
longer before making a response on each trial. Taken together, this work pro-
vides empirical results and methodological ideas that can help further refine the
computational accounts of SCZ and ASD disorders.
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“It appears that things are not as they appear”
– Unknown
1.1 Computational psychiatry
Modern-day psychiatry is far from precise. Current diagnostic categories are
mostly based on surface symptomatology (DSM-V, APA, 2013; ICD-10, WHO,
1993), and lack validity (e.g., Kendell and Jablensky, 2003; Dalal and Sivaku-
mar, 2009), while treatments often rely on trial and error (e.g., McMahon, 2014)
and focus on managing symptoms rather than treating the underlying illness
(e.g., Jacob, 2015). That is primarily a consequence of not having a sufficient
understanding of how the observed mental dysfunctions arise from the complex
computations performed by the brain, and not knowing what exactly among these
computations goes wrong (e.g., Hyman, 2007). Computational psychiatry steps
in to fill this gap: rooted in computational neuroscience it aims to understand
mental disorders in terms of normative computational accounts of brain function
and neurobiology (Adams et al., 2016; Stephan and Mathys, 2014; Montague
et al., 2012; Huys et al., 2011). Such computational models are used together
1
1. General Introduction 2
with experimental data to study how disruption at different levels of information
processing propagate upward to produce dysfunction at the level of behavior.
Importantly, explicit implementations of different models allows for quantitative
and rigorous model comparison for testing alternative hypotheses about brain
function and dysfunction. In addition to uncovering the mechanisms of mental
disorders (theory-driven approach), computational psychiatry also employs ma-
chine learning tools for finding patterns in large amounts of data, which could
be used for building diagnostic tools that stratify current diagnostic categories
and that are more predictive of the treatment outcomes than the conventional
methods (data-driven approach; Yahata et al., 2017; Huys et al., 2016).
1.2 Perception as Bayesian inference
The fundamental challenge for the brain is to infer states of the world from in-
herently noisy sensory information. To do it effectively, the brain must use an
internal model of the environment (Conant and Ross Ashby, 1970). The Bayesian
brain hypothesis formalizes this process as a statistically optimal integration of in-
coming sensory information (likelihood) and knowledge or expectations about the
environment (prior) (von Helmholtz, 1867; Gregory, 1980; Dayan et al., 1995; Lee
and Mumford, 2003; Kersten et al., 2004; Doya, 2007). Here, optimality refers
to weighting prior and likelihood proportionally to their associated certainty.
That is, the influence of prior increases as the reliability of sensory information
decreases and vice versa. In this sense, people have been shown to perform opti-
mally on a variety of perceptual tasks, including multisensory and sensorimotor
integration (for reviews, see Knill and Pouget, 2004; Pouget et al., 2013).
Interestingly, the characteristic biases found in many perceptual tasks and
illusions can be explained by priors that correspond to natural-scene statistics,
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such as expectations for cardinal orientations (Girshick et al., 2011) and global
convexity (Langer and Bülthoff, 2001), expectations that objects tend to be static
or move slowly (Weiss et al., 2002), that the light comes from above (Sun and
Perona, 1998) or that someone’s gaze is directed at us (Mareschal et al., 2013).
The correspondence between environmental statistics and internal priors is an-
other sense in which people can be considered to be optimal. To remain optimal,
however, the priors have to be dynamically updated to take into account any
new regularities in the environment. Multiple studies have demonstrated that
people can update their priors to approximate the statistics of the stimulus on
relatively short time scales (e.g., Adams et al., 2004; Körding and Wolpert, 2004;
Sotiropoulos et al., 2011; for a review, see Seriès and Seitz, 2013).
On the neural level, hierarchical Bayesian inference is supported by the brain’s
hierarchical architecture (the recurrent feedforward/feedback loops) and can be
implemented via predictive coding1 (Srinivasan et al., 1982; Mumford, 1992; Rao
and Ballard, 1999; Lee and Mumford, 2003; Friston, 2008; Bastos et al., 2012). In
predictive coding, each level in the inference hierarchy predicts the input of the
level below it. The mismatch between predictions and inputs (prediction error)
is sent back to the higher levels and drives the updating of priors/predictions.
The prediction errors are weighted by the ratio of sensory likelihood and prior
precisions (learning rate) to modulate the size of the update: the more precise
the likelihood (or the less precise the prior) the larger the update. This process
repeats iteratively as the brain continuously strives toward minimization of pre-
diction error, i.e., as it builds ever more accurate model of the world. Importantly,
encoding of sensory prediction errors and uncertainty at different hierarchical lev-
els has been associated with specific neuromodulatory systems, providing further
1note that while Bayesian inference and predictive coding often go hand in hand, the former
primarily deals with uncertainty, while the latter is rooted in redundancy reduction; thus, one
does not necessarily imply the other (see Aitchison and Lengyel, 2017)
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neurobiological basis for Bayesian inference and learning (Fiorillo et al., 2003;
Angela and Dayan, 2005; Iglesias et al., 2013; Friston et al., 2012; Moran et al.,
2013; Schwartenbeck et al., 2015; Marshall et al., 2016; Diaconescu et al., 2017;
for a review, see Iglesias et al., 2017).
1.3 Bayesian accounts of Schizophrenia and ASD
Capturing such fundamental aspects of brain function, Bayesian inference pro-
vides a normative framework for understanding mental disorders. In particular,
Bayesian accounts have been proposed for schizophrenia (SCZ), which is pri-
marily characterized by reoccurring hallucinations and delusions (Hemsley and
Garety, 1986; Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Corlett et al., 2009; Adams et al., 2013;
Jardri and Denève, 2013; Sterzer et al., 2018; Heinz et al., 2019) and autistic
spectrum disorder (ASD), which is primarily characterized by severe social in-
teraction difficulties, inflexible behavioral patterns, as well as sensory hypo- and
hyper-sensitivities (Pellicano and Burr, 2012b; Van de Cruys et al., 2014; Law-
son et al., 2014; Sinha et al., 2014; Rosenberg et al., 2015; Palmer et al., 2017).
In both disorders, precision ascribed to sensory evidence and prior expectations
is proposed to be imbalanced, resulting in disproportionate influence of either
top-down or bottom-up signals. In ASD, the influence of priors is thought to
be weaker, while in SCZ both weaker and stronger priors have been proposed to
explain different findings.
In SCZ, overly precise and salient sensory information might be underlied by
increased tonic dopamine levels at D2 receptors (Howes and Kapur, 2009; Winton-
Brown et al., 2014), while weaker influence of top-down priors might result from
the hypofunction of feedback-mediating N-methyl-d-aspartate receptors (NMDA-
R) (Olney and Farber, 1995; Friston et al., 2016). Failure to accurately predict
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sensory experiences could explain hallucinations (for example, unpredicted sub-
vocalization might be interpreted as someone else’s voice; Allen et al., 2007;
Moseley et al., 2013), as well as the findings of reduced mismatch negativity in
scalp-recorded electroencephalogram: i.e., reduced difference in event-related po-
tential amplitudes between frequent (expected) and oddball (unexpected) stimuli
(Wacongne, 2016). Furthermore, weakened priors could explain reduced suscep-
tibility to some perceptual illusions (Dakin et al., 2005a; Notredame et al., 2014;
King et al., 2017). Precision imbalance in favour of sensory evidence would also
result in overly high learning rate and could explain the ’jumping to conclusions’
observed in probabilistic reasoning tasks (Huq et al., 1988; Fine et al., 2007). Be-
ing bombarded with overly salient sensory experiences, the drive for minimization
of prediction error might lead to forming compensatorily strong and idiosyncratic
high-level priors (beliefs) which would explain the emergence and persistence of
delusions (Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Adams et al., 2013; Corlett and Fletcher,
2014). These high-level priors might also provide another mechanism via which
delusion-related hallucinations can arise: by overriding sensory evidence (Powers
et al., 2016; Corlett et al., 2019).
In ASD, increased weighing of sensory information could explain reduced sen-
sitivity to context (Mitchell and Ropar, 2004), and would subsume previous ASD
theories emphasizing detail-oriented perceptual and cognitive processing style
(Weak Central Coherence: Frith, 1989; Happé and Frith, 2006; Enhanced Per-
ceptual Functioning: Mottron and Burack, 2001; Mottron et al., 2006). Further-
more, increased sensory precision could explain enhanced performance on tasks
involving simple stimuli as well as sensory hypersensitivities and sensory over-
load (Intense World Theory: Markram and Markram, 2010). For instance, in the
embedded figures test, where ASD exhibit superior performance, brain imaging
studies have found increased visual cortical activation and decreased prefrontal
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activation, consistent with sensory overwheighing and diminished top-down mod-
ulation interpretation (Ring et al., 1999; Lee et al., 2007; Manjaly et al., 2007).
Similar to SCZ account, overwheighing of sensory information might also ex-
plain reduced susceptibility to some perceptual illusions in ASD (Happé, 1996;
Chouinard et al., 2016; although see Ropar and Mitchell, 2001). In social situ-
ations, attending to sensory details at the expense of relevant social cues might
contribute to social interaction difficulties - one of the most prominent symptoms
of ASD (Theory of Mind deficits: Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Baron-Cohen, 2000).
The strong desire for routines and rigid behaviors observed in ASD might be
understood as an attempt to introduce more predictability in one’s environment,
where the lack of contextual modulation results in more variable and overwhelm-
ing sensory experiences (Gomot and Wicker, 2012; Pellicano and Burr, 2012b).
Furthermore, overly precise sensory representations or weaker priors would imply
high learning rates, which could lead to forming prior expectations that are too
specific and do not generalize across situations (Plaisted, 2001; Van de Cruys
et al., 2014). In other words, the Bayesian accounts of ASD provide a computa-
tional framework for what many previous theories have captured conceptually. In
particular, it allows to address one of the long-standing disagreements between
top-down (Happé and Frith, 2006; Mitchell and Ropar, 2004) and bottom-up the-
ories (Mottron et al., 2006; Markram and Markram, 2010), by providing a unify-
ing framework that is well-suited for studying the interaction between bottom-up
and top-down information flow. However, recent debates surrounding Bayesian
accounts of ASD still show a similar divide (Pellicano and Burr, 2012b; Van de
Cruys et al., 2013; Brock, 2012; Teufel et al., 2013; Friston et al., 2013; van Boxtel
and Lu, 2013), with some authors proposing weaker priors (Pellicano and Burr,
2012b), others arguing for increased sensory precision (Brock, 2012; Van de Cruys
et al., 2013; Lawson et al., 2014).
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The experimental work inspired by the Bayesian accounts of ASD and SCZ has
nevertheless produced mixed results (see studies summarized in Table 1.2 and
Table 1.1). In SCZ, intact priors have been reported across many visual illusions
(Grzeczkowski et al., 2018; Kaliuzhna et al., 2019) and for repetition probability
effects in face repetition suppression (Kovács et al., 2019). Most other studies in-
vestigated the relationship between priors and symptoms of delusions and halluci-
nations rather than the diagnostic category of schizophrenia. With this approach,
some studies found delusions to be associated with weaker perceptual priors in
bistable perception (Schmack et al., 2013, 2015), disambiguation of local features
in two-tone images (Davies et al., 2018) and cross-modal (audio-visual) associative
learning in random-dot kinematogram task (Stuke et al., 2019). However, other
studies reported the opposite: delusions being associated with stronger perceptual
priors in disambiguation of two-tone images (Teufel et al., 2015) and in sequential
information-sampling task (Baker et al., 2019). Delusion-proneness in the general
population has also been associated with stronger cognitive placebo-induced pri-
ors in bistable perception (Schmack et al., 2013), while in SCZ patients such priors
were found to be weaker on the group level, but correlated positively with the
severity of positive symptoms (Schmack et al., 2017). Hallucination symptoms
have been associated with stronger priors in cross-modal (audio-visual) associa-
tive learning (Powers et al., 2017), disambiguation of global features in two-tone
images (Davies et al., 2018), disambiguation of degraded speech (Alderson-Day
et al., 2017) and auditory tone duration reproduction (Cassidy et al., 2018).
More nuanced findings have been reported by three studies using more detailed
computational models to explain SCZ belief updating in probabilistic reasoning
tasks. Using a circular inference model where both priors and sensory evidence
can be reverberated multiple times during a single belief update, Jardri et al.
(2017) found positive SCZ symptoms to be related to over-counting of sensory
evidence. Stuke et al. (2017) investigated non-linearity of belief updating and
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found hallucination- and delusion-proneness in the general population to be as-
sociated with larger updates when presented with surprising/disconfirmatory in-
formation. Finally, using a Bayesian bielief-updating model with attractor-like
dynamics, Adams et al. (2018) showed that SCZ patients could be characterized
as having increased belief instability and response stochasticity.
In ASD, many studies have reported intact priors: in probability effects in rep-
etition suppression (Ewbank et al., 2015), figure-ground segregation (Spanò et al.,
2016), the direction-of-gaze prior (Pell et al., 2016), the light-from-above prior
(Croydon et al., 2017), disambiguation of two-tone images (Van de Cruys et al.,
2018), brightness illusion (Laeng et al., 2018), and Kaniza’s triangle (Utzerath
et al., 2019) and many many other perceptual illusions (Chouinard et al., 2016).
Weaker priors have been reported in a probabilistic orientation discrimination
task (Skewes et al., 2015), in repetition suppression (Ewbank et al., 2014, 2017),
in auditory localization (Skewes and Gebauer, 2016), for central tendency bias
in time interval reproduction (Karaminis et al., 2016), for the slow-speed prior
(Powell et al., 2016), for adaptation to direction of social stimuli (Lawson et al.,
2018), for action prediction (Chambon et al., 2017) and for disambiguation of
two-tone images (Król and Król, 2019). A couple of studies also investigated
the dynamics of prior updating. Lieder et al. (2019) studied contraction bias
in auditory pitch discrimination and found that adults with ASD showed slower
prior updating, with their priors being more influenced by distant sensory history.
Lawson et al. (2017) studied prior updating in ASD under volatile conditions. In
a cross-modal (audio-visual) associative learning task, they found adults with
ASD to exhibit increased meta-volatility estimates, which led to smaller adjust-
ments of their learning rate when transitioning from stable to volatile phases of
the task. In contrast to Lieder et al. (2019), however, the average learning rates
were not found to be different.
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One methodological limitation that runs across both SCZ and ASD studies
is that explicit generative models of the tested inferences are rarely implemented
(see Table 1.2 and Table 1.1). Consequently, in the case of positive findings,
it often remains unclear, what underlying mechanisms are responsible for the ob-
served differences. This is perfectly exemplified by studies that do fit detailed
models and capture nuanced effects that would be hard to infer from the behav-
ioral data alone (e.g., Lawson et al., 2017; Jardri et al., 2017; Stuke et al., 2017;
Powers et al., 2017; Adams et al., 2018; Baker et al., 2019). In particular, very
few studies have used experimental designs and computational models that can
reliably quantify individual prior and likelihood effects (see Table 1.2 and Table
1.1). Thus, when reduced biases are observed, they are often reported as being
a result of weaker priors, even though reduced biases could also result from more
precise sensory representations. Importantly, this fails to address the unresolved
debate of whether Bayesian impairments in ASD originate from weaker priors
or stronger likelihoods (Pellicano and Burr, 2012b; Brock, 2012; Van de Cruys
et al., 2013; van Boxtel and Lu, 2013). Furthermore, while ASD and SCZ share
a lot of similarities within the Bayesian framework (with the proposed primary
impairment in both disorders being weaker influence of priors, relative to sensory
evidence), they tend to be tested on different tasks. This leaves a gap between the
theory and the empirical observations; studying these disorders together might
help clarify where they computationally diverge. Finally, many studies are based
on schizotypy and autistic traits in the general population, under the assump-
tion that the proposed impairments would generalize along these dimensions.
However, most studies that do test both the traits and the clinical groups find
divergent effects. For instance, Ewbank et al. (2014, 2017) found repetition sup-
pression along autistic traits in the general population to be reduced for faces,
objects and scenes, while in ASD group it was reduced only for faces. Simi-
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larly, Lawson et al. (2018) found reduced adaptation to direction for social and
non-social stimuli along autistic traits in the general population, while in ASD
reduced adaptation was found only for social stimuli. In SCZ context, Schmack
et al. (2013, 2017) found placebo-induced priors along delusion-proneness in the
general population to be stronger, while in a clinical SCZ sample placebo-induced
priors were found to be weaker. Together, such discrepancies suggest that the
assumption of continuity of the effects should not be made lightly.
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Table 1.1: Recent experimental studies testing Bayesian accounts of schizophrenia
(SCZ). Note that ’Type of prior’ column provides descriptive, not taxonomic
information. N/A - not applicable. CTR - controls. Exp 1/2/3 - denote different
experiments/datasets when there is more than one.




Type of prior Sample
Stabilizing of 3D
bistable rotating sphere
(Schmack et al., 2013;
Schmack et al., 2015;
Schmack et al., 2017)
Weaker perceptual










Exp 1: N = 105,
delusion-proneness
Exp 2: 28 SCZ, 32 CTR
Exp 3: 21 SCZ, 28 CTR
Disambiguation of
two-tone images






18 at-risk, 16 CTR






























25 CTR, 25 SCZ
Probabilistic reasoning task
with cross-modal priors







































Exp 1: N = 30
(CTR; pharmacological
manipulation)


















A range of classical
visual illusions
(Grzeczkowski et al., 2018)













N/A Posterior afterprevious sample
Exp 2:

















Perception of brightness, line
length, and motion direction
(Kaliuzhna et al., 2019)
Intact priors None N/A Natural priors 19 SCZ, 21 CTR.
Incentivized
information-sampling task









previous sample 24 SCZ, 21 CTR
Repetition probability effects
(Kovács et al., 2019) Intact priors None N/A
Frequency of
repetition/alteration 17 SCZ, 17 CTR
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Table 1.2: Recent experimental studies testing Bayesian accounts of ASD. Note
that ’Type of prior’ column provides descriptive, not taxonomic information.
N/A - not applicable, AQ - Autism Quotient, CTR - controls. Exp 1/2/3 -
denote different experiments/datasets when there is more than one.




Type of prior Sample
Repetition suppression
(Ewbank et al., 2014, 2017)
Weaker priors for
faces in ASD; Weaker
for faces, shapes and
scenes in AQ
None,




15 ASD, 15 CTR
(adults)
Adaptation to numerosity
(Turi et al., 2015) Weaker priors None N/A
Adaptation, presented just
before the test trial
16 ASD, 18 CTR
(children)
Orientation discrimination







The effect of expectations
on repetition suppression
of faces
(Ewbank et al., 2015)











23 ASD, 30 CTR
(children and adults)
Direction of gaze




(Powell et al., 2016) Weaker priors
None (but uses
math. derivations) N/A Natural prior
AQ traits
N = 31 (Exp 1)
N = 26 (Exp 2)
Susceptibility to simple
optical illusions





None N/A Natural prior AQ traitsN = 131
Central tendency bias
in time interval reproduction
(Karaminis et al., 2016)














N/A Average frequencyof different stimuli
16 ASD, 19 CTR
(adults)
Adaptation to audiovisual
asynchrony (Turi et al., 2016) Weaker priors None N/A Adaptation/recalibration













18 ASD, 20 CTR
(adults)
Light-from-above
(Croydon et al., 2017) Intact priors None N/A Natural prior


















(Van de Cruys et al., 2018)





(Laeng et al., 2018)
Intact priors None N/A Natural prior 11 ASD, 24 CTR(adults)
The effect of expectations
on repetition suppression
of objects
(Utzerath et al., 2018)




22 ASD, 22 CTR
(adolescents)
Adaptation to direction for
social and non-social stimuli
(Lawson et al., 2018)
Weaker priors only
for social stimulus
in ASD and for
all stimulus in AQ
None N/A Adaptation/recalibration
AQ traits
N = 28 (Exp 1)
17 ASD, 19 CTR
(adults; Exp 2)
4 tasks: Illusory contours,
blur detection, Mooney,
representational momentum
(Tulver et al., 2019)





(Utzerath et al., 2019)
Intact priors None,but fMRI used N/A Natural prior









Mean of a feature
(recent sensory history)
Exp 2:
37 ASD, 32 CTR
Exp 3:




(Król and Król, 2019)
Weaker priors Eye-tracking only N/A Single-presentationvisual prior




effects on action prediction





N/A Cue-action contingencies 24 ASD, 24 CTR(children)
Low-level visual spacial
context modulation
(Sandhu et al., 2020)
Intact priors Psychometriccurves N/A Natural priors
27 ADS, 20 CTR
(adults)
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1.4 Aims and outline of the thesis
The aim of this thesis was to experimentally investigate the Bayesian accounts
of SCZ and ASD by addressing some of the methodological limitations of the
previous work. To this end, we studied SCZ and ASD patient groups as well
as schizotypy and autistic traits in the general population within a single visual
motion estimation task that induces perceptual priors (Chalk et al., 2010). An
important important feature of this task design was that responses were on an
interval scale (unlike most previous work in this area that used binary response
design), which allowed to estimate perceptual variability, which in turn made it
possible to disentangle prior and likelihood influences on perception. Another im-
portant feature of the used task design was that the acquired prior was expressed
in multiple behavioral measures (e.g., detection, discrimination, reaction times).
This allowed to detect more nuanced differences in how the acquired priors influ-
enced performance in the task and gave better control over potential confounds.
Finally, to stay true to the principles of computational psychiatry, we performed
extensive computational modelling analysis, which allowed to quantify nuanced
individual and group differences in terms of model parameters.
The first part of the thesis (Chapters 2-4) consists mostly of published work
and constitutes the core part of the thesis. Each chapter is based on the same
experimental design (using the Moving Dots task described above together with
Bayesian modelling) but in each case it is applied to a novel dataset: Chapter
2 - autistic and schizotypy traits in the general population, Chapter 3 - SCZ
patient group, Chapter 4 - ASD patient group. The second part of the thesis
(Chapters 5 and 6) presents further exploratory analysis focused on additional
effects observed across the three aforementioned datasets. This serves to control
for potential confounds, allows to investigate other individual and group differ-
ences and relates our work to other frameworks and areas of research. InChapter
1. General Introduction 14
5 we re-analyse the performance in the task by accounting for additional biases
present in our data that the standard Bayesian model could not account for. This
relates our work to research on reference repulsion. In Chapter 6 we investi-
gate the observed Bayesian effects by accounting for within-trial dynamics. This
leads us to constructing a Continuous Choice Drift Diffusion Model (CDM) - an
extension of the classical binary choice Drift Diffusion Model (DDM).
Part I




Perceptual Bayesian inference in
autistic and schizotypy traits
This chapter includes a postprint of a published journal article: Karvelis, P.,
Seitz, A. R., Lawrie, S. M., Seriès, P. (2018). Autistic traits, but not schizotypy,
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Recent theories propose that schizophrenia/schizotypy and autistic spectrum disorder are related 
to impairments in Bayesian inference i.e. how the brain integrates sensory information 
(likelihoods) with prior knowledge. However existing accounts fail to clarify: i) how proposed 
theories differ in accounts of ASD vs. schizophrenia and ii) whether the impairments result from 
weaker priors or enhanced likelihoods. Here, we directly address these issues by characterizing 
how 91 healthy participants, scored for autistic and schizotypal traits, implicitly learned and 
combined priors with sensory information. This was accomplished through a visual statistical 
learning paradigm designed to quantitatively assess variations in individuals’ likelihoods and 
priors. The acquisition of the priors was found to be intact along both traits spectra. However, 
autistic traits were associated with more veridical perception and weaker influence of 
expectations. Bayesian modeling revealed that this was due, not to weaker prior expectations, but 
to more precise sensory representations.  
  




In recent years Bayesian inference has come to be regarded as a general principle of brain 
function that underlies not only perception and motor execution, but hierarchically extends all the 
way to higher cognitive phenomena, such as belief formation and social cognition. Impairments 
of Bayesian inference have been proposed to underlie deficits observed in mental illness, 
particularly schizophrenia 1-3, 49-51 and autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) 4-7. The general 
hypothesis for both disorders is that the weight, also called “precision”, ascribed to sensory 
evidence and prior expectations is imbalanced, resulting in sensory evidence having relatively 
too much influence on perception.  
 
In schizophrenia, overweighting of sensory information could explain the decreased 
susceptibility to perceptual illusions8, as well as the peculiar tendency to jump to conclusions9. 
Moreover, the systematically weakened low-level prior expectations might lead to forming 
compensatory strong and idiosyncratic high-level priors (beliefs), which would explain the 
emergence and persistence of delusions as well as reoccurring hallucinations 1-3. 
 
In ASD, the relatively stronger influence of sensory information could explain hypersensitivity to 
sensory stimuli and extreme attention to details. The weaker influence of prior expectations 
would also result in more variability in sensory experiences. The desire for sameness and rigid 
behaviors could then be understood as an attempt to introduce more predictability in one’s 
environment 4. Furthermore, this could lead to prior expectations which are too specific and 
which do not generalize across situations 5. While all theories agree that the relative influence of 
prior expectations is weaker in ASD, the primary source of this imbalance is debated: does it arise 
from increased sensory precision (i.e. sharper likelihood) or from reduced precision of prior 
expectations? 10-12 (Fig. 1). Some authors argue for attenuated priors 4, 11, while others argue for 
increased sensory precision 6, 7, 10, 13  but conclusive experimental evidence is lacking.  
 
A number of studies have aimed at testing Bayesian theories, either in a clinical population, or by 
studying individual differences in the general population 14-17 under the hypothesis of a 
continuum between autistic/schizotypal traits and ASD/schizophrenia 18-20. Attenuated slow-
speed priors were reported in a motion perception task in individuals with ASD traits 14. Autistic 
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children also showed attenuated central tendency prior in temporal interval reproduction21. 
Attenuated priors were also reported in perceptual tasks that incorporate probabilistic reasoning 
15, 22. However, the direction of gaze priors 23 and the light-from-above priors 24 were found to be 
intact. Autistic children also demonstrated intact ability to update their priors in a volatile 
environment in a decision-making task 25 but a follow-up study in ASD adults showed that they 
overestimate volatility in a changing environment 26. In schizophrenia/schizotypal traits, Teufel et 
al.16 reported increased influence of prior expectations when disambiguating two-tone images, 
while Schmack et al.27,28 reported weakened influence of stabilizing predictions when observing a 
bistable rotating sphere.  
 
 
Figure 1. Alternative hypotheses for ASD impairments within the Bayesian inference 
framework.  In Bayesian terms, the percept can be described as a posterior distribution, which is 
a combination of sensory information (likelihood) and prior expectations (prior). Two contrasting 
hypotheses have been proposed to underlie behavioral differences in ASD: enhanced sensory 
precision, i.e. smaller σsens (left) vs. attenuated priors, i.e. larger σexp (right). Both hypotheses 
predict a reduced influence (bias) of the prior on the location of the posterior distribution 
(posterior mean). However, these alternatives differ in their predictions for perceptual variability, 
which is determined by the posterior width: the enhanced sensory precision hypothesis should 
lead to reduced variability while the attenuated prior hypothesis should lead to increased 
variability. By measuring both bias and variability, our experimental paradigm can distinguish 
between these two hypotheses. 
 
Overall, the existing findings are not only mixed, but also employ very different paradigms, 
which makes their direct comparison difficult. Further, a critical limitation of most studies 
(except for Karaminis et al. 21) is the lack of formal computational models that can test whether 
behavioral differences originate from different priors or from different likelihoods. Moreover, to 
our knowledge, despite the similarity of the Bayesian theories proposed for ASD and 
schizophrenia, there is no previous work investigating both autistic and schizotypal traits within 
the same experimental paradigm so as to test their differences.  
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We here address these questions empirically in a context of visual motion perception.  We used a 
previously developed statistical learning task29 in which participants have to estimate the 
direction of motion of coherently moving clouds of dots (Fig. 2). Chalk et al. 29 found that in this 
task healthy participants rapidly and implicitly develop prior expectations for the most frequently 
presented motion directions. This in turn alters their perception of motion on low contrast trials 
resulting in attractive estimation biases towards the most frequent directions. In addition, prior 
expectations lead to reduced estimation variability and reaction times, as well as increased 
detection performance for the most frequently presented directions.  When no stimulus is 
presented, the acquired expectations sometimes lead to false alarms (hallucinations), again, 
mostly in the most frequent directions. Importantly, such biases were well described using a 
Bayesian model, where participants acquired a perceptual prior for the visual stimulus that is 
combined with sensory information and influences their perception.  As such, this paradigm is 
well suited to quantitatively model variations in likelihoods and priors in individuals with 
ASD or schizotypal traits. 
 
 
Figure 2. The moving dots task. (a) Sequence of events on a single trial. First, a fixation point is 
presented. Next, a field of coherently moving dots is presented along with an estimation bar 
(extending from the fixation point) which participants are required to move to indicate perceived 
motion direction. Lastly, in a two-alternative forced choice, participants are asked to report 
whether they saw the dots during the estimation part (detection task). (b) The probability of 
different motion directions being presented: directions at ±32° are presented more often than 
other directions. Motion direction is plotted relative to a central reference angle (at 0°), which 
was randomly set for each participant. 
 
 




Here, we investigated individual differences in statistical learning in relation to autistic and 
schizotypal traits in a sample of 91 healthy participants. 8 participants failed to perform the task 
satisfactorily and were excluded from the analysis (see Methods), leaving 83 participants in the 
study (41 women and 42 men, age range: 18-69; mean: 25.7). 
 
Task behavior at low contrast 
 
First, we investigated whether participants acquired priors on the group level. We discarded the 
first 170 trials as that is how long it took for the 2/1 and 4/1 staircases contrast levels to converge 
(Appendix 1—Figure 2) and for prior effects to become significant (Appendix 1—Figures 3, 4 
and 5). We analyzed task performance at low contrast levels (converged 2/1 and 4/1 staircases 
contrast levels) where sensory uncertainty is high. Replicating findings of Chalk et al. (2010), we 
found that on the group level people acquired priors that approximated the statistics of the task. 
Such priors were indicated by:  attractive biases towards ±32°
 
(Fig. 3a), less variability in 
estimations at ±32°
 







over all other motion directions; signed rank test: p< 0.001), shorter estimation 
reaction times at ±32°
 
as compared to all other motion directions (Fig. 3c; average reaction time 
was 201.87 ± 2.47 ms at ±32°
 
versus 207.75 ± 2.60 ms over all other motion directions; signed 
rank test: p < 0.001) and better detection at ±32°
 
as compared to all other motion directions (Fig. 
3d; detected 75.57 ± 0.65% at ±32°
 
versus 66.70 ± 0.83% over all other motion directions; 




Another indicator of acquired priors is the distribution of estimation responses on trials when no 
actual stimulus was presented. We found that participants sometimes still reported seeing dots 
(experienced hallucinations) but mostly so around ±32°
 
(Fig. 3f, solid line). To quantify the 
statistical significance of hallucinations around ±32°, the space of possible motion directions was 




was multiplied by 
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the total number of bins: 
 
prel = p(θest = ±32(±8)°) · Nbins ,                                                                  (1) 
 
where Nbins is the number of bins (45), each of size 16°. This probability ratio would be equal to 1 
if participants were equally likely to estimate within 8°
 
of ±32°, as they were to estimate within 
other bins. We found that the median of prel was significantly greater than 1 (median(prel) = 1.6, 
p<0.001, signed rank test). Furthermore, the estimation distribution when no dots where detected 
(Fig. 3f, dash-dot line) was found to be significantly flatter (median(prel) = 0, p < 0.001, signed 
rank test comparing with the median of prel for hallucinations), suggesting that the hallucinations 
were indeed of perceptual nature (rather than related to a response bias). 
 
Figure 3. Average group performance on low-contrast trials (a-d) and on trials with no stimulus 
(e). (a) Mean estimation bias, (b) standard deviation of estimations, (c) estimation reaction time 
and (d) fraction of trials in which the stimulus was detected. (f) Probability distribution of 
estimation responses on trials without stimulus. The solid line denotes the estimation responses 
when participants reported detecting a stimulus (hallucinations). The dash-dot line denotes 
estimation distributions when participants correctly reported not detecting a stimulus. (e) 
Distribution of hallucinations for high and low AQ groups (median split). The vertical dashed 
lines correspond to the two most frequently presented motion directions (±32°). Error bars and 
shaded areas represent within-subject standard error. 
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Task performance and autistic/schizotypy traits 
 
Participants were prescreened to make sure they covered a wide range of autistic and schizotypy 
scores. The AQ scores in our sample ranged from 6 to 41 (full questionnaire range being 0 to 50) 
with a mean (±SD) of 20.3 (±8.3), which is a typical distribution for a neurotypical population57. 
The RISC scores ranged from 8 to 55 (full questionnaire range being 0 to 78) with a mean of 31.7 
(±11.9), and the SPQ scores ranged from 4 to 59 (full questionnaire range being 0 to 74) with a 
mean of 26.4 (±13.8), both of which are typical for the general population41,42. 
 
We found that on low contrast trials autistic traits lead to less variability in estimations (Fig. 4b; mean 
standard deviation of estimations: r = −0.327, p < 0.001), which remained significant after 
Bonferroni correction (p = 0.002). Moreover, there was a negative relationship between autistic 
traits and estimation bias, which was trending according to robust regression (Fig. 4a; mean 
absolute estimation bias: r = −0.175, p = 0.053) and significant according to Kendall’s 
correlation (τb = −0.163, p = 0.032),  however, it did not survive Bonferroni correction (p = 
0.212). In the Bayesian framework, less bias could arise either due to wider priors or narrower 
sensory likelihoods, while less variability could be a result of either narrower priors or narrower 
likelihoods (see Fig. 1). Thus, observing less bias and less variability together suggests that the 
effects are driven by narrower likelihoods. An alternative is that the differences in variability 
could be due to differences in motor precision, which we further assess via modeling (below). 
 
   
Figure 4. Correlations between AQ scores and task performance on low contrast trials (a, b) and 
when no stimulus is presented (c). (a) Mean absolute bias (r = −0.175, p = 0.053), (b) mean 
standard deviation (i.e. variability) of estimations (r = −0.327, p < 0.001), and (c) the total 
number of hallucinations (r = −0.238, p = 0.010). The blue lines are robust regression slopes. 
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Schizotypy traits (RISC and SPQ scores) did not show any effect on task performance at low 
contrast as indicated by the absence of correlations with mean absolute estimation bias (RISC: r 
= 0.140, p = 0.197; SPQ (N=39): r = −0.160, p = 0.204) and with mean estimation variability 
(RISC: r = 0.197, p = 0.092; SPQ (N=39): r = −0.229, p = 0.171); see Appendix 1—Figures 6, 7 
and 8. 
 
No-stimulus trials and autistic/schizotypal traits 
We also investigated how the traits affected performance on trials when no actual stimulus was 
presented. First, we looked at the total number of estimations. We found that autistic traits were 
associated with less hallucinations (Fig. 4c; r = −0.238, p = 0.010), while schizotypal traits were 
found to have no effect on the number of hallucinations (RISC: r = 0.126, p = 0.163; SPQ (N=39):  
r = -0.010, p = 0.959). Secondly, we looked for relationships between the traits and how the 
estimations on no-stimulus trials were distributed. Specifically, we were interested in whether the 
traits predicted how densely hallucinations were distributed around ±32°, as this could be 
considered to reflect the differences in the width of the underlying acquired prior distribution. 
For weaker priors we would expect a more spread out distribution of hallucinations. To test this 
hypothesis, we looked at the fraction of total hallucinations in the region around ±32°
 
for three 




of ±32°.  Bayesian Kendall 
correlation analysis on these measures provided positive evidence that none of the traits had any 
effect on how hallucinations were distributed, suggesting no differences in the acquired prior 
distributions (fraction of hallucinations within 8° of ±32°: AQ - τb = 0.003, BF01 = 7.24; RISC - τb 
= -0.050, BF01 = 3.73; SPQ - τb = 0.101, BF01 = 8.72; within 16°
 
of ±32°: AQ - τb = -0.068, BF01 
= 2.86; RISC - τb = -0.129, BF01 = 0.84; SPQ - τb = 0.018, BF01 = 5.45; within 24°
 
of ±32°: AQ - 
τb = 0.057, BF01 = 11.67; RISC - τb = -0.078, BF01 = 2.40; SPQ - τb = 0.006, BF01 = 5.02). 
 
Modeling results 
Group level results 
To quantitatively evaluate the relationships between underlying perceptual mechanisms and task 
performance we fitted a range of generative models. One class of models was Bayesian - it was 
based on the assumption that participants combine prior expectations with uncertain sensory 
information on a single trial basis (Fig. 5).  




Figure 5. Bayesian model of estimation response for a single trial. The actual motion direction 
(θact) is corrupted by sensory uncertainty (σsens), and then combined with prior expectations 
(mean θexp and uncertainty σexp) to form a posterior distribution. The perceptual estimate 
(θperc) is defined as the mean of the posterior distribution. Finally, motor precision (1/σ𝑚
2 ) and a 
probability of random response (α) are incorporated to generate the response (θest). This results 
in 4 free model parameters: σsens, σexp, θexp and α. The motor precision is estimated from high 
contrast trials and is used as a fixed parameter. 
 
To account for the possibility that the bimodal probability distribution of the stimuli, in addition 
to inducing prior expectations, has also affected the sensory likelihood, we constructed three 
variations of the Bayesian model: ’BAYES’, where the sensory precision was constrained to be 
the same across all presented motion directions, ’BAYES_varmin’, where the sensory precision 
was allowed to be different for the most frequently presented motion directions, but was the same 
across all other directions, and ’BAYES_var’, where sensory precision was allowed to be 
different across all motion directions. Another class of models was based on the assumption that 
task performance can be explained by response strategies that do not involve Bayesian inference. 
That is, on any given trial participants responded based on the prior expectations or sensory 
information alone. We considered four variations of response strategy models: ’ADD1’, ’ADD2’, 
’ADD1_m’ and ’ADD2_m’ (see Methods for details). 
 
To compare the models, we computed BIC values for each individual for each model; we used 
individual BIC values as a summary statistic and compared the models using signed rank test in 
order to preserve individual variability, which corresponds to a random effects Bayesian model 
selection procedure. We found that the BAYES model had significantly smaller BIC values than 
the remaining models (see the p-values within Fig. 6a). 
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To determine how the best fitting model compared to the actual data, we analyzed the estimation 
biases and variation in estimation responses as predicted by BAYES (Fig. 6b,c). As in the 
experimental data analysis, we computed estimation distributions predicted by the model by 
assuming occasional random estimations (see Eq. (2)). Finally, using the BAYES model, we 
reconstructed the priors acquired by participants. While on the individual level there was a 
considerable variation in the shape of acquired priors (see Appendix 1—Figure 10), on the group 
level, it approximated the statistics of the task (Fig. 6d). 
 
 
Figure 6. Modelling results. (a) Model comparison for all participants using Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC). y-axis measures the relative difference between BIC of each model 
(as indicated on the x-axis) and BIC of BAYES model. Values greater than zero on the y-axis 
indicate that the BAYES model provided a better fit. Each dot represents a participant. Red 
horizontal lines denote median values; blue horizontal lines denote 25th and 75th percentiles. p-
values above the plot indicate whether the median of the difference was significantly different 
from zero for each model (signed rank test). Panels (a) and (c) present task performance at 
different motion directions as predicted by BAYES model: (b) estimation bias, (c) standard 
deviation of estimations. Error bars represent within-subject standard error. (d) Population 
averaged prior as recovered via BAYES model. The vertical dashed lines correspond to the two 
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Model parameters and autistic/schizotypal traits 
 
Correlational analysis of BAYES model parameters showed that there was no correlation between 
AQ and the precision of the prior σexp (Fig. 7b; r = 0.018, p = 0.962). That autistic traits had no 
effect on the precision of the prior was confirmed by Bayesian Kendall correlation, which 
provided positive evidence (τb  = 0.001, BF01 = 6.99).  
 
Importantly, autistic traits were found to be strongly associated with less uncertainty in the 
sensory likelihood, σsens (Fig. 7c; r = −0.185, p = 0.011), which also remained significant after 
Bonferroni correction (p = 0.044). Finally, there was no correlation with the amount of random 
estimations (Fig. 7d; r = −0.135, p = 0.238). Motor precision, which was estimated from high 
contrast trials, separately from all other parameters (see Methods), was also correlated with 
autistic traits (r = 0.245, p = 0.012). On the other hand, consistent with the absence of differences 
in the behavioral findings, schizotypal traits were not associated with any difference in the 
BAYES model parameter values (Appendix 1—Figure 9), and in particular, were found to have 
no effect on prior precision (RISC: τb = -0.012, BF01 = 6.90; SPQ: τb = 0.071, BF01 = 3.97). 
 
 
Figure 7. Correlations between AQ scores and BAYES model parameters. (a) θexp - mean of the 
prior expectations (r = 0.031, p = 0.820), (b) σexp - uncertainty of the prior distribution (r = 
0.018, p = 0.962), (c) σsens - uncertainty in the sensory likelihood (r = −0.185, p = 0.011) and (d) 
α - fraction of random estimations (r = −0.135, p = 0.238). The blue lines are robust regression 
slopes.
 
Parameter recovery for BAYES 
 
Finally, to further investigate that in our experimental paradigm the influence of stronger 
likelihoods can be distinguished from that of weaker priors 10, 11 we performed parameter recovery 
for the winning BAYES model. Parameter recovery involves generating synthetic data with 
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different sets of parameters (’actual parameters’) and then fitting the same model to estimate the 
parameters (’recovered parameters’) that are most likely to have produced the data. If actual and 
recovered parameters are in a good agreement, it means that the effects of different parameters 
can be reliably distinguished. At the same time, parameter recovery is also affected by the 
parameter estimation methods and even more so by the amount of data used for model fitting. 
Therefore, parameter recovery provides an overall check for the reliability of modelling results 
and is recommended as an essential step in computational modelling approaches 30. 
 
We found that overall BAYES model (and MLE parameter estimation using simplex optimization 
function) recovered parameters very well, which was reflected in Pearson’s correlation between 
actual and recovered estimates being r > 0.9 for all model parameters (Fig. 8).   
 
Figure 8. Comparison of actual (x-axis) vs. recovered (y-axis) parameters using the ’BAYES’ 
model. (a) θexp - mean of the prior expectations (r = 0.90), (b) σexp - uncertainty of the prior 
distribution (r = 0.92), (c) σsens - uncertainty in the sensory likelihood (r = 0.95), (d) α - fraction 






In this study, we investigated whether autistic and schizotypal traits are associated with differences 
in the implicit Bayesian inference performed by the brain. Specifically, we wanted to know 
whether autistic and schizotypal traits are accompanied by 1) differences in how the priors are 
updated and/or in their precision and/or by 2) differences in the precision with which the sensory 
information (the likelihood) is represented. We used a visual motion estimation task 29 that induces 
implicit prior expectations via more frequent exposure of two motion directions (±32°). We found 
that on the group level (N=83) participants acquired prior expectations towards ±32° motion 
directions. This was indicated by shorter estimation reaction times and better detection at ±32°, as 
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well as attractive biases towards ±32° and reduced estimation variability at ±32°. Moreover, when 
no stimulus was presented, participants sometimes still reported seeing the stimulus, mostly around 
±32°. Performance was best explained by a simple Bayesian model, which provided a good fit to 
the data and captured the characteristic features of perceptual bias and variability. This model 
provided estimates of Bayesian priors and sensory likelihoods for each participant, which were 
then analyzed in relation to participants’ schizotypal and autistic traits. 
 
Schizotypal traits were found to have no measurable effect on perceptual biases in our task and, 
therefore, were not associated with any differences in the precision ascribed to priors and 
likelihoods. This finding challenges recent accounts of positive symptoms of schizophrenia that 
predict impaired updating of priors and an imbalance in precision ascribed to sensory information 
and prior expectations 1-3. An immediate explanation might be that the influence of schizotypal 
traits in the healthy population is not strong enough to lead to behavioral differences, even if the 
dimensionality assumption holds. This would need to be addressed by further research 
investigating clinical populations. Another possibility is that the aberrant perception subconstruct 
of schizotypal traits, for which we did not acquire explicit measures, is more relevant for the 
hypothesized effects then the entire construct as a whole. For example, a recent study by Powers et 
al3 1  found that overweighing of perceptual priors was specifically linked to hallucinatory 
propensity and not to the diagnostic status of psychosis itself.  Furthermore, Teufel et al.16 also 
found that stronger influence of prior knowledge was primarily associated with hallucinatory 
propensity and not with delusional propensity (i.e. the latter had no significant effects once the 
former was partialed out).  Another possible difference between Teufel et al.16 study and ours 
might be the level at which the priors operate. In Teufel et al.16, participants were presented with 
ambiguotwo-tone versions of images before and after seeing the actual images in full color and had 
to report whether the presented two-tone image contains a face. The low-level prior for basic 
perceptual features (as induced in our task) might function at a hierarchically lower level than prior 
knowledge related to complex collection of features and semantic content (faces). The level at 
which prior expectations are induced has indeed been shown to matter. A series of studies by 
Schmack et al.17, 27, 28 using 3D rotating cylinders report weaker low-level (perceptually-induced - 
stabilizing) priors but stronger high-level (cognitively-induced) priors in both schizophrenia and 
schizotypal traits. It is difficult to compare and reconcile these findings with ours. One possibility 
is that the priors induced in our task lie in between their perceptual and cognitive levels. The 
taxonomy of priors in relation to their place in the computational hierarchy or to their complexity 
or specificity is still far from being established 32 and thus the potential relevance of such 
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distinctions is still not known. 
 
Autistic traits were associated with significant behavioral differences: weaker biases and lower 
variability of direction estimation on low contrast trials. Modeling revealed that this was because of 
increased sensory precision as well as higher motor precision, while there was no attenuation of 
acquired priors. Parameter recovery analysis confirmed that our methodology provides reliable 
parameter estimates and, in particular, allows disentangling variations in priors and likelihoods.  
 
Autistic traits were also found to be associated with less false detections (hallucinations) on trials 
when no stimulus was presented, consistent with the idea that prior expectations had less influence 
in individuals with higher AQ. In an attempt to measure those individual differences, we fitted a 
more sophisticated Bayesian model that could account not only for the estimation performance but 
also for the detection data (see Appendix 2). This model provided a good fit to both estimation 
and detection data and preserved the correlation between ASD traits and the precision of the 
motion direction likelihood (r = -0.202, p = 0.029). However, parameter recovery was not as good 
as for the BAYES model presented above (see Appendix 2 – Figure 3) and for this reason we 
focused on the simpler model in this paper.  
 
Overall, our findings are in agreement with most of the recent Bayesian theories of ASD, namely, 
that autistic traits are associated with a relatively weaker influence of prior expectations. However, 
we find that this is due to enhanced sensory precision 6, 7, 10, 13, rather than attenuated priors per se 4. 
Other empirical studies inspired by the Bayesian accounts have reported either attenuated or intact 
priors, but most are subject to methodological limitations, either because they did not use 
computational modeling 15, 22,-24 or because their model could not extract likelihoods and quantify 
their variations 14, 26.  
 
The idea that sensory processing could be enhanced in autism has long been proposed outside the 
Bayesian framework. Autistic traits have been associated with enhanced orientation discrimination 
33, but only for first-order (luminance-defined) stimulus 34. This enhancement has been proposed to 
be a result of either enhanced lateral 34, or a failure to attenuate sensory signals via top-down gain 
control 6, both of which could be directly related to narrower likelihoods in the Bayesian 
framework35. However, in motion perception, previous research did not find improved 
discrimination for first-order stimulus in autism, while for second-order (texture-defined) stimulus, 
the autistic group was found to underperform 36. Our findings challenge these results and call for 
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more research in this area.   
 
In ASD as in schizotypy, prior integration might function differently at different levels of sensory 
processing. For example, Pell et al.23 reported intact direction-of-gaze priors for healthy individuals 
with high autistic traits and for highly functional individuals with a clinical diagnosis. The authors 
did not directly investigate differences in sensory precision, but the lack of behavioral differences 
suggests that there was none. Arguably, their paradigm involves more complex stimuli than used in 
our task, which are also strongly associated with semantic content (faces). It would not be 
surprising if increased sensory precision does not extend to such stimuli. In fact, autistic 
individuals are known to exhibit differential performance based on the complexity of the stimulus 
34, which also lies at the foundation of some theoretical accounts, such as the ‘Weak Central 
Coherence’ 37. 
 
In our paradigm people acquire prior expectations very quickly, within 200 trials (see Appendix 1), 
which did not allow us to study individual differences in the rate at which the priors are acquired. 
Bayesian accounts predict differences in the dynamical updating of the priors, namely, that both 
autistic and schizotypal traits should be associated with increased learning rate - which is the 
ratio of likelihood and posterior precisions 7. Our findings of increased sensory precision in 
autistic traits also suggest that their learning rate should be faster. However, this prediction might 
need to be more nuanced for volatile environments when there are multiple (hierarchical) levels of 
uncertainty that need to be updated simultaneously. A recent study by Lawson et al.26 found that 
when transitioning from stable to volatile environments, autistic adults showed larger change in the 
learning rate about volatility and smaller change in the learning rate about the environmental 
probabilities, while the average learning rates were found to not be different from those of controls.   
 
Another aspect that our paradigm could not test is the specificity of the acquired priors 32. Some 
Bayesian accounts 5 predict that priors may be overly context-sensitive in autism. This is in line 
with the view that generalization is impaired in autism 38. Furthermore, such over-specificity is 
thought to be stronger with more repetitive stimuli 39. Future research could address this using 










We investigated statistical learning and Bayesian inference in a visual motion perception task 
along autistic and schizotypal traits. To our knowledge, this study is the first to investigate 
differences in Bayesian inference along both trait spectra in a single task. Furthermore, this 
study is the first visual study to computationally disentangle and quantitatively assess the 
variations in individuals’ likelihoods and priors. Surprisingly, schizotypal traits were found to 
have no effect on task performance and thus were not associated with any differences in the 
underlying statistical learning and Bayesian inference. For autistic traits, however, significant 
behavioral differences in prior integration were found, which were due to an increase in the 
precision of internal sensory representations in participants with higher AQ. Whether the current 







91 (47 females, 44 males, age range: 18-69) naïve participants with no motor disabilities and with 
normal (or corrected to normal) vision were recruited from the general population. We advertised 
for participants using posters and the internet across University of Edinburgh locations and other 
sites across Edinburgh. All participants gave informed written consent and received monetary 
compensation for participation. The study was approved by the University of Edinburgh School of 




ASD was assessed using 50-item version Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) 40, which is commonly 
used for assessing milder variants of autistic-like traits within the general population. Schizotypal 
traits were assessed using The Rust Inventory of Schizotypal Cognitions (RISC) 41. RISC is 
specifically developed to measure schizotypal traits in the general population. In addition, a sub-
group of 41 participants also completed Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ) 42. Finally, 
all participants were also asked to complete the Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Well-being Scale 
(WEMWBS)43 in order to control for potential depression-induced differences in performance 44. 





The visual stimuli were generated using Matlab Psychophysics Toolbox 45. Participants viewed 
the display in a dark room at a distance of 80-100cm. The stimuli consisted of a cloud of dots with 
a density of 2 dots/deg2
 
moving coherently (100%) at a speed of 9°/sec. Dots appeared within a 
circular annulus with minimum diameter of 2.2°
 
and maximum diameter of 7°. The stimuli were 
displayed on a Dell P790 monitor running at 1024×768 at 100 Hz. The display luminance was 





The task was developed previously in our laboratory 29. Participants have to: i) estimate the 
direction of coherently moving simple stimuli (dots) that are presented at low contrast levels 
(estimation task) and then ii) indicate whether they have actually perceived the stimulus or not 
(detection task). Since Chalk et al.29 had shown that the effects of acquired priors become 
significant within the first 200 trials, instead of two experimental sessions of 850 trials each as in 
the original study, we used a single session of 567 trials (lasting around 40 min). 
 
Each trial started by first displaying a fixation point (0.5°, 12.2 cd/m2) for 400 ms, after which a 
field of moving dots appeared along with an orientation bar (length 1.1°, width 0.03°, luminance 4 
cd/m2, extending from the fixation point). Initial angle of the bar was randomized for each trial. 
Participants had to estimate the direction of motion by aligning the bar (using a computer mouse) 
to the direction the dots were moving in, and by clicking the mouse button to validate their 
estimate. The display cleared when either the participant had clicked the mouse or when 3000ms 
had elapsed. On trials where no stimulus was presented, the bar still appeared for the estimation 
task to be completed.  
 
After a 200ms delay, the participants had to indicate whether they had actually detected the 
presence of dots in the estimation period (detection task). The display was divided into two parts 
by a vertical white line across the center of the screen, the left-hand side area reading "NO DOTS" 
and the right-hand side area reading "DOTS" (Fig. 2a). The cursor appeared in the center of the 
screen, and participants had to move it to the left or right and click to indicate their response. 
Immediate feedback for correct or incorrect detection responses was given by a cursor flashing 
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green or red, respectively. The screen was cleared for 400 ms before the start of a new trial. Every 
20 trials, participants were presented with feedback on their estimation performance in terms of 
average estimation error in degrees (e.g., "In the last 20 trials, your average estimation error was 
23°"). Every 170 trials (i.e. on three occasions) participants were given a chance to "have a short 






The stimuli were presented at four different levels of contrast: 0 contrast (no-stimulus trials), 2 
low levels contrasts and high contrast, randomly mixed across trials. There were 167 trials with 
no stimulus. The 2 low levels of contrast were determined using 4/1 and 2/1 staircases on 
detection performance 46. There were 243 trials following the 4/1 staircase and 90 trials 
following the 2/1 staircase. The remaining 67 trials were at high contrast, which was set to 3.51 
cd/m2
 
above the background luminance. 
 
For the two low contrast levels, there was a predetermined number of possible directions:  0°, 
±16°, ±32°, ±48°, and ±64°
 
with respect to a reference direction. The reference direction was 
randomized for each participant. For the 2/1 staircased contrasts, each predetermined motion 
direction was presented equally frequently. Unbeknownst to participants, stimuli at high and 4/1 




motion directions, resulting in 
a bimodal probability distribution (Fig. 1b). For the 4/1 staircase contrast level, the dots were 
moving at ±32°
 
in 173 (∼70%) trials and in all the other predetermined motion directions in the 
remaining 70 (∼30%) trials equally frequently. At the highest contrast level, 34 (∼50%) trials had 
the dots moving at ±32°
 
and the remaining 33 (∼50%) trials were at random directions (i.e. not 




Responses on high contrast trials were used as a performance benchmark to ensure that 
participants were performing the task adequately. The predefined inclusion criteria were: 1) at 
least 80% detection and 2) less than 30° root mean squared error of estimations. 8 out of 91 
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participants failed to satisfy at least one of the criteria and were excluded from further analysis 
(Appendix 1—Figure 1). 
 
Data analysis on the estimation of motion directions was performed on 4/1 and 2/1 staircased 
contrast levels only and only on trials where participants both validated their choice with a click 
within 3000 ms in the estimation part and clicked "DOTS" in the detection part. The first 170 
trials of each session were excluded from the analysis, as this was the upper limit for the 
convergence of the staircases to stable contrast levels (Appendix 1—Figure  2). 
 
After removing these trials, the luminance levels achieved by the 2/1 and 4/1 staircases were 
found to be considerably overlapping (Appendix 1—Figure 2). Therefore, the data for both of 
these contrast levels was combined for all further analysis.  
To account for random estimations (either accidental or intentional) that participants made on 
some trials, we fitted each participant’s estimation responses to the probability distribution: 
 
(1−α)·V(θ|µ,κ) + α,                                                                                             (2) 
 
Where α is the proportion of trials in which participant makes random estimates, and V(θ|µ,κ) is 
the probability density function for the estimated angle θ for von Mises (circular normal) 
distribution with the mean µ and precision κ. The parameters µ and κ of the von Mises distribution 
were determined by maximizing the likelihood of the distribution in Eq. (2) for each presented 
angle.  
To analyze the distribution of estimations in no-stimulus trials, we constructed histograms of 16
◦ 
size bins. These histograms were converted into probability distributions by normalizing over all 
motion directions. We analyzed the estimation distribution when participants reported seeing dots 
(clicked "DOTS") within no-stimulus trials. We interpreted these false alarms as a simple form of 











Bayesian models assume that participants combined a learned prior of the stimulus directions with 
their sensory evidence in a probabilistic manner. We first assume that participants make noisy 
sensory observations of the actual stimulus motion direction (θact), with a probability 
 
psens(θsens|θact) = V(θt, κsens).       (3) 
 
where θt itself varies from trial to trial around θact according to p(θt|θact) = V(θact, κsens). 
While participants cannot access the “true” prior, p(θ), directly, we hypothesized that they learned 
an approximation of this distribution, denoted pexp(θ). This distribution was parameterized as the 
sum of two von Mises distributions, centered on motion directions θexp and -θexp, and each with 
precision κexp : 
 
pexp(θ) = 0.5 [V (-θexp ,κexp) + V(θexp , κexp)]      (4) 
 
Combining these via Bayes’ rule gives a posterior probability that the stimulus is moving in a 
direction θ: 
 
ppost(θ|θsens) ∝ pexp(θ) · psens(θsens|θ)       (5) 
 
The perceived direction, θperc, was taken to be the mean of the posterior distribution (almost 
identical results would be obtained by using the maximum instead). Finally, we accounted for 
motor precision and a possibility of random estimates on some trials via: 
 
p(θest|θperc) = (1−α) · V(θperc, κm) + α,                             (6) 
 
where α is the proportion of trials in which participants make random estimates and κm is the motor 
precision. 
 
Increased exposure to some motion directions might not only give rise to prior expectations, but also 
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induce learning in the sensory likelihood function itself 47,52. Therefore, we fitted two more model 
variants: ’BAYES_var’ where κsens varied with the stimulus direction (i.e. it took five different 
values for each of the angles: 0°, ±16°, ±32°, ±48°, and ±64°) and ’BAYES_varmin’ where κsens 
was allowed to be different for ±32°
 
but was the same for all other directions.  
 
Response strategy models 
 
We wanted to test whether task behavior might be better explained by simple behavioral 
strategies. This class of models assumed that on trials when participants were unsure about the 
presented motion direction, they made an estimation based solely on prior expectations, while on 
the remaining fraction of trials they made unbiased estimates based solely on sensory inputs. The 
first model, ’ADD1’, assumed that estimations derived from prior expectations were simply 
sampled from a learnt expected distribution, pexp(θ) (see Chalk et al.29 and Appendix 2). The 
second model, ’ADD2’, was just as ’ADD1’ except when participants were unsure about the 
stimulus motion direction, instead of sampling from the complete learned probability distribution 
ranging from −180°
 
to +180°, they effectively truncated this distribution on a trial by trial basis 
and sampled from only one part of it, negative (−180°
 
to 0°) or positive (0°
 
to +180°), depending 
on which side of the distribution the actual stimulus occurred (see Chalk et al, 2010 and SI).  We 
also considered slight variations of the ‘ADD1’ and ‘ADD2’ models, denoted ‘ADD1_m’ and 
‘ADD2_m’ respectively. These were identical to ‘ADD1’ and ‘ADD2’ except from setting 1/κexp 
to zero; that is, on trials when perceptual estimates were derived only from expectations, they 




We used performance in high contrast trials to estimate motor precision, κm, for each individual. We 
assumed that, for those trials, sensory uncertainty was close to zero. Motor precision was then 
determined by fitting estimation responses to the distribution in Eq. (2) by replacing µ with the 
actual motion direction, θact. The estimated motor precision was used in all subsequent model 
fitting as a fixed parameter. The rest of the free parameters were estimated by fitting the response 
data at the two low (staircased) contrast levels. For each model with a set of free parameters M, we 
computed the probability distribution p(θest|θact; M) of making an estimate θest given the actual 
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stimulus direction θact. For the response strategy models, by definition, the p(θest|θact; M) 
corresponds to average behavior in the task.  
 
The parameters were estimated by maximizing the fit of the log likelihood function for the 
experimental data for each participant individually. The maximum likelihood was found using a 
simplex algorithm, using fminsearchbnd Matlab function. To avoid convergence at a local 
maximum we constructed a grid of initial κexp and κsens parameter values covering the range 





To compare the model fits we used Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), which approximates 
the log of model evidence 48 : 
 
−2 · log(P (D|M )) ≈ BIC = −2 · log(P (D|M, Θ̂ )) + k · log(n),                         (7) 
 
where M is model, D is observed data and P (D|M, Θ̂ ) is the likelihood of generating the 
experimental data given the most likely set of parameters, Θ̂ ; k is the number of model 
parameters and n is the number of data points (or equivalently, the number of trials). BIC evaluates 
the model by how it fits the data by also penalizing for model complexity (number of parameters); 




To determine whether the BAYES model can distinguish the effects of strong likelihoods from 
those of weak priors 10, 11 and to evaluate the robustness of our methods, we performed parameter 
recovery. First, we generated 80 sets of parameters (i.e. 80 synthetic individuals) by randomly 
sampling each parameter from a Gaussian distribution centered on the mean value of each 
parameter found in our sample (40°
 
for θexp, 15° 
 
for σexp, 10° for σsens, 0.06 for α and 10°
 
for 
σmotor). Second, for each set of parameters, we simulated data for 200 trials with the Bayesian 
model by randomly sampling from the estimation probability distribution. We used 200 simulated 
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trials only, to match the empirical data (200 corresponds to the amount of experimental trials used for 
fitting, after excluding high contrast and zero contrast trials).1 Finally, we fitted the BAYES model 
to the simulated data. To evaluate the goodness of recovered parameters, we computed Pearson’s 




Due to the presence of outliers in many of the measures, we used robust regression techniques for  
measuring the presence and strength of the effects in our data. This was done using robustfit 
function in Matlab, which downweighs the influence of outliers in proportion to their distance 
from the regression line, which is computed via iteratively reweighted least squares (IRLS)53. For 
the loss function we used Huber function54 with a tuning constant of 1.345, which corresponds to 
95% estimator efficiency as compared to ordinary least squares.  
 
Furthermore, we applied Bonferroni correction for multiple testing based on the number of 
independent hypotheses that we tested; that is, whether two personality traits, ASD and 
schizotypy, were associated with the two variables of interest, acquired priors and sensory 
likelihoods, - this resulted in 4 different hypotheses. Note that while the number of null hypothesis 
significance tests that we performed exceeds this number, the tests within each set concerning the 
same hypothesis were not independent (each test was based on derivative and/or correlated values 
to those in the other tests within the same set), and thus would not have met the independence 
assumption on which Bonferroni correction is based.  
 
Finally, due to the limitations of frequentist statistics for accepting the null hypothesis, we 
performed Bayesian correlation analysis and computed Bayesian Factors55 for the null hypothesis 
(BF01). This was done using JASP56 (Version 0.8.6). Due to the presence of outliers, this analysis 





1 Simulating more trials would result in a better parameter recovery but the results would no longer be 
informative about the reliability of parameters estimated from empirical data. 
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In order to ensure that participants performed adequately in the psychophysical task, we used 
predetermined performance criteria for inclusion into the study. Firstly, participants were required 
to detect the motion stimuli on more than 80% of trials with the high contrast motion stimuli and 
also make active estimates of the motion directions by clicking the mouse. Secondly, their average 
estimation performance on the high contrast stimuli had to be within 30° of the correct angle. 8 
out of 91 participants failed to satisfy at least one of the criteria: 2 participants did not satisfy the 
first criteria, 4 did not satisfy the second criteria and 2 did not satisfy both of the criteria 




Appendix 1—Figure 1. Task performance at the highest contrast level and exclusion Criteria. 
Left panel: fraction of detected high contrast trials - quantified as the fraction of trials in which 
participants both validated their choice with a click within 3000 ms in the estimation part and 
reported seeing dots (clicked "DOTS") in the detection part. Right panel: root mean square error 
of estimations on high contrast trials. The dashed lines represent minimum performance criteria 
(more than 80% detection and less than 30◦ RMS error of estimations). Excluded participants are 









Staircased stimulus contrast levels 
 
Appendix 1—Figure 2 describes the average convergence of the contrast staircases. Two groups 
comprising our sample performed the task at different background contrast levels. For a subgroup 
of 50 participants (left panel), the background luminance was set to 1.16 cd/m2 for the other sub-
group of 41 (right panel) it was set to 5.18 cd/m2 For both groups, contrast staircases converged 
after 170 trials for both intermediate contrast levels, denoted with the vertical dashed line. In both 
groups, 2/1 and 4/1 staircased contrasts were considerably overlapping: on average 2/1 being 
0.20±0.04 cd/m2 and 4/1 being 0.22±0.04 cd/m2 above the 1.16 cd/m2 background luminance; and 
on average 2/1 being 0.42±0.05 cd/m2 and 4/1 being 0.46±0.05 cd/m2 above the 5.18 cd/m2 




Appendix 1—Figure 2. Population averaged stimulus contrast relative to the background contrast 
for the 2/1 (red) and 4/1 (black) staircased contrast levels. Standard deviation is denoted by 
shaded areas with corresponding colors. The vertical dashed line marks 170 trials. Left panel: 44 
participants (remaining after exclusion) that performed the task with the background luminance 
set to 1.16 cd/m2. Right panel: 39 participants (remaining after exclusion) that performed the task 
with the background luminance set to 5.18 cd/m2. 
 
 
Combining the different background luminance levels 
 
 
To compare the two sub-groups that performed the task at different background luminance levels, 
we performed Wilcoxon two-tailed rank sum test for all of the behavioral measures and none of 
them indicated any differences: mean absolute estimation bias (z = 0.652; ranksum = 1920; p = 
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0.514), mean variance of estimations (z = -0.406; ranksum = 1803; p = 0.685), total number of 
hallucinations (z = 0.128; ranksum = 1862; p = 0.898) number of hallucinations within 8◦ of ±32◦ 
(z = 0.870; ranksum = 1943; p = 0.384), mean estimation reaction time (z = 0.479; ranksum = 
1901; p = 0.632). The two groups were therefore combined. 
 
Temporal emergence of the impact of expectations 
 
 
We investigated how many trials it took for the acquired prior effects to impact behavior. First, we 
looked at estimation reaction times (RT) and compared mean RT of each individual at ±32° with 
mean RT at all other directions; we compared cumulative moving averages at every 30 trials 
(Appendix 1—Figure 3). We found that it took less than 90 trials for RT at ±32◦  to become 




Appendix 1—Figure 3. Cumulative moving average of ratio of estimation reaction times at ±32° 
vs average reaction times at all other directions. Red bars indicate median values and blue bars 
indicate 25th and 75th percentiles. p-values indicate whether RTs at ±32° are significantly shorter 
than average RTs over all other directions (one-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test). 
 
Similarly, we looked at average detection performance and compared the fraction of trials in 
which stimulus was detected at ±32° with the mean fraction detected over all other presented 
directions; again, we compared cumulative moving averages at every 30 trials (Appendix 1—
Figure 4). We found that it took less than 90 trials for detection at ±32° to become significantly 
better than average detection over all other presented directions (Appendix 1—Figure 4 and p-
values within). 




Lastly, for trials where no stimulus was presented, we looked at how long it took participants to 
start hallucinating predominantly around ±32° as opposed to all other possible directions. This was 
quantified as a probability ratio prel: 
 prel = p(θest = ±32(±8)°) · Nbins , (1) 
 
where Nbins is the number of bins (23), each of size 16◦. This probability ratio would be equal to 1 
if participants were equally likely to estimate within 8° of ±32° as they were to estimate within 
other bins. Again, we computed cumulative moving mean at every 30 trials (Appendix 1—Figure 
5). For participants who did not report seeing dots at any direction within a given number of trials 
(i.e. zero total hallucinations) this probability ratio was undefined, therefore, those individuals 
were omitted from significance test at that point. We found that it took less than 210 trials for prel 
to become significantly larger than 1 (Appendix 1—Figure 5 and p-values within). 
 
 
Appendix 1—Figure 4. Cumulative moving average of ratio of fraction of detected stimuli at 
±32° vs average fraction detected at all other directions. Red bars indicate median values and blue 
bars indicate 25th and 75th percentiles. p-values indicate whether fraction detected at ±32° are 
significantly larger than average fraction detected over all other directions (one-tailed Wilcoxon 
signed rank test). 
 
 




Appendix 1—Figure 5. Cumulative moving average of ratio of fraction of detected stimuli at 
±32° vs average fraction detected at all other directions. Red bars indicate median values and blue 
bars indicate 25th and 75th percentiles. p-values indicate whether fraction detected at ±32° are 
significantly larger than average fraction detected over all other directions (one-tailed Wilcoxon 
signed rank test). 
 
 
Schizotypy traits and task performance 
 
Appendix 1—Figure 6 and Appendix 1—Figure 7 show task performance by groups which 
were formed by splitting the sample on the median RISC and SPQ scores respectively. Appendix 
1—Figure 8 shows the correlations between RISC and SPQ scores and the corresponding 















Appendix 1—Figure 6. Average group performance on low-contrast trials (a-d) and on trials 
with no stimulus (e) by groups split by median RISC score. (a) Mean estimation bias, (b) standard 
deviation of estimations, (c) estimation reaction time and (d) fraction of trials in which the 
stimulus was detected. (e) Distribution of hallucinations. The vertical dashed lines correspond to 
the two most frequently presented motion directions (±32°). Error bars and shaded areas represent 
within-subject standard error. 
 
 
Appendix 1—Figure 7. Average group performance on low-contrast trials (a-d) and on trials 
with no stimulus (e) by groups split by median SPQ score. (a) Mean estimation bias, (b) standard 
deviation of estimations, (c) estimation reaction time and (d) fraction of trials in which the 
stimulus was detected. (e) Distribution of hallucinations. The vertical dashed lines correspond to 
the two most frequently presented motion directions (±32°). Error bars and shaded areas represent 
within-subject standard error. 




Appendix 1—Figure 8. Correlations between personality traits, RISC (top row) and SPQ (bottom 
row) and task performance. There were no significant correlations with any of the measures: mean 
absolute bias (left column), mean estimation variability (middle column) and total number of 
hallucinations (right column). Robust correlation coefficients and p-values are indicated above 
each plot. The blue lines denote robust regression.  
 
Schizotypy traits and model parameters 
 
Appendix 1—Figure 9 shows the robust correlation analysis results between the BAYES model 
parameter estimates and schizotypy scores. There was no significant correlation with any of the 
parameters. Further Bayesian correlation analysis provided positive evidence that schizotypy traits 
had no effect on prior precision (RISC: τb = -0.012, BF01 = 6.90; SPQ: τb = 0.071, BF01 = 3.97). 
 




Appendix 1—Figure 9. Correlations with the BAYES model parameter values and schizotypy 
traits (as measured by both RISC and SPQ). First column: θexp - mean of the prior expectations, 
second column: σexp - uncertainty of the prior distribution, third column: σsens - uncertainty in the 
sensory likelihood and fourth column: α - fraction of random estimations. Robust correlation 
coefficients and p-values are indicated above each plot. The blue lines denote robust regression. 
 
Individual priors recovered via BAYES model 
Appendix 1—Figure 10 shows a representative sample of the priors we extracted for a number of 
individuals, using the ‘BAYES’ model. 
 
Appendix 1—Figure 10. A representative sample of prior expectations for each individual as 
reconstructed via ‘BAYES’ model. The dashed lines correspond to the two most frequently 
presented motion directions (±32°). 
 





Response bias models 
 
 
We wanted to account for the possibility that the task behavior might be better explained by 
simple behavioral strategies. This class of models assumed that on trials when participants were 
unsure about the presented motion direction they made an estimation based solely on prior 
expectations, while on the remaining fraction of trials they made unbiased estimates based solely 




The first model (‘ADD1’) assumed that when participants were unsure about which motion 
direction they had perceived, they made an estimate that was close to one of the two most 
frequently presented motion directions. In this model, on each trial, participants make a sensory 
observation of the stimulus motion direction, θobs. We parameterize the probability of observing 
the stimulus to be moving in a direction θobs by a von Mises (circular normal) distribution centered 
on the actual stimulus direction and with width determined by 1/κsens: 
  
 psens(θsens|θact) = V (θact, κsens) (3) 
 
On most trials, we assume that participants make a perceptual estimate of the stimulus motion 
direction (θperc) that is based entirely on their sensory observation so that θperc = θobs. However, on 
a certain proportion of trials, when participants are uncertain about whether a stimulus was present 
or not, they resort to their expectations by making a perceptual estimate that is sampled from a 
learned distribution, pexp(θ). For simplicity, we parameterize this distribution as the sum of two 
circular normal distributions, each with width determined by 1/κexp, and centered on motion 
directions −θexp and θexp, respectively. Finally, we accommodate for the fact that there will be a 
certain amount of noise associated with moving the estimation bar to indicate which direction the 
stimulus is moving in as well as allowing for a fraction of trials α, where participants make 
estimates that are completely random. Thus, the estimation response θest is related to the perceptual 
estimate θperc via the equation: 
 
 p(θest|θperc) = (1−α) ∗ V (θperc, κm) + α. (4) 




Bringing all this together, the distribution of estimation responses for a single participant is given 
by: 
 
 p(θest|θact) = (1−α)[(1-a(θ))pl(θobs = θest|θact) + a(θ)pexp(θest)] ∗ V (0, κm) + α. (5) 
 
where the asterisk denotes a convolution and a(θ) determines the proportion of trials that 
participants sampled from the expected distribution, pexp(θ). The resulting ‘ADD1’ model has 9 
free parameters θexp, kexp, a(θ) (which can take a different value for each of the 5 angles: 0°, ±16°, 




The second model, ‘ADD2’, was just as ‘ADD1’ except that it had slightly more complex strategy 
for trials when participants were unsure about the stimulus motion direction: instead of sampling 
from the complete learned probability distribution ranging from −180◦ to +180◦ (Eq. (11)), they 
effectively truncated this distribution on a trial by trial basis and sampled from only one part of it, 
negative (−180 to 0◦) or positive (0 to +180◦), depending on which side of the distribution the 
actual stimulus occurred. Incorporating this into the distribution of estimation responses gives:  
 
p(θest|θact) = (1−α)[(1-a(θ)-b(θ))pl(θobs = θest|θact) + a(θ)pexpN(θest) + b(θ)pexpP(θest)] ∗ V (0, κm) + α 
, (6) 
 
where asterisk (∗) denotes convolution; a(θ) and b(θ) determine the proportion of trials in which 
participants sample from either anticlockwise or clockwise distributions pexpN(θ) and pexpP(θ), 
respectively. 
 
In addition, we also considered slight variations of the ‘ADD1’ and ‘ADD2’ models, denoted 
‘ADD1_m’ and ‘ADD2_m’ respectively. These were identical to ‘ADD1’ and ‘ADD2’ except 
from setting 1/κexp to zero; that is, on trials when perceptual estimates were derived only from 
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Non-symmetric prior models 
 
 
The stimulus distribution is multimodal and symmetric. Learning such a distribution might be 
inherently difficult. We reasoned that some individual differences might lie in asymmetries of the 
acquired priors. Therefore, we explored an alternative parameterization of the acquired priors 
which allowed them to be asymmetrical. We allowed the two modes in the prior to have different 
position with respect to 0◦ and to have different amount of probability associated with each mode. 
This resulted in: 
   pexp(θ) = (1 − π) · V (θp,κexp) + π · V (θn,κexp)    (2) 
where π (∈ [0 1]) is a mixing parameter. Using this parameterization we fitted ‘BAYES’ model as 
described in the main text (thus, we denoted this alternative model as ‘BAYES_π’). The 
alternative parameterization did not result in a better BIC as compared to ‘BAYES’ model (p = 
0.378, signed rank test). In addition, we performed parameter recovery to determine how robust 
‘BAYES_π’ is and found that recovering the mixing parameter π was not very reliable (r=0.4), 
although other parameters retained most of their previous reliability (Appendix 2—Figure 1). We 









Appendix 2—Figure 1. Comparison of actual and recovered parameters via ‘BAYES_π’ model. 
θp and θn - positive and negative modes of the bimodal distribution of prior expectations, σexp - 
uncertainty of the prior distribution, σsens uncertainty in the sensory likelihood, α - fraction of 
random estimations, π - mixing parameter responsible for the degree of bimodality. Actual 
parameters are scattered along x-axis and recovered parameters are scattered along y-axis. The 
dashed diagonal line is a reference line indicating perfect parameter recovery. Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients are indicated above each plot. 
 
 
Full models (estimation + detection) 
 
 
We have built a Bayesian model that incorporates both estimation and detection performance 
(‘BAYES_full’) in order to fully account for the task behavior. This time, the acquired priors 
consisted of both the expectations about the direction of stimuli motion (θ) and the expectations 
about whether stimulus is presented (s=1) or not (s=0). It was parameterized as: 
 
 
where parameter b accounts for a participant’s average expectation that the stimulus will be 
presented. Thus, we assumed that expectations about motion direction were uniform for when no 
stimulus was expected. While the expectations about motion direction when the stimulus was 
expected followed the bimodal probability distribution just as in the previous models. 
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On each trial, given the presented motion direction (θact) and the presence of the stimulus (s), 
participants made sensory measurements psens(θsens,ssens|θact,s). For simplicity, we assumed that the 
sensory probability of whether the stimulus was present (psens(ssens|θact,s)) was independent of the 
sensory input about the motion direction (psens(θsens|θact,s)). We further assumed that ssens was 
independent of the presented motion direction θact, as informed by ‘BAYES_var’ model (that 
allowed the sensory likelihood to vary based on the presented motion direction), which did not 
produce a better fit. As before, the mean of the motion direction was allowed to fluctuate on trial-
by-trial basis, such that: 
 
 p(θ|θact) = V (θact,κsens) , (7) 
 
where κsens is sensory precision. Given the estimate of the mean θ, the sensory input θsens is 
represented with the associated uncertainty via: 
 
 psens(θsens|θ) = V (θ,κsens) . (8) 
 
Putting all this together, the sensory likelihood was expressed as: 
 
 psens(θsens,ssens|θ,s) = psens(θsens|θ,s)p(ssens|s) , (9) 
 




where we assumed that sensory likelihood is uniform when no stimulus is presented. Finally, 
psens(ssens|s) was parameterized as: 
 
 
where parameter c is the average probability of detecting dots when they are not presented, and 
parameter ’d’ is the average probability of detecting dots when they are presented. Putting 
together prior and likelihood, the resulting posterior probability distribution becomes: 
 
 ppost(θ,s|θsens,ssens) α psens(θsens|θ,s) · psens(ssens|s) · pexp(θ,s) . (10) 
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With a given posterior participants could have performed detection task at least in two ways. One 
way is to maximize the posterior (i.e. to always choose the value of s that has higher probability): 
 sperc = argmax [ppost(s|θsens,ssens)] (11) 
 





where η ∈ [0 1] and is drawn for each trial from a uniform distribution. We considered both of 
these possibilities and implemented a variant of the model for each. Finally, just as in ‘BAYES’ 




As previously, we accounted for motor precision and the lapse responses via: 
 p(θest|θperc) = (1 − α) · V (θperc,κmotor) + α · pexp(θ) ∗ V (0,κmotor) . (13) 
 
In total, ‘BAYES_full’ model had 7 free parameters. To fit the model, in addition to intermediate 
contrast trials, we also used no-stimulus trial data. The rest of the fitting procedure was the same 
as in the main text: we built a distribution of 1,000 posterior estimations for each presented angle 
and one more distribution of 1,000 posterior estimations for no stimulus trials. 
 
We found that ‘BAYES_full’ provided a good fit and captured the main features of both 
estimation and detection performance (Appendix 2—Figure 2). As before, to test how reliable 
parameters estimated for ‘BAYES_full’ model are, we performed parameter recovery. Just as for 
‘BAYES’ parameter recovery described in the main text, we generated 80 sets of parameters and 
simulated 200 trials of data with ‘BAYES_full’ model for each of them. Then we fitted 
‘BAYES_full’ to the simulated data. The results revealed that parameters ’d’ and ’c’ had very 









Appendix 2—Figure 2. Task performance as predicted by the BAYES_full model. Left panel: 
mean estimation bias at different motion directions. Middle panel: standard deviation of 
estimations at different motion directions. Right panel: fraction of detected stimuli at different 
motion directions. The dashed lines correspond to the two most frequently presented motion 




Appendix 2—Figure 3. Comparison of actual and recovered parameters via ‘BAYES_full’ 
model. θexp - the mean of prior expectations of motion direction, σexp - uncertainty of the prior 
expectations of motion direction, σsens - uncertainty in the sensory likelihood, α - fraction of 
random estimations, b - prior expectation for dots being presented, c likelihood of detecting the 
dots when they are not presented, d - likelihood of detecting the dots when they are presented. 
Actual parameters are scattered along x-axis and recovered parameters are scattered along y-axis. 
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Perceptual Bayesian inference in
people with SCZ diagnosis
This chapter includes a postprint of a published journal article: Valton, V.,
Karvelis, P., Richards, K. L., Seitz, A. R., Lawrie, S. M., Seriès, P. (2019).
Acquisition of visual priors and induced hallucinations in chronic schizophrenia.
Brain. 142(8), 2523-2537.
Vincent Valton and I co-first authored this paper as this project had been
started during Vincent’s PhD - a preliminary analysis can be found in his thesis
(Valton, 2014). Since then, the project has been advanced in many ways. Firstly,
the sample size has gone up from 10 patients and 10 controls to 20 patients and
23 controls. Secondly, the current analysis employs more sophisticated statistical
methods: mixed ANOVA for simultaneously testing behavioral task effects and
group differences, Bayes factors for testing the null hypothesis and random effect
Bayesian model selection for model comparison. Thirdly, the current analysis
features a new winning computational model (a Bayesian model where lapse
estimations follow the acquired prior instead of being random), which provided a
unified explanation for group differences in different task conditions. Finally, the
60
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current analysis also includes parameter recovery of the winning model, which
demonstrates the reliability of the modelling results. All of the current analysis
and results were produced by me (except for power analysis and Supplementary
Figure 6, which were done by Vincent); however, they were accompanied by
multiple discussions and decisions made jointly by me, Vincent and the other
authors. The initial version of the paper was written by Vincent when reporting
the preliminary analysis of the results in 2014, while I updated the manuscript
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Prominent theories suggest that symptoms of schizophrenia stem from learning deficiencies 
resulting in distorted internal models of the world. To further test these theories, we here use 
a visual statistical learning task known to induce rapid implicit learning of the stimulus 
statistics (Chalk et al., 2010). In this task, participants are presented with a field of 
coherently moving dots and need to report the presented direction of the dots (estimation 
task) and whether they saw any dots or not (detection task). Two of the directions were more 
frequently presented than the others. In controls, the implicit acquisition of the stimuli 
statistics influences their perception in two ways: 1- motion directions are perceived as being 
more similar to the most frequently presented directions than they really are (estimation 
biases); 2- in the absence of stimuli, participants sometimes report perceiving the most 
frequently presented directions (a form of hallucinations). Such behaviour is consistent with 
probabilistic inference, i.e. combining learnt perceptual priors with sensory evidence. We 
investigated whether patients with chronic, stable, treated schizophrenia (n=20) differ from 
controls (n=23) in the acquisition of the perceptual priors and/or their influence on 
perception. We found that, although patients were slower than controls, they showed 
comparable acquisition of perceptual priors, correctly approximating the stimulus statistics. 
This suggests that patients have no statistical learning deficits in our task. This may reflect 
our patients relative wellbeing on antipsychotic medication. Intriguingly, however, patients 
made significantly fewer hallucinations of the most frequently presented directions than 
controls and fewer prior-based lapse estimations. This suggests that prior expectations had 
less influence on patients’ perception than on controls when stimuli were absent or below 
perceptual threshold.  
 
Keywords: Schizophrenia, Inference, Statistical Learning, Hallucinations 
 
  






An increasingly popular idea in neuroscience is that perception and decision-making can be 
well described in terms of probabilistic inference processes (Knill and Pouget, 2004; Fiser et 
al., 2010; Friston, 2010; 2012). For example, statistical and perceptual learning studies show 
that the perceptual systems continuously extract and learn statistical regularities of the 
environment (for a review in visual perception, see e.g. Seriès and Seitz, 2013). This learning 
results in the construction of internal models of the environment, or expectations, which are 
used automatically and unconsciously to predict and disambiguate perceptual inputs in 
situations of uncertainty and to guide decisions.   
 
In this context, it has been proposed that psychiatric disorders in general, and schizophrenia in 
particular, might be explained in terms of deficits in probabilistic inference (Friston, 2005; Frith 
and Friston, 2012; Adams et al., 2013; Jardri and Denève, 2013, for reviews see: Friston et al. 
2016; Valton et al., 2017; Sterzer et al 2018). Impaired statistical learning and/or inference 
deficits would lead to distorted internal models of the world, which could then explain the 
existence of abnormal beliefs or delusions experienced by patients with schizophrenia. 
Incorrect perceptual inference may also lead to severe forms of illusions and result in the 
complex hallucinations that are part of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia.  
 
Two different lines of research support this general idea. First, a number of studies using 
explicit probabilistic learning tasks, such as the “beads task” report that patients with 
schizophrenia show a deficit in integrating probabilistic information resulting in faster 
responses than control subjects, an effect called the ‘jumping-to-conclusions’ bias (Huq et al., 
1988; Speechley et al., 2010; Averbeck et al., 2011; Evans et al., 2012). Interestingly, patients 
with stronger delusional symptoms fare worse at the task than those who do not (Huq et al., 
1988; Speechley et al., 2010), and control subjects displaying delusional ideation also show 
similar impairments at the task (Freeman et al., 2008), suggesting a link between delusions and 
probabilistic inference (Garety et al., 2013; Garety and Freeman 2013). Second, patients with 
schizophrenia do not experience visual illusions in the same way as controls do. For example, 
patients are less susceptible to certain visual illusions such as the hollow-mask illusion (Dima 




et al., 2009; 2010;  Keane et al., 2013; for review see: Silverstein and Keane 2011a; 2011b; 
Notredame et al., 2014). This suggests that they either have different implicit expectations 
about the environment (i.e. they would not have such a strong expectation that faces are 
convex) or that these expectations do not affect patients’ perception in the same way as 
observed in controls. 
 
A few studies have recently tried to test the impaired Bayesian inference hypothesis more 
directly, but the findings are mixed. Teufel et al. (2015) found that early psychosis and 
schizotypal traits were associated with an increased influence of prior knowledge when 
disambiguating two-tone images. Powers et al. (2017) also reported an increased perceptual 
prior influence in experimentally-induced hallucinations in both patients and controls with 
higher propensity to hallucinatory experiences. Interestingly, however, a series of studies by 
Schmack et al. (2013; 2015; 2017) found an increased influence of cognitive priors on the 
perception of bi-stable stimuli in participants with schizotypal traits and clinical schizophrenia, 
but showed on the contrary a decreased influence of perceptual priors, suggesting that the level 
at which the prior operates in the inference hierarchy might lead to differential effects. Finally, 
Jardri et al. (2017) investigated probabilistic reasoning and found schizophrenia patients to be 
over-counting sensory evidence and under-weighting priors, which they described using a 
circular inference model. Together these findings paint a complicated picture of Bayesian 
inference in schizophrenia where priors can have either increased or decreased influence 
depending on the task, the stimulus and the type of priors involved (e.g. low-level perceptual 
prior vs. high-level cognitive prior).  
 
A general limitation of these studies however, is that it is typically unclear to what extent the 
effects are driven by deficits in statistical learning (i.e. forming and updating the priors) or 
impaired inference per se. Moreover, past studies were usually only qualitatively comparing the 
behavioural results they collected with the proposed Bayesian theories. 
 
To address these issues, we simultaneously investigated the implicit acquisition of priors, how 
these priors are integrated with sensory information and the influence they have on perception 
when stimulus is absent (i.e. experimentally induced hallucinations) in patients with 
schizophrenia. We used a previously developed statistical learning task (Chalk et al., 2010; 




Gekas et al., 2013; Karvelis et al., 2018) that is known to induce the rapid acquisition of the 
statistics of motion stimuli. In this task, participants need to report the direction of motion of a 
cloud of dots (estimation task) and whether they have perceived the dots or not (detection task; 
on some trials no stimulus is presented). Unbeknownst to the participants, two directions of 
motion are more frequently presented than others. Participants implicitly and unconsciously 
learn those stimulus statistics. This learning influences perception such that: 1) motion stimuli 
are perceived as being more similar to the most frequently presented stimuli than they really are 
(i.e. estimation biases); 2) participants sometimes report perceiving the most frequently 
presented stimuli in absence of visual stimuli (a form of hallucination). In previous work 
(Chalk et al (2010) Karvelis et al (2018)), we showed that Bayesian modelling could be applied 
to individual participants’ performances to quantitatively monitor their acquisition and use of 
the statistics of the stimuli (perceptual prior). We apply the same techniques in the current 
study to compare the perceptual priors acquired by patients with schizophrenia to those of 
controls.   
 
 




A sample of 25 (22 male) individuals with psychosis (diagnosed with either DSM-IV 
schizophrenia, n = 21; or schizoaffective disorder, n = 4), and 23 (13 male) controls with 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision were recruited. Patients were recruited from inpatient and 
outpatient adult mental health services across NHS Lothian. Diagnoses were determined using 
the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID-I; First, Gibbons, Spitzer, & Williams, 
2002). None of the control participants met DSM-IV criteria for a psychotic disorder, bipolar 
disorder, or schizotypal or schizoid personality disorder. Symptom severity was measured with 
the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) (Kay, Fiszbein, & Opler, 1987), current 
IQ with the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) and pre-
morbid IQ with the National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson, & Willison, 1991). All 
patients were medicated (85% on second generation anti-psychotics, 50% of these were also on 
mood stabilisers). The study was conducted in accordance with the national and international 




ethical standards for human experimentation and research (Declaration of Helsinki, 2013; Good 
Clinical Practice, 2014). All participants provided fully informed written consent. The study 
received ethical approval from the South East Scotland Research Ethics Committee 01 and 
NHS Lothian Research & Development. Following previous studies using the same paradigm 
(Chalk et al. 2010), we determined that 20 participants per group would give us ≥80% power to 
detect the correct acquisition of the prior and significance between groups (see power 
calculations in supplemental material). We thus aimed to recruit between 20-25 participant per 
group to account for possible exclusions due to poor performance at the task. 
 
Twenty patients and twenty three controls successfully performed the task (see below and 
Supplementary Figure 1 for exclusion criteria based on performance). The demographic 
details of the included participants are shown in Table 1.  It is of note that the patients all had 
relatively low levels of symptoms on the PANSS, but ongoing functional impairment.  
 
 





Gender (males) 13 17 0.04 
Age (years) 33.86 (12.08) 39.40 (9.43) 0.07 
Premorbid IQ 115.55 (4.41) 113.18 (8.76) 0.58 
Current IQ 117.45 (7.28) 111.15 (10.70) 0.06 
PANSS Positive Scale 8.86 (2.29) 12.55 (5.01) <0.01 
PANSSNegative Scale 8.41 (2.24) 12.20 (5.05) <0.01 
PANSS General Scale 22.27 (6.48) 26.10 (8.35) 0.12 
PANSS Total 39.55 (9.22) 50.85 (15.86) <0.01 
GAF 74.81 (11.42) 54.75 (14.36) <0.001 
OLZ eq. (mg/day) --- 12.61 (6.24) N/A 
Illness duration (years) --- 13.33 (9.01) N/A 
 
Table 1. Participants’ demographics. PANSS = Positive and Negative Symptom Scale (lower 
score is better): potential range is 7-49 for the Negative and Positive scales is, 16-112 for the 
General scale and 30-210 for the Total score. GAF = Global Assessment of Functioning 
(potential range 1-100; higher score is better), OLZ eq. = Olanzapine equivalent dosage in 
mg/day. Values indicate mean and (standard deviation). For gender, group comparisons were 
done using Chi-square test, for all other measures, two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test was used. 
See Table S1 and Supplementary Figure 6 for a more detailed description of the clinical 
characteristics.  





Apparatus,  Stimuli & Procedure 
 
The setup for this study was similar to that used by Chalk et al. (2010). Motion stimuli 
consisted of a field of dots with a density of 2 dots/deg2, moving coherently (100%) at a speed 
of 9°/s.  
 
Each trial was composed of two tasks arranged as follows (Fig. 1A): First, participants were 
presented with a fixation point (0.5° diameter) for 400 ms. With the fixation point still on-
screen, the motion stimulus (field of dots) was displayed along with a red bar extending from 
this fixation point. During the presentation of the field of dots, participants were required to 
estimate the direction of motion by aligning the red bar into the perceived direction of motion 
(Estimation task). The angle of this bar was randomized on each trial and participants were 
instructed to focus their gaze on the fixation point throughout the estimation task. The display 
then cleared when either the participant clicked the mouse to validate their choice (estimation) 
or 3000 ms had elapsed. After the estimation, a 200 ms delay was enforced before the detection 
screen was presented. The new screen was divided in two equal areas reading ‘Dots’ and ‘No 
Dots’, giving the participants a two-alternative forced choice (2-AFC). Participants were 
required to move the cursor to the right or the left to indicate whether they detected dots or not, 
and click to validate their choice (Detection task). The cursor then flashed green or red for 
correct or incorrect responses respectively. No time-outs were enforced during the detection 
task. Finally, the screen was cleared for 400 ms before a new trial began. Every 20 trials, 
participants were presented with feedback on their estimation performance in terms of average 





Participants completed 567 trials (i.e. lasting approximately 40 minutes vs. 850 trials lasting 60 
minutes in Chalk et al. 2010) with opportunities for breaks every 170 trials to prevent fatigue. 
Stimuli were presented at four different randomly interleaved contrast levels. The highest 
contrast level was 1.7 cd/m2 above the 5.2 cd/m2 background. There were 167 trials at zero 




contrast and 67 trials at high contrast. Contrasts of other stimuli were determined using a 4/1 
and 2/1 staircase on detection performance (García-Pérez, 1998). Throughout the experiment, 
there were 90 trials with the 2/1 staircase and 243 trials with the 4/1 staircase. On a given trial, 
the direction of motion for the two staircased contrast levels could either be 0°, ±16°, ±32°, 
±48°, and ±64° with respect to a central reference angle. This central reference angle was 
randomised for each participant.  
 
Unbeknownst to participants, we manipulated their expectations about which motion directions 
were most likely to occur by presenting stimuli moving at ±32° more frequently (resulting in a 
bimodal distribution, Fig. 1B). At the highest contrast level, 50% of trials were at ±32° and 





Figure 1: (A) Experimental procedure. Participants were presented with a fixation point 
followed by the motion stimulus and a response bar (red bar) that they were instructed to align 
to the perceived motion-direction. The screen was cleared either when participants clicked to 
validate their estimation or 3000 ms had elapsed. A new screen appeared with a two-alternative 
forced choice task (2-AFC), requiring participants to indicate whether they perceived the dots 
during the estimation task. (B) Probability distribution of the motion directions. Unbeknownst 
to participants, the distribution of motion direction was bimodal (i.e. stimuli appeared most 









Behavioural data analysis 
 
Performance on high contrast trials was used as an indicator of whether participants were 
performing the task adequately. Detection accuracy of at least 70% and estimation root mean 
square error (RMSE) of less than 30 degrees were the minimum criteria. All 23 controls met 
these criteria, while 5 out of 25 patients did not meet at least one of the criteria and thus were 
excluded from further data analysis (Supplementary Fig. 1). 
 
The main data analysis was performed on 2/1 and 4/1 staircased contrast levels and only on 
confirmed trials (i.e. trials where participants validated their choice with a click within 3000 ms 
in the estimation task and reported seeing dots in the subsequent detection task). The first 100 
trials were excluded from the analysis to allow the staircases to converge to stable contrast 
levels (Supplementary Fig. 2). After removing these trials, the luminance levels achieved by 
the 2/1 and 4/1 staircases were found to be overlapping (Supplementary Fig. 2), thus they 
were combined for all further analysis. Finally, since the distribution of presented directions 
was symmetrical around a central reference angle, the behavioural measures at equal absolute 
distance from the reference angle were averaged together.  
 
In the estimation task, the variance of participants' direction estimates was large. As in previous 
work (Chalk et al., 2010; Gekas et al., 2013), we hypothesized that this variability resulted 
from random estimations on a proportion of trials, thus increasing substantially the variance of 
motion-direction estimates. To account for this, we fitted the individual estimation responses to 
the following distribution: 
 
(1 − 𝛼) ∙ 𝑉(𝜇, 𝜎) +  𝛼 2𝜋⁄                                (1) 
 
where α is the proportion of estimations at random directions and V(μ, σ) is the circular normal 
(i.e. von Mises; Mardia, 1972) distribution with mean μ and width σ.  
 
In trials where no stimulus was presented, we reconstructed the probability distributions of 
participants' responses over motion directions using Kernel Density Estimation (Silverman, 
1986; Wand, 1994). The KDE is a non-parametric method used to estimate the probability 




density function from discrete measures of a continuous variable. To do so, a kernel that 
defines the form of the probability density function (e.g. von Mises kernel) was placed at each 
of the observed measurement. Then, all the individual kernels were summed to create the 
probability density function of the random variable (motion direction).  
 
To assess the effects of the acquired expectations in both groups and to simultaneously 
determine whether patients differed from controls, we performed 2-way ANOVA with motion 
direction as a within-subjects factor and group as a between-subjects factor; and Bonferroni 
post hoc tests for all pairwise comparisons. All analysis was done using SPSS version 24. To 
determine the strength of the evidence for the null hypothesis (i.e. finding no group difference 
vs. finding evidence that the groups are similar) we also report Bayes factors using the 
Bayesian statistical software package JASP. We report Kendall correlation coefficients 





To test for individual variability in the underlying perceptual inference and to obtain more 
direct measurements of the acquired expectations, we fitted a range of models to our data. The 
first class of models assumed that the biases were of a perceptual nature, as conceived in the 
Bayesian framework: sensory information is combined with a learned prior of the stimulus 
statistics in a probabilistic way. The simple ‘BAYES’ model assumed that the likelihood 
precision was constrained to be the same across all presented motion directions (corresponding 
to the hypothesis that there was no learning in the likelihood due to the distribution of the 
motion directions). An additional variant of the ‘BAYES’ model tested the hypothesis that 
lapse estimations were not completely random, but instead were made according to the 
acquired prior expectations. We call these responses ‘prior-based lapses’ (Fig. 4). This model 
was termed ‘BAYES_P’ and was otherwise equivalent to ‘BAYES’.  
 






Figure 4. Bayesian model of estimation response for a single trial. The actual motion direction 
(θactual) is corrupted by sensory uncertainty (σsensory), and then combined with prior expectations 
(mean θexpected and uncertainty σexpected) to form a posterior distribution. The perceived motion 
direction (θperceived) then corresponds to the mean of the posterior distribution. However, on a 
fraction of trials, determined by the lapse rate (αprior-based), the perceived motion direction is 
sampled form the prior. Finally, in both cases, the response (θestimated) is made by perturbing 
θperceived with motor noise (σmotor). This results in 4 free model parameters: σsensory, σexpected, 
θexpected and αprior-based. The motor noise (σmotor) is estimated from high contrast trials and is used 
as a fixed parameter. 
 
 
Another class of models assumed that task performance could be explained by response 
strategies that do not involve Bayesian integration (heuristic models). According to these 
models, on any given trial participants responses were based solely on either the prior 
expectations or sensory information. We considered four variations of response strategy models 
(see Methods and Supplementary information for details). Below we present the Bayesian 




Following the Bayesian framework, we assumed that participants combined sensory 
information (likelihood) with their expectations about the motion direction (prior) on every 
trial. The sensory likelihood of the observed motion direction (θsensory) was parameterised as a 
von Mises circular normal distribution with variance σsensory: 
 




plikelihood(θsensory|θ) = V (θ, σsensory)                                        (2) 
                              
The mean of this distribution depended on the actual presented motion direction (θactual), and to 
account for trial-to-trial variability it was drawn from another von Mises distribution centred on 
θactual with variance σsensory (i.e. V (θactual, σsensory)).  
 
We then hypothesized that participants acquire an approximation of the ‘true’ prior from 
experience (pprior), representing the participants’ expectations of motion directions. The 
acquired priors were parameterized as the sum of two von Mises circular normal distributions, 





 [V (−θexpected, σexpected) + V (θexpected, σexpected)]                    (3) 
 
Combining the prior and the likelihood gives us the posterior probability that the stimulus is 
moving in a direction θ: 
pposterior(θ|θsensory) ∝ plikelihood(θsensory|θ) · pprior (θ)                            (4) 
 
The perceived direction, θperceived, was taken to be the mean of the posterior distribution (almost 
identical results would be obtained by using the maximum instead).  
 
Finally, we accounted for motor noise (i.e. aligning and clicking the mouse) and lapse 
estimations, such that:  
 
p(θestimate|θperceived) = (1 − αprior-based) · V (θperceived, σmotor) + αprior-based · pprior(θ)           (5) 
 
 where σmotor is the motor noise and αprior-based is the proportion of prior-based lapse estimations 
on each trial (i.e. lapse estimations that follow the participants’ acquired expectations – 
pprior(θ)). That is we posited that when participants are shown a stimulus below their contrast 
threshold, it effectively becomes a no-stimulus trial, where participants might ‘hallucinate’ a 
stimulus at the most expected motion directions, sampling from their prior distribution 




(Laquitaine and Gardner 2018, see Fig. 7). We called this model ‘Bayes_P’ for Bayes with 
Prior-based lapses. 
 
Finally, we also tested variants of this model, where lapse estimations were uniformly 
distributed, rather than following the participants expectations (model ‘BAYES’), or that due to 
increased exposure to stimuli at specific angles, sensory uncertainty σsensory could vary across 
angles (0°, ±16°, ±32°, ±48°, ±64°; model ‘BAYES_var’), or that sensory uncertainty varied 
only at the most presented directions (model ‘BAYES_varmin’ – see Methods and 





Detection performances and contrast levels 
 
Participants’ detection performance was monitored to adapt the stimulus contrast to each 
participant’s just noticeable difference (JND, a measure of contrast sensitivity). Using 2/1 and 
4/1 staircases, we ensured that the individual detection performances would converge to 70.4% 
and 84.1% respectively (Levitt, 1971).  
 
Contrast staircases converged to stable luminance levels after about 100 trials for both groups 
(Supplementary Fig. 2); Controls converged to 0.41 cd/m2 (±0.03) for 2/1 staircase and 0.46 
cd/m2 (±0.03) for 2/1 staircase while patients converged to 0.57 cd/m2 (±0.04) for 2/1 staircase 
and 0.62 cd/m2 (±0.05) for 4/1 staircase. These results confirm previous findings (Skottun and 
Skoyles, 2007) suggesting that patients with schizophrenia display significantly poorer 
contrast-sensitivity in comparison to controls (2/1 staircase: Z = 3.15, p = 0.002; 4/1 staircase: 




First, we investigated whether participants acquired the statistics of the stimulus. To do so, we 
looked at patterns suggestive of statistical learning in each group, namely attractive biases 




towards the most frequent directions, decreased reaction times and improved detection 
performance for the most frequent directions (Fig. 2).  
 
 
Figure 2: Performance on low contrast trials by patients (blue lines) and controls (black lines). 
(A) Mean estimation bias as a function of the true motion direction. (B) Estimation standard 
deviation (i.e. variability) as a function of the presented of motion direction. (C) Lapse 
estimations as a function of motion direction, estimated using (eq. 1). (D) Reaction times 
during the estimation task as a function of motion direction. (E) The fraction of trials in which 
the stimulus was detected as a function of the presented motion direction. The error bars 
represent within-subject standard error. The vertical dashed lines correspond to the most 
frequently presented motion directions (i.e. ±32°). *, ** and *** indicate significance levels at 
p < 0.05, p < 0.01, and p < 0.001, respectively. These results are not affected by any violations 






To investigate whether the participants’ perceived motion-directions were biased, we measured 
the difference between the true motion direction and the motion direction reported by the 




participants. Fig. 2A displays the average estimation bias plotted against the true motion 
direction for each group. Overall, there was a significant effect of motion direction on the 
estimation bias (F(2.45, 100.52) = 15.37, p < 0.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.273, Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
ε = 0.613), but no differences between the groups (group main effect: F(1, 41) = 0.83, p = 
0.369, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.001; with moderate to substantial evidence for the null hypothesis, BF01 = 3.99); 
and no group*angle interaction (F(2.45, 100.52) = 1.64, p = 0.193, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  0.038).  Pairwise 
comparisons (with Bonferroni correction) revealed that there was an attractive bias towards 
±32° at ±48° and ±64° (MD = 4.858, p = 0.002; and MD = 14.395, p < 0.001, respectively), but 
not at ±16° (MD = 1.818, p = 0.955). Together, these results confirm that both patients and 
controls were biased towards perceiving motion directions as being more similar to the most 
frequently presented directions than they really were, consistent with having acquired the priors 
that approximate the statistics of the stimulus. 
  
We also investigated whether the effects of acquired prior expectations were reflected in the 
variability of estimations, namely a decrease of variability for the expected directions (Fig. 2B). 
We found a significant main effect of motion direction (F(3.07, 125.69) = 5.18, p = 0.002, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
0.112, Greenhouse-Geisser correction ε = 0.766), but no differences between the groups (main 
effect of group: F(1, 41) = 0.02, p = 0.880, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.001; with moderate to substantial evidence 
for the null hypothesis, BF01 = 3.74); and no group*angle interaction F(3.07, 125.69) = 1.58, p 
= 0.196, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  0.037). Pairwise comparisons showed that variability at 0° stood out the most, 
being significantly larger than at ±32° and ±48° (MD = 4.680, p = 0.012; and MD = 4.733, p = 
0.025, respectively), although not different than at ±16° and ±64° (MD = 3.044, p = 0.239 and 
MD = 2.990, p = 0.541). The increased variability in the region between the two modes reflects 
their conflicting influence on the percepts in this region.  
 
Finally, we analysed lapse estimations, which were captured by the ‘α’ term in Eq. (1) and 
which were assumed to arise from random responses on some of the trials (Fig. 2C). We found 
both motion direction and group main effects to be significant (F(4,164) = 5.76, p < 0.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
0.123 and F(1, 41) = 6.41, p = 0.015, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.135, respectively), with patients exhibiting fewer 
lapse estimations. Pairwise comparisons revealed that lapse rate at 0° was significantly smaller 
than at all other directions (±32°, MD = 4.814, p = 0.001; ±48°, MD = 6.010, p = 0.007; ±64°, 




MD = 4.951, p = 0.003), except for ±16° (MD = 3.043, p = 0.393). The finding that the 
estimated lapses would depend on the presented motion direction was surprising: if the lapses 
were completely random, we should observe no such dependence in the estimated values. We 
therefore postulated that when participants make guesses about the direction of motions, their 
estimations might be sampled from the distribution of the acquired prior expectations rather 
than uniformly. Later, we explicitly tested this possibility via computational modelling and 
found that it indeed was the case (see Modelling results).   
 
 
Reaction times and Detection Performance 
 
Next, we examined how participants’ acquired expectations influenced reaction times and the 
detection of stimulus. The estimation reaction times (Fig. 2D) show a significant main effect of 
motion direction (F(2.73,111.76) = 10.80, p < 0.001 𝜂𝑝
2= 0.209, Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
ε = 0.681). This was driven by decreased reaction times at the most frequent directions as 
revealed by pairwise comparisons: reaction time at ±32° was significantly shorter than at all 
other directions (0°, MD = 0.104, p = 0.001; ±16°, MD = 0.068, p = 0.004; ±64°, MD = 0.139, 
p < 0.001), except for  ±48° (MD = 0.027, p = 1.000). Furthermore, patients were found to also 
be significantly slower than controls (F(1, 41) = 4.11, p = 0.049, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.091), but we found no 
interaction between group and motion direction (F(2.73, 111.76) = 0.66, p = 0.563, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.016). 
Slow reaction time is a hallmark of schizophrenia that has been documented thoroughly in the 
literature in simple reaction-time tasks using visual and/or auditory stimuli (e.g., see 
Nuechterlein, 1977; Fioravanti et al., 2012).  
 
An even more direct way of assessing how the acquired expectations influenced the detection 
of stimulus is to analyse the fraction of trials where participants explicitly report seeing or not 
seeing the stimulus (Fig. 2E). We found that the detection of stimulus was greatly affected by 
the presented motion direction (F(2.36,96.64) = 8.51, p < 0.001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.172, Greenhouse-
Geisser correction ε = 0.589), with stimulus at ±32° being the most frequently detected 
direction as shown by pairwise comparisons: detection at ±32° was significantly better than at 
all other directions (0°, MD = 9.59, p = 0.004; ±16°, MD = 6.48, p = 0.001;  ±48°, MD = 6.54, 




p = 0.001; ±64°, MD = 12.35, p < 0.001). However, the groups were not found to be different 
(main group effect: F(1,41) = 3.62, p = 0.064, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.081; although there was no evidence for 
the null hypothesis either, BF01 = 0.97); group*motion direction interaction was also non-
significant: F(2.36,96.64) = 1.11, p = 0.340, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.026).  
 
Overall, these results indicate that, in terms of detection responses (hit rates and reaction-time), 
similar benefits of statistical learning were present in both patient and control groups. Overall, 
behavioural measures suggest that prior effects (e.g. Bias, RT, and Hit rate) became significant 




Perceived motion in absence of visual stimuli (hallucinations)  
 
Finally, we investigated whether the acquired statistics about the motion stimulus affected the 
participants’ perception on trials where no stimulus was presented, but where participants 
reported both a motion direction and seeing a stimulus. We refer to this effect as hallucinations. 
These hallucinations in our perceptual task are of course different in terms of content and 
complexity from the visual hallucinations observed in psychosis. However, the underlying 
mechanisms might be informative to the understanding of illusions and hallucinations in 
schizophrenia (Silverstein and Keane 2011a; 2011b; Notredame et al., 2014).  
 
To quantify the probability ratio that participants made estimates that were closer to the most 
frequently presented motion directions relative to other directions, we multiplied the probability 
that participants estimated within 16° of these motion-directions by the total number of 32° 
bins: 
𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 𝑝(𝜃𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 = ±32(±16)°) ∙ 𝑁𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑠                 (6) 
 
 
This probability would be equal to 1 if participants were equally likely to estimate within 16° of 
±32° as they are to estimate within the other 16° bins.  
 




We found that the median value of ‘pratio’ was significantly greater than 1 for both patients and 
controls (median(𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ) = 2.88, p = 0.003 and median(𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ) = 2.75, p <0.001, respectively; 
two-tailed signed-rank test), indicating that both patients and controls were much more likely to 
hallucinate the most frequent motion directions as opposed to all other directions (Fig. 3A, B). 
Bayesian statistical analysis provided moderate to substantial evidence for the groups being the 
same in this measure (BF01 = 3.32).  Finally, hallucinations of the most frequent directions (i.e. 
hallucinations at ±32°±16°) were quick to develop during the course of the experiment: they 
became significant after only 150 trials for both controls (p=0.036, one-tailed signed-rank test; 
Supplementary Fig. 3D) and patients (p=0.035, one-tailed signed-rank test; Supplementary 
Fig. 4D).  
 
While both patients and controls hallucinated predominantly towards the most frequently 
presented directions (i.e. prior-based hallucinations), patients exhibited fewer of such 
hallucinations (Fig. 3C; hallucinations within ±16º of ±32º; p = 0.016, two-sided rank-sum 
test), and also exhibited less hallucinations overall (Fig. 3D; p = 0.004, two-sided rank-sum 
test). We wanted to know whether the severity of the symptoms was predictive of the 
magnitude of this effect. However, we found no correlations between the number of 
hallucinations and the PANSS positive, negative, general or total scores nor duration of illness, 
or between the daily-dosage of anti-psychotics (Olanzapine equivalent; Leucht et al., 2015) and 
the total number of hallucinations. 
 
We also investigated the distribution of responses when participants estimated the direction of 
motion but reported not seeing any dots. Interestingly, in this subset of trials, and unlike in our 
previous work (Chalk et al, 2010), estimations were also more likely than chance to be made 
around the most frequent motion directions by both patients and controls (median(𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ) = 
1.24, p = 0.002 and median(𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ) = 1.41, p = 0.045, respectively; two-sided signed rank test). 
One explanation for this might be habitual effects - when the bar is moved towards the most 
frequent directions out of motor habit. Another possible explanation is that participants might 
have hallucinated stimuli in the expected prior directions, but their confidence about their 
percept being very low, they sometimes chose to report not seeing any dots in the hope to give 
the correct answer (each detection response was followed by immediate feedback). 
 







Figure 3. Estimation responses in the absence of stimulus. (A, B) Distribution of the estimation 
responses by patients and controls, respectively. The vertical grey lines represent reported 
motion directions when no stimulus was present (i.e. hallucinations) pooled across each group. 
The green line denotes the probability distribution of these hallucinations, which was produced 
using Kernel Density Estimation. The red line denotes probability distribution of responses that 
were followed by participants’ reporting seeing no stimulus. The orange line denotes all 
estimations regardless of the detection response. In the main plots the data is averaged across 
the central motion direction, while the insets show the corresponding distributions across the 
full range.  (C, D) Comparison of patients and controls by (C) the total number of 
hallucinations (p = 0.004, two-sided rank-sum test) and (D) the number of hallucinations 
around the most frequently presented motion directions (within ±16º of ±32º; p = 0.016, two-
sided rank-sum test). Red horizontal lines denote median values; blue horizontal lines denote 
25th and 75th percentiles. Black dots denote individual participants, grey areas represent 
density of the data points. * and ** indicate significance levels at p< 0.05 and p<0.01 
respectively.  






We fitted the models to the behavioral data and computed the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) for each participant, which gives us information regarding model fit while penalizing for 
extra model complexity (preventing overfitting). We found that the BAYES_P model had the 
smallest BIC for both patients and controls (Fig. 5A, and B) – indicating best performance, 
with a difference in BIC between the winning model (BAYES_P) and the second best model 
(BAYES) being larger than 10. This is equivalent to a log Bayes factor larger than 10, and is 
considered to be very strong or ‘decisive’ evidence in favor of the winning model (Kaas & 
Raftery, 1995). We also ran a random effect Bayesian model selection analysis (Rigoux et al., 
2014; Daunizeau et al., 2014) to ensure that the favoured model was not being selected due to a 
subset of participants in each group. The analysis confirmed that BAYES_P was best at 
describing behaviour for both groups (Fig. 5C and D). Model fits to the data also showed that 
BAYES_P to be better at fitting lapse estimations, confirming that such estimations followed 
the acquired prior distribution instead of being random (Fig. 6C,G). Moreover, we found a 
strong correlation between the prior-based lapses recovered via BAYES_P and hallucinations 
(τb = 0.657, p < 0.001; Kendall’s correlation; Fig. 7B), suggesting that prior-based lapses could 
be considered as hallucinations experienced on trials when stimulus is too weak to be detected 
(Fig. 7A).  
 
Finally, we compared patients and controls on the basis of BAYES_P parameter estimates (Fig. 
6I-L). Consistent with the behavioral data analysis, we found no differences in the acquired 
prior expectations (Fig. 6I, J; the mean of acquired prior: p = 0.874, BF01 = 3.32; and the 
uncertainty in the acquired prior: p = 0.401; two-tailed rank-sum test; BF01 = 2.95). There were 
no differences in the precision of sensory likelihood (Fig. 6K, p = 0.742, two-tailed rank-sum 
test; BF01 = 2.96). Lastly, just as in the behavioral data, we found that patients made less prior-
based lapse estimations (Fig. 6L, αprior-based : p = 0.024, two-tailed rank-sum test), suggesting 
that the model parameter ‘αprior-based’ captures the participants’ propensity to experience prior-
based hallucinations in our task.  
 






Figure 5. Model comparison and selection. (A, B) Fixed effects model selection using 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for (A) controls and (B) patients. X-axis measures the 
relative difference between BIC of each model (as indicated on Y-axis) and BIC of BAYES_P 
(winning model) summed across participants. Smaller BIC indicate a better model fit while 
penalizing for added model complexity. For both patients and controls BAYES_P provided the 
best model evidence, 12 BIC units better than BAYES for patients and 146 BIC than BAYES 
for controls. (C, D) Random effect Bayesian model selection (Rigoux et al., 2014; Daunizeau et 
al., 2014) for (C) controls and (D) patients. Higher protected exceedance probability indicates a 
model having a higher likelihood of being more frequent among the subjects. For both patients 
and controls BAYES_P was the most likely model. The insets in C and D show the distribution 
of Bayesian Factor for BAYES_P vs. BAYES summarized by a boxplot, jittered data scatter 
and a probability density which was estimated using a normal kernel.  
 






Figure 6. Model fits and parameter estimates. (A-H) Model fits for the best fitting model 
BAYES_P (green) and the second best model BAYES (yellow), to the behavioral data (black). 
(A-D) controls and (E-H) patients. (A, E) estimation bias, (B, F) estimation variability, (C, G) 
estimation lapse rate, (D, H) prior expectations of each individual (transparent green) and group 
average (thick green) as estimated via BAYES_P model. The vertical dashed lines correspond 
to the most frequently presented motion directions (i.e. ±32°). The error bars represent within-
subject standard error.  (I-L) Comparison of BAYES_P model parameter estimates of patients 
and controls. (I) θexpected – the mean of acquired prior (p = 0.874, two-tailed rank-sum test; 
BF01 = 3.32), (J) σexpected – the uncertainty in the acquired prior (p = 0.401, two-tailed rank-
sum test; BF01 = 2.95), (K) σsensory – the uncertainty of sensory likelihood (p = 0.742, two-
tailed rank-sum test; BF01 = 2.96), (L) αprior-based – prior-based lapse rate (p = 0.024, two-tailed 
rank-sum test). Red horizontal lines denote median values; blue horizontal lines denote 25th 
and 75th percentiles. Black dots denote individual participants, grey areas represent density of 
the data points. * indicates significance level at p< 0.05. See Supplementary Figures 7 and 8 for 
the model fits for bias of each individual.  
 
 






Figure 7. Relationship between lapse estimations and hallucinations. (A) The amount of 
lapse estimations at different stimulus contrast levels. Contrast staircase trials were split into 
two subsets along the 75% detection threshold, which was determined for each individual from 
their psychometric curves. The data then was pooled across both patient and control groups. 
We found that the amount of lapse estimations depended on the presented contrast level with 
more lapse estimations being made at lower contrasts (F(1,84) = 12.61, p < 0.001), which 
supported our interpretation that these estimations were not merely attentional lapses but 
hallucinations on trials when stimulus was hard to detect. The error bars represent within-
subject errors. (B) Prior-based lapses and hallucinations. A strong positive correlation between 
prior-based lapse estimations (recovered via BAYES_P model) on low contrast trials and 
hallucinations on no-stimulus trials (τb = 0.657, p < 0.001; Kendall’s correlation) provided 
further support that both of these behaviours are driven by the same mechanism (i.e. both being 
samples from the prior).   
 
 
Parameter recovery for model BAYES_P 
 
To gauge the reliability of our modelling results, we performed parameter recovery for the 
winning BAYES_P model. Parameter recovery consists of simulating synthetic data with 
different sets of known parameter values (‘true parameters’) for a given model and then fitting 
the same model to the synthetic data to estimate and recover these parameters (‘recovered 
parameters’). The strength of correlation between the actual and recovered parameters 
measures the reliability of modelling results. Parameter recovery, just as the parameter 
estimation from behavioral data, is sensitive to any correlations that might be present among 




the model parameters, to the choice of parameter estimation methods and also to the amount of 
data used for model fitting. Therefore, parameter recovery serves as a crucial step in validating 
the reliability of the modelling results (Palminteri, et al., 2017). 
 
We found that the winning BAYES_P model recovered parameters very well, which was reflected 
in the coefficient of determination (R2) for all recovered parameters being R2 ≥ 0.84 





We were interested in testing the emerging model of schizophrenia proposing that the disorder 
could stem from deficits in Bayesian inference (Corlett et al., 2009a, 2009b; Fletcher and Frith, 
2009; Adams et al., 2013; Schmack et al., 2013, 2015, 2017; Teufel et al., 2015; Powers et al., 
2017, Jardri et al., 2017). The experimental paradigm we chose is well suited to quantitatively 
assess the acquisition of sensory priors, how these priors are used in perception, as well as to 
quantify inter-individual variability in the learning and inference process (Chalk et al 2010, 
Karvelis et al, 2018). 
 
 
Acquisition of visual prior expectations  
 
We found that both the control and patient groups implicitly learned the statistics of the motion 
stimuli and that those expectations modified their perception, consistent with them acquiring a 
Bayesian prior of the stimulus statistics and combining it with sensory evidence, replicating our 
previous results (Chalk et al, 2010). This was reflected by attractive estimation biases towards 
the frequently presented directions, faster reaction times and higher detection rates at these 
directions, as well as hallucinated motion directions in the absence of stimulus predominantly 
following the most frequent directions.  
 




Patients with schizophrenia were not qualitatively, nor quantitatively different from controls in 
the measures used to assess learning of the task statistics. This suggest that while there are 
clearly domain-specific perceptual (e.g. hallucinations) and learning deficits in schizophrenia 
(e.g. jumping to conclusions), our study demonstrates that these deficits are not due to a 
domain-general impairment in the acquisition and/or utilization of statistical information in the 
environment. That is, we find that patients with chronic schizophrenia do not appear to be 
impaired in the acquisition of visual statistical priors in our task. 
 
These results are consistent with studies finding no deficit in implicit learning in schizophrenia 
(Kéri et al., 2000; Danion et al., 2001; Marvel et al., 2005; for review see: Gold et al., 2009). In 
contrast with studies that assay explicit statistical learning and inference using more cognitive 
tasks (i.e. usually believed to involve frontal cortical regions), here we measured implicit 
statistical learning of visual stimuli that could be embodied in visual processing areas rather 
than frontal cortices (Kok et al., 2013). In fact, patients with schizophrenia appear relatively 
spared in implicit learning tasks that do not require integrating information after each trial 
(Gold et al., 2009). These results are also consistent with our previous study using the same 
paradigm showing intact statistical learning in participants with high schizotypal traits 
(Karvelis et al, 2018).  
 
Impact of acquired visual prior expectations 
 
We found no difference between patients and controls as to the influence of the acquired 
expectations on their performance regarding estimation of the motion directions. They were not 
more or less biased towards the most frequent directions, nor more or less variable in those 
estimations.  
 
Patients were found to differ from controls in three ways, however. First, patients with 
schizophrenia displayed significantly poorer contrast discrimination thresholds and slower 
reactions times, as documented in previous studies. Second, and more interestingly, patients 
reported significantly fewer hallucinations at all directions and fewer prior-based hallucinations 
(i.e. hallucinations of the most frequently presented motion directions). Third, patients 
exhibited fewer prior-based lapse estimations than controls on low contrast trials. Prior-based 




lapses can be interpreted in the same way as hallucinations on no-stimulus trials. When using 
contrast staircases, contrast levels hover around the detection threshold, which means that on a 
significant number of trials the stimulus contrast falls below the participants’ threshold of 
perception, effectively becoming equivalent to trials with no stimulus. If participants have 
hallucinations on these trials (and thus report that they have perceived a stimulus), these will be 
expressed in our results as prior-based lapses. In support for this interpretation, we found that 
there were significantly more lapse estimations made on trials when the stimulus contrast was 
below the 75% detection threshold then when it was above (F(1,84) = 12.61, p < 0.001; Fig. 
7A) and we found a strong correlation between prior-based lapses and hallucinations on no-
stimulus trials (Fig. 7B). Together, this suggests that although patients appear to acquire the 
same prior as controls, they tend to hallucinate this prior less than controls when there is no 
stimulus, or when the stimulus is below detection threshold. 
 
The fact that patients exhibit fewer prior-based hallucinations suggests that their perception is 
less influenced by their learned prior expectations than observed in control participants. This is 
consistent with previously reported findings suggesting that patients with chronic schizophrenia 
are less sensitive to expectation-driven illusions (e.g. the hollow-mask illusion) than controls 
(Tschacher et al., 2006; Dima et al., 2009; Crawford et al., 2010; Horton and Silverstein, 2011; 
Keane et al., 2013, Notredame et al., 2014). This finding is also in line with results from 
Schmack et al. (2013, 2015), reporting a decreased influence of induced expectations (priors) 
on perception.  
 
It is intriguing however that the influence of prior expectations is weaker in the detection task, 
but similar to that of controls for the estimation task. The absence of differences in the 
estimation bias could be explained by different factors. One factor might be that very few of 
our patients reported clinically significant levels of hallucinations (PANSS items >3), and that 
this propensity might be more pertinent than the diagnosis of schizophrenia per se (Powers et 
al, 2017).  We found some evidence supporting this idea: PANSS Positive symptom score and 
prior-based lapses (estimated via BAYES_P) were close to being negatively correlated (τb=-
0.314, p= 0.063; Kendall’s correlation; Supplementary Fig. 5A); this relationship was also 
backed up by a much stronger correlation for when lapse estimations were estimated directly 
from the behavioural data using Eq. (1) (τb = -0.465, p = 0.006; Kendall’s correlation; 




Supplementary Fig. 5B). However, it should be noted that no correlation was found between 
the PANSS Positive symptom score and hallucinations exhibited on no-stimulus trials.  
 
Similarly, the absence of stronger effects might be related to illness duration: weaker estimation 
biases may be characteristic of earlier stages of the illness but may not be detectable anymore 
in our patients as they have been generally ill for a long time, due to medication or 
compensatory mechanisms. We find some support for this idea with a significant correlation 
between duration of illness and magnitude of estimation bias (τb = 0.523, p = 0.003; Kendall’s 
correlation; Supplementary Fig. 5C).  
 
Finally, since the differences appear only for the detection part of the task, it might be that 
chronic patients have simply developed an increased perceptual threshold. Following this idea, 
patients would require stronger evidence (i.e. sharper posterior) in order to perceive a stimulus 
or to make a decision about the presence of a stimulus. This is consistent with the fact that 
patients required higher stimulus contrasts and integrated information over longer periods of 
time before responding (slower reaction times during the estimation task). We therefore 
hypothesize that it is a possible adaptation strategy used by patients over time to minimize 
responses to stimuli that were not truly present (i.e. their psychotic hallucinations).  
 
Taken together, our results suggest that statistical learning is intact in relatively well patients 
with chronic schizophrenia on stable doses of second generation antipsychotic medication. The 
impact of their acquired priors is also the same as that of controls in the estimation task, but 
weaker in the detection task. These results are surprising in view of the current prominent 
theories proposing that schizophrenia is a disorder of predictive processing or Bayesian 
inference, and suggest ways in which these accounts need to be nuanced. The similarity of 
controls and patients’ performance in our task may however be related to the success of 
treatment or some other adaptive process related to illness duration. Future work will aim at 
testing participants at earlier stages of the illness, and ideally before pharmacological treatment 
has begun.  
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Acquisition of visual priors and induced hallucinations in chronic 
schizophrenia: Supplementary information  
 
 







Supplementary Figure 1: Performance on high contrast trials. (A) Root mean square error of 
estimations. (B) Fraction of trials on which the stimulus was detected. The dots represent 
included participants; the cross marks represent excluded participants. Dashed lines denote 
inclusion criteria (30 degree estimation and 70% detection).  





Supplementary Figure 2: Convergence of 2/1 and 4/1 staircase luminance levels. (A) 
Controls, (B) Patients. Both groups reached convergence after ~100 trials. These trials were 




Emergence of prior effects 
 
We wanted to determine when the acquired expectations started to have a significant effect on 
performance and whether this was the same for both groups. First and most importantly, we 
wanted to know when the estimations on low contrast trials became biased towards ±32°. To do 
so, we computed cumulative moving averages at every 50 trials for the bias at ±48° with 
respect to bias at ±32°. Next, we looked at estimation reaction times (RT) on low contrast trials 
and compared mean RT of each individual at ±32° with mean RT at all other directions. 
Similarly, we looked at the average detection performance on low contrast trials and compared 
the fraction of trials in which stimulus was detected at ±32° with the mean fraction detected 
over all other presented directions.  
 
We found that both patients and controls showed signs of very rapid acquisition of the priors. 
For the bias to become statistically significant, it took less than 100 trials for patients 
(Supplementary Fig. 3A) and less than 150 trials for controls (Supplementary Fig. 4A). 
Similarly, both patients and controls became significantly faster and significantly better at 
detecting stimulus moving at ±32° within the first 100 trials (Supplementary Fig. 3B, C and 
4B, C respectively).  





Supplementary Figure 3: Emergence of prior effects in patient group. (A) Cumulative moving 
averages of bias at ±48° with respect to bias at ±32°. (B) Cumulative moving averages of 
median differences between estimation RTs at ±32° and RTs at all other directions. (C) 
Cumulative moving averages of median differences between fraction of detected stimuli at 
±32° and fraction detected at all other directions. (D) Cumulative moving averages of the 
probability ratio of hallucinating predominantly around   ±32 on no-stimulus trials. Red bars 
indicate median values and blue bars indicate 25th and 75th percentiles. p-values are denoted 
above each plot (one-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test).  





Supplementary Figure 4: Emergence of prior effects in control group. (A) Cumulative 
moving averages of bias at ±48° with respect to bias at ±32°. (B) Cumulative moving averages 
of median differences between estimation RTs at ±32° and RTs at all other directions. (C) 
Cumulative moving averages of median differences between fraction of detected stimuli at 
±32° and fraction detected at all other directions. (D) Cumulative moving averages of the 
probability ratio of hallucinating predominantly around   ±32 on no-stimulus trials.  Red bars 
indicate median values and blue bars indicate 25th and 75th percentiles. p-values are denoted 
above each plot (one-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test). 






Supplementary Figure 5: Exploratory analysis. (A) Prior-based lapses (estimated via 
BAYES_P) as a function of PANSS positive score (τb = -0.314, p = 0.063; Kendall’s 
correlation). (B) Lapse estimations (determined via Eq.(1)) and PANSS positive score (τb = -
0.465, p = 0.006; Kendall’s correlation). (C) Mean absolute bias as a function of duration of 
illness. The plot shows a positive relationship between the duration of illness and the amount of 
bias exhibited during the task (r = 0.711, p < 0.001; Pearson’s correlation. The correlation 

























Detailed clinical characteristics 
 
The demographic and clinical characteristics of the included participants can be seen in Table 
S1 and Supplementary Figure 6. It is of note that patients had relatively low levels of symptoms 
on the PANSS, but ongoing functional impairment. Most were assigned a PANSS rating of 1 
(absent), 2 (minimal/questionable) or 3 (mild) for delusions, hallucinatory behaviour, 
suspiciousness/persecution, and unusual thought content, reflecting the clinically stable state of 
the psychosis group. Except for one patient, all had been taking anti-psychotic medication at 
the time of testing (atypical, n = 18; typical, n = 1). Nine were also taking anti-depressants and 








Delusions (P1) 2.60 (1.90) 1.48 (0.79) W = 158 < .05 
Hallucinatory behaviour (P3) 1.85 (1.31) 1.22 (0.60) W = 175 .07 
Suspiciousness/Persecution (P6) 2.00 (1.26) 1.61 (0.84) W = 198 .40 
Unusual thought content (G9) 2.05 (1.10) 1.35 (0.57) W = 150 < .05 
Table S1. Demographic and detailed Clinical Characteristics (mean and standard deviation in 
parentheses). P# refer to specific items/symptoms of the PANSS (Positive and Negative 
Symptom Scale). For all measures Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (normal approximation with 


















Supplementary Figure 6: Histogram and pair-plots for general PANSS subscales, and 
histograms for items P1, P3, P6 and G9 of the PANSS. Blue data represents controls, while red 
data represents patients. The graphical overlay displaying the symptom data for patients and 
controls suggests that the patient groups is homogeneous and relatively well with respect to 








Normality and Non-parametric testing 
 
We ran normality tests among repeated measures for each group separately, as well as for each 
group averaged across angles (Table S2). 
  
 
Table S2. Shapiro-Wilk normality tests for estimation bias, variability, lapses, reaction time 
and detection rate at each stimulus motion direction (0°, ±16°, ±32° ±48° ±64°) and averaged 
across motion directions (mean) for each group (patients and controls). Degrees of freedom are 
df = 20 for patients and df = 23 for controls for all angles. Normality violations below α = 0.05 
significance level are highlighted in bold.  
 
Some deviations from normality were identified for estimation biases and lapses. For these 
measures we re-ran group comparisons using two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test that does not 
require normality assumptions. To our knowledge there is no well-established non-parametric 
equivalent to the 2-way mixed ANOVA, therefore, we focused on verifying group comparisons 
on the mean values of bias and lapses. Most importantly, while being more conservative than 
parametric tests, the non-parametric rank-sum test results were found to be in complete 
agreement with the ANOVA test results: patients exhibited significantly less lapse estimations 
than controls (W = 324, p = 0.005, two-sided rank-sum test) and there were no differences in 
the mean absolute bias between the groups (W = 399, p = 0.324, two-sided rank-sum test).  
Furthermore, we also report Bayesian statistical analyses on all of the measures reported, which 


























0° Patients .964 .616 .944 .290 .236 <.001 .963 .602 .964 .622 
 Controls .953 .337 .929 .103 .486 <.001 .968 .632 .960 .472 
±16° Patients .914 .075 .931 .163 .530 <.001 .963 .602 .970 .757 
 Controls .967 .614 .953 .341 .705 <.001 .984 .966 .861 .004 
±32° Patients .899 .039 .883 .020 .906 .053 .831 .003 .927 .133 
 Controls .904 .030 .915 .053 .860 .004 .951 .300 .939 .170 
±48° Patients .839 .003 .951 .385 .505 <.001 .959 .527 .982 .956 
 Controls .922 .074 .866 .005 .847 .002 .953 .340 .963 .531 
±64° Patients .702 <.001 .897 .036 .740 <.001 .958 .503 .934 .183 
 Controls .790 <.001 .901 .027 .861 .004 .963 .519 .972 .731 
Mean Patients .583 <.001 .948 .340 .682 <.001 .894 .033 .919 .096 
 Controls .743 <.001 .937 .153 .886 .015 .967 .626 .933 .116 
 




feel confident that the findings reported in the manuscript do not suffer from the normality 
assumptions being violated.  
 
It is worth noting however that the effects of deviations from normality assumptions in 
ANOVAs has been well studied in the literature, and such tests were found to be robust to 
normality assumptions violations which could explain our findings being replicated in both 
Bayesian and non-parametric tests (Glass et al., 1972; Harwell et al., 1992; Lix et al., 1996). 
 
Supplementary Figure 7: BAYES_P bias fits for each subject in the control group. Black 
solid line is the behavioural data, green line is the mean bias and blue shaded area is the 
standard deviation of the bias as predicted by BAYES_P. The model predictions were 
generated using the parameter values obtained from maximum likelihood estimation. The 
model was simulated to produce the same number of responses as in the empirical data of each 
subject. For each subject, the simulation was repeated 30 times to obtain a distribution of 
biases, which then was used to calculate the mean and the standard deviation of the bias. 






Supplementary Figure 8: BAYES_P bias fits for each subject in the patient group. Black solid 
line is the behavioural data, green line is the mean bias and blue shaded area is the standard 
deviation of the bias as predicted by BAYES_P. The model predictions were generated using 
the parameter values obtained from maximum likelihood estimation. The model was simulated 
to produce the same number of responses as in the empirical data of each subject. For each 
subject, the simulation was repeated 30 times to obtain a distribution of biases, which then was 













Supplementary Figure 9. Parameter recovery with BAYES_P model. (A) θexpected - mean of 
the prior expectations (R2 = 0.96), (B) σexpected - uncertainty of the prior distribution (R
2 = 0.89), 
(C) σsensory - uncertainty in the sensory likelihood (R
2 = 0.84), (D) αprior-based – prior-based lapse 
rate (R2 = 0.94). X-axes – actual parameters used for simulating the data (denoted with the 
superscript ‘act’), Y-axes – recovered parameters (denoted with the superscript ‘rec’) from 
fitting the model to the simulated data. The dashed diagonal line is a reference line indicating 






Variant Bayes models 
 
The model ‘Bayes’ is similar to the model ‘Bayes_P’ described in the main text, but has 
uniform lapse estimations instead of ‘prior-based’ lapse estimations, such that:  
 
p(θestimate|θperceived) = (1 − α) · V (θperceived, σmotor) + α/2𝛑 
 
The model ‘Bayes_var’ is similar to the model ‘Bayes’, except that to account for the 
possibility of exposure effect to sensory uncertainty, we allow sensory uncertainty σsensory to 
vary for each of the following angles 0°, ±16°, ±32°, ±48°, ±64°, resulting in five σsensory free 
parameters. 
 
The model ‘Bayes_varmin’ is similar to the model ‘Bayes’, except that we allow σsensory to vary 
only for the most presented angles ±32°, resulting in two σsensory free parameters (σsensory at ±32°, 
and σsensory at all other angles). 
 
          




Response strategy models 
 
We wanted to control for the possibility that the task behaviour might be explained by simple 
behavioural strategies that do not involve Bayesian integration. This class of models assumed 
that participants did not combine their expectations with sensory information, but relied on 
either of them alone on any given trial.  
  
The first model, ‘ADD1’, assumed that estimations derived from prior expectations were 
simply sampled from a learnt prior distribution, pexpected(θ), which was parameterized as in Eq 
(4). However, on trials when participants did perceive motion direction, it was based solely on 
the sensory input, psensory(θsensory|θactual) = V (θactual, σsensory).  
 
Putting together the estimations derived from sensory input and the ones derived from learnt 
expectations, and the possibility of random estimations, the average distribution of estimation 
responses for a single participant is: 
 
  
p(θestimate|θactual) = (1 − α)· [(1 − a(θ)) · psensory(θsensory|θactual)  +  a(θ) · pexpected(θestimate)]  
                                                          ∗V(0,σmotor)+α,                                             (9) 
  
where a(θ) determines the proportion of trials in which participants sampled from the acquired 
prior, pexpected(θ); asterisk (∗) denotes convolution. The resulting ‘ADD1’ model has 9 free 
parameters (θexpected, σexpected, a(θ) (which can take a different value for each of the 5 angles:  0◦, 
±16◦, ±32◦, ±48◦, ±64◦), σsensory and α). 
 
The second model, ‘ADD2’, was the same as ‘ADD1’ except that it had more complex strategy 
for trials when participants relied on the prior: instead of sampling from the complete acquired 
prior distribution ranging from −180◦ to +180◦  (Eq.  (4)), they sampled from only one half of 
it, negative (−180° to 0°) or positive (0° to +180°), depending on which side of the distribution 
the actual stimulus occurred on: 
 
 




pexpectedN (θ) = V (−θexpected, σexpected)                                               (10) 
pexpectedP (θ) = V (θexpected, σexpected)                                        (11) 
  
Incorporating this into the distribution of estimation responses results in: 
 
p(θestimate|θactual) = (1 − α)·[((1 − a(θ) − b(θ)) · psensory(θsenssory|θactual) 
+ a(θ) · pexpectedN (θestimate) 
+ b(θ) · pexpectedP (θestimate)] 
∗ V(0,σmotor) + α ,                             (12) 
  
where asterisk (∗) denotes convolution; a(θ) and b(θ) determine the proportion of trials in 
which participants sample from either negative or positive parts of the prior distribution, 
respectively. 
 
Finally, we also considered two variations of the ‘ADD1’ and ‘ADD2’ models. These were 
identical to ‘ADD1’ and ‘ADD2’ except from setting σexpected to zero (i.e. no uncertainty); that 
is, on trials when perceptual estimates were derived only from expectations, they were equal to 





We used the performance in trials with the highest contrast level to estimate motor noise, σmotor, 
for each individual. We assumed that at this level sensory uncertainty was close to zero (σsensory 
≈ 0). The motor noise was determined by fitting estimation responses at the highest contrast 
level to the distribution in Eq. (2) using the actual motion direction, θactual, as the mean. The 
estimated motor noise was used in all the subsequent model fitting as a fixed parameter. 
 
The rest of the free parameters of each model were estimated by fitting the response data from 
the two staircased contrast levels (~200 trials per participant). For each model with a set of free 
parameters M, we computed the probability distribution p(θestimate|θactual; M) of making an 
estimate θestimate given the actual stimulus direction θactual. For the response strategy models, by 




definition, the p(θestimate|θactual; M) corresponds to average behaviour in the task (Equations 9 
and 12). Bayesian models, on the other hand, explicitly model trial-to-trial variability in the 
posterior estimate, which in our case is the mean of the posterior (Eq. (6)). To relate this to the 
behavioural data we built a distribution of 1,000 samples for each presented angle (where each 
sample is the mean of the posterior obtained via Eq. (6) and perturbed by motor noise via Eq. 
(7) or (8)). 
 
The parameters were estimated by maximizing the fit of the log likelihood function for the 
experimental data for each participant individually: 
 
𝑀 =  argmax
𝑀
[∑ log (p(𝜃𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒  =  𝜃𝑖,𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎|𝜃𝑖))
𝑛
𝑖 ] ,                                   (13) 
  
where θi,data  is participant’s estimation response, θi is the actual presented motion direction  on  
the  ith trial and n is the number of trials. The maximum likelihood was found using 
fminsearchbnd function in Matlab, by minimizing negative log-likelihood. Parameters α, a(θ) 
and b(θ) were bounded between 0 and 1, while θexpected, σexpected and σsensory were bounded from 
0 to ∞. To reduce the possibility of convergence at a local maxima we constructed a grid of 
initial σexpected and σsensory parameter values covering the range as found in previous studies 
(σexpected from 10° to 25° in 3° increments and σsensory from 5° to 15° in 3° increments, which 
resulted in 22 different initializations). A set of parameters with the largest log-likelihood was 





To compare the model fits we used Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), which approximates 
the log of model evidence (e.g., see Burnham and Anderson, 2004): 
 
−2 · log(P (D|M )) ≈ BIC = −2 · log(P (D|M, Θ)) + k · log(n)   ,                  (14) 
 




where M is model, D is observed data and P (D|M, Θ) is the likelihood of generating the 
experimental data given the most likely set of parameters, Θ; k is the number of model 
parameters and n is the number of data points (or equivalently, the number of trials). BIC 
evaluates the model by how it fits the data by also penalizing for the number of parameters (i.e. 
model complexity) to avoid over-fitting. Lower BIC score indicates a better model. We also ran 
a random effect Bayesian model selection analysis for group studies (Rigoux et al., 2014). We 
used the VBA Matlab toolbox (Daunizeau et al., 2014) to perform this analysis, and used 





To test the reliability of the parameter estimates of our winning model we performed parameter 
recovery. This allowed us to simultaneously test whether parameters are identifiable (e.g., 
whether likelihood and prior uncertainty is not correlated and can be distinguished) and 
whether having ~200 trials (the amount of low contrast trials in our data) for data fitting and 
using maximum likelihood estimation are sufficient to give reliable results.  
 
First, we generated 100 sets of parameters (i.e. 100 synthetic individuals) by randomly 
sampling each parameter from a Gaussian distribution which had a mean and variance as the 
parameter estimates from the collected participant data. Second, for each set of parameters we 
simulated data for 200 trials with the winning model by randomly sampling from the estimation 
probability distribution, which, as for the behavioural data, was built from a 1000 posterior 
means (Eq. (6)), each perturbed by motor noise (Eq. (8)) Finally, we fitted the winning model 
to the simulated data. To evaluate the goodness of recovered parameters we computed the 
coefficient of determination (R2) for a linear regression, which quantified how well the actual 














Power calculations (a-priori): detecting effect of the prior on behaviour 
 
We performed power calculations using an independent dataset from a previously published 
study that used the exact same task design but had 2 sessions of 850 trials (Chalk et al., 2010). 
We used the first 567 trials of the first session for the power analysis, to conform to the same 
trial structure present in the current study.  
 
‘Bias’ and ‘Detection rate’ were selected as the behavioural measures relevant for determining 
the effect of the prior on behaviour. Given these parameters, power calculations for ‘Bias’ and 
‘Detection rate’ revealed that 18-20 subjects are required respectively to detect an effect with 
80% power.  
 
Power calculations (a-priori): detecting group differences 
 
To our knowledge, the current task design has never been tested in a chronic Schizophrenia 
sample. We therefore turned to the literature to estimate the effect size between patients and 
controls in motion perception (Chen, 2011) and illusions (Dima et al., 2009; Dima et al., 2011).  
 
We determined that 20 participants in each group should allow us to detect an effect size of at 
least 0.9 with 80% power, which is a smaller effect than previous effect sizes reported in 
motion perception (Chen et al., 1999a; Chen et al., 1999b), perceptual illusions (Dima et al., 
2009; Dima et al., 2011), or cognition generally (Fioravanti et al., 2012). 
 
Based on this analysis we aimed to recruit approximately 25 subjects per group, which would 
permit to reliably detect the effect of: the prior on perception, as well as differences in motion 
perception or illusions between groups, even accounting for a potentially large (e.g. 20%) 
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Abstract 
In Bayesian inference framework, perception is an active process where incoming 
ambiguous sensory information (‘likelihood’) is integrated with accumulated 
environmental statistics (‘prior’). Current computational theories of Autism Spectrum 
Disorders (ASD) suggest that many of the sensory symptoms could be understood within 
such framework: perception being less influenced by the priors. We investigated whether 
adults with ASD (N = 17) differed from age-, gender- and IQ-matched controls (N = 30) 
in rapid acquisition of perceptual priors and their influence on perception. We used a 
visual motion estimation task designed for quantitatively assessing both prior and 
likelihood distributions. While ASD group was faster in their responses, they showed no 
differences in prior acquisition nor in precision of their sensory likelihoods. This contrasts 
with our previous findings using the same task in the general population, where we found 
autistic traits to be associated with more precise likelihoods.  
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Introduction 
 
Perception can be thought of as Bayesian inference, where ambiguous sensory information 
(‘likelihood’) is integrated with prior knowledge of the world (‘prior’) to infer the causes of 
sensory signals (Rao & Ballard, 1999; Knill & Pouget, 2004; Friston, 2005). Such priors are 
continuously updated to match long-term and short-term statistical regularities of environmental 
features (see Seriès & Seitz, 2010 for a review). Importantly, the extent to which priors shape 
perception depends on the relative amount of precision with which priors and likelihoods are 
represented in the brain.  
 
Recent theoretical accounts hypothesize that autism spectrum disorders (ASD) could be 
understood in terms of imbalanced weighting of priors and likelihoods, resulting in perception 
that is closer to the sensory input.  This could be due to priors being generally weaker - i.e. less 
precise (Pellicano & Burr, 2012), or due to sensory likelihoods being overly precise (Brock, 
2012). Considering the hierarchical nature of perceptual inference and the dynamics of prior 
updating, overly precise likelihood might arise from insufficient sensory attenuation via top-
down gain control (Lawson et al., 2014), and would lead to an inflexibly high rate of prior 
updating (Van de Cruys et al., 2014). These proposals can retrospectively explain a wide range 
of symptoms and experiment-based characterizations of ASD behaviour (for a review see 
Palmer et al., 2017).  
 
However, experimental studies aimed at explicitly testing these Bayesian accounts so far have 
produced mixed results. A handful of studies found support for the weaker prior hypothesis: 
along ASD traits in the general population, Powell et al. (2016) reported weaker slow-speed 
priors in motion perception, while Skewes et al. (2015) found weaker priors in a probabilistic 
reasoning game involving orientation discrimination. In children with ASD, Karaminis et al. 
(2016) found a reduced central tendency effect in temporal interval reproduction.  However, 
plenty of other studies show priors in ASD to be intact: convexity and shape familiarity priors 
in figure-ground segregation in children and young adults with ASD (Spanò et al., 2016), the 
direction of gaze priors in high functioning adults with ASD (Pell et al., 2016), the light-from-
above priors in children with ASD (Croydon et al., 2017), induced priors when disambiguating 
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two-tone (Mooney) images along ASD traits in the general population (Van de Cruys et al., 
2018; although see Król & Król, 2019) and priors underlying the illusions of Kanizsa’s Triangle 
in adolescents with ASD (Utzerath et al., 2019). A few studies have also investigated the 
dynamics of prior updating. Lawson et al. (2017) used a probabilistic associative learning task 
and found that adults with ASD estimated volatility to be more variable, which lead to smaller 
adjustments of their learning rate about stimuli contingencies when transitioning from stable to 
volatile phases of the task; however, the average learning rates were not found to be different. 
In contrast, a recent study by Lieder et al., (2019) reported reduced learning rates in adults with 
ASD for a contraction bias in pitch discrimination task.  
 
One important limitation among most of these studies is that only the relative effects of priors 
vs likelihoods are investigated, leaving it unclear – in the case of positive findings – whether the 
effects originate from altered priors or altered sensory representations. We had addressed this 
limitation in a recent experiment that allowed us to quantify both priors and likelihoods (Karvelis 
et al., 2018). We found that autistic traits in the general population were associated decreased 
biases and that this was underlied not by weaker priors but by increased sensory precision. Here 
we used the same experimental design to test whether these findings generalize to ASD 
population. 
 
We studied adults with ASD using a visual motion perception task in which perceptual 
performance is well characterized by Bayesian inference (Chalk et al., 2010; Karvelis et al., 
2018; Valton et al., 2019). In this task, participants have to estimate motion direction of 
coherently moving cloud of dots (Fig. 1). Unbeknownst to participants, two of the motion 
directions are presented more frequently, which leads to rapid and implicit acquisition of prior 
expectations for these directions. When ambiguous (low contrast) stimulus is presented, the 
acquired priors result in attractive estimation biases towards the frequent directions as well as 
reduced intra-trial variability, reduced reaction times and increased detection performance for 
the most frequent directions. Finally, when no stimulus is presented, the acquired priors 
occasionally give rise to hallucinations of the stimulus moving in the expected directions.  
 
 





20 (10 female) individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), and 30 (11 female) controls 
(CTR) were recruited from advertisements in GP practices and educational settings. The sample 
size was based on power analysis using the effect size found in Karvelis et al., (2018) and aiming 
for 80% power with 5% Type I error rate (see Supplementary Material for details). Participants 
were included if they had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were able to provide fully 
informed consent, and had an IQ > 70 (as measured by the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence; Wechsler, 1999). A subsample of 11 participants in the ASD group were 
interviewed using the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000); 
where feasible, collateral information was gathered from school reports, clinical letters, and 
medical notes. Participants with comorbid anxiety or unipolar mood disorders were included. 
Participants with any neurological disorder, bipolar disorders, attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder, psychotic disorders, or current substance use disorder were excluded. All participants 
were interviewed using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID-I; First, Spitzer, 
Gibbon, & Williams, 2002) to determine inclusion/exclusion criteria. Participants provided 
informed written consent and were financially compensated for their time and travel. The study 
received ethical approval from the South East Scotland Research Ethics Committee 01 and NHS 
Lothian Research & Development.  
 
Apparatus, Stimuli, & Procedure 
 
The experimental setup used in this study was the same as in Karvelis et al. (2018). The stimuli 
were displayed on a Dell P790 monitor running at 1024 x 768 at 100Hz using Matlab’s 
Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997). The visual stimuli consisted of a cloud of dots moving 
coherently within a circular annulus (see Fig. 1A). Four randomly interleaved contrast levels 
were presented throughout the task: zero contrast (no stimulus; 167 trials), two low contrast 
levels (90 trials at 2/1 staircase; 243 trials at 4/1 staircase), and one high contrast level (67 trials). 
The luminance on the high contrast trials was 1.76 cd/m2 above a 5.18 cd/m2 background. There 
were 9 predetermined motion directions in which the stimuli moved: 0º, ±16º, ±32º, ±48º, and 
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±64º. These directions were set with respect to a central reference angle, which was randomly 
chosen for each participant. On high contrast trials, 50% of the time the dots moved at 
completely random directions. The stimuli on low contrast trials moved only at the 
predetermined motion directions. Across all the non-zero contrasts, the dots moved at ±32º for 
58% of the trials, in the other 7 predetermined directions for 36% of the trials and in completely 
random directions for 6% of the trials. This resulted in a bimodal probability distribution of 
motion direction (Fig. 1B). Participants were not told that stimuli would be presented more at 




Figure 1: The moving dots task. (A) On each trial, participants were presented with a fixation 
point followed by the motion stimulus and a response bar (red bar). Participants were instructed 
to align the bar to the perceived motion direction. The screen was cleared either when 
participants either made an estimation or 3000 ms had elapsed. Lastly, a new screen presented 
participants with a two-alternative forced choice task (2-AFC), requiring to indicate whether 
they perceived the dots during the estimation task. (B) Probability distribution of the motion 
directions. Unbeknownst to participants, stimuli moving at ±32° appeared more often than at 
other motion directions.  
 
On each trial, the participants were first required to estimate the motion direction of dots by 
aligning the red bar to the direction of motion. Second, in a two-alternative forced choice 
decision between ‘NO DOTS’ or ‘DOTS’, participants were required to indicate whether they 
detected the stimulus at all by correspondingly clicking on the right or left side of the screen. 
Feedback on estimation performance was presented every 20 trials by displaying participants’ 
root mean square error, while feedback on detection performance was displayed immediately 
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after responding by the cursor flashing green or red for correct and incorrect responses, 
respectively.  
 
Before starting the task, participants were given visual and verbal instructions and completed at 
least 8 practice trials under supervision of the experimenter, to ensure that the instructions were 
understood. Participants were instructed to keep their eyes on the fixation point and to respond 
as quickly and as accurately as they can. The task was completed in a darkened room with a 
viewing distance of approximately 100cm. Each participant completed 567 trials of the task with 
breaks every 170 trials. The task took ~45 minutes to complete and participants were fully 
debriefed at the end. 
 
 
Behavioural data analysis 
 
Performance on high contrast trials was used as a benchmark to ensure adequate performance in 
the task. The minimum criteria for inclusion were: 1) detection accuracy of at least 70% and 2) 
estimation root mean square error (RMSE) of less than 30 degrees. All 30 controls met the 
criteria, while 2 out of 20 ASD participants did not meet the second criterion and thus were 
excluded from further data analysis; one more ASD participant was excluded due to very poor 
detection performance (<30%) on the low contrast trials (Supplementary Fig. 1). 
 
The first 100 trials were excluded from the analysis, as this is how long it took for the staircases 
to converge to stable contrast levels (Supplementary Fig. 2), and for the acquired prior effects 
to become significant (Supplementary Fig. 3). The contrast levels achieved by the 2/1 and 4/1 
staircases were found to be overlapping, thus they were combined for all further analysis. 
Finally, since the distribution of presented directions was symmetrical around a central reference 
angle, the behavioural measures at equal absolute distance from the reference angle were 
averaged together to increase the precision of the summary statistics.  
 
The main data analysis was carried out on the estimation performance on low contrast trials (2/1 
and 4/1 staircases). Trials on which participants did not make an estimation within the given 
time (3000 ms) or in the subsequent detection task reported not seeing the stimulus were 
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excluded from this analysis. To account for any possible lapse estimations when determining 
bias and variability of responses, the distribution of each individual estimation responses was 
fitted to the following distribution: 
 
(1 − 𝛼) ∙ 𝑉(𝜇, 𝜎) +  𝛼 2𝜋⁄                            (1) 
 
where V(μ, σ) is the von Mises circular normal distribution with mean μ and width σ. Parameter 
α corresponds to the proportion of lapse estimations (uniformly distributed random responses). 
The estimation bias was calculated as the difference between the estimated mean μ and the true 
motion direction, while the estimation variability corresponded to σ.  
 
To simultaneously assess the effects of the acquired priors in both groups and to determine 
whether ASD participants differed from controls, we performed 2-way mixed ANOVA with 
motion direction as a within-subjects factor and group as a between-subjects factor. We ran 
Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons to determine which motion directions were driving 
the effects. All analysis was done using SPSS version 25. To evaluate the strength of the 
evidence for the null hypothesis we also report Bayes factors (BF01) obtained using the Bayesian 




To control for the possibility of different mechanisms underlying the performance of each 
individual we fitted a range of models to our data. The first class of models assumed that the 
biases were of a perceptual nature, as conceived in the Bayesian framework: on every trial, the 
incoming noisy sensory information is combined with a learned prior of the stimulus statistics, 
with the mean of the resulting posterior distribution corresponding to the percept (Fig. 2). We 
tested four variants of the Bayesian model (introduced in detail in the next section). Another 
class of models assumed that task performance could be explained by response strategies that 
do not involve Bayesian integration (Laquitaine & Gardner, 2018). According to these models, 
on any given trial participants responded by relying on either the prior or the likelihood alone; 
the resulting response distribution would thus be a sum (as opposed to a product) of the prior 
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and the likelihood (hence the class name ‘ADD’). We considered four variations of ‘ADD’ 
models (see Supplementary Information for details). Below we present the Bayesian models as 
they provided a better explanation to the data (see Fig. 4, model comparison).  
 
 
Figure 2. Bayesian model of estimation response for a single trial for the best fitting model 
(Bayes_P). The actual motion direction (θact) is corrupted by sensory uncertainty (σs), and then 
combined with prior expectations (mean θp and uncertainty σp) to form a posterior distribution. 
The mean of the posterior distribution then corresponds to the perceived motion direction (θperc). 
However, on a fraction of trials, determined by the prior-based lapses (αp), the perceived motion 
direction is sampled directly from the prior. Finally, in both cases, the response (θest) is made by 
perturbing θperc with motor noise (σm). This results in 4 free model parameters: σs, σp, θp and αp. 
The motor noise (σm) is estimated from high contrast trials and is used as a fixed parameter 





Following the Bayesian framework, we assumed that participants combined sensory information 
(likelihood) with their expectations about the motion direction (prior) on every trial. The sensory 
likelihood of the observed motion direction (θs) was parameterised as a von Mises circular 
normal distribution with variance σs: 
                      plikelihood(θs|θ) = V (θs, σs)                                        (2) 
 
The mean of this distribution, (θs) depended on the actual presented motion direction (θact), and 
to account for trial-to-trial variability it was drawn from another von Mises distribution centred 
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on θact with variance σs (i.e. V (θact, σs)). Centring the likelihood on the noisy estimate of the 
actual motion direction reflects the fact that the observer does not have direct access to the actual 
motion direction and the experimenter cannot know the mean of the internal likelihood an any 
given trial (Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006; Körding et al, 2007).  Since the model is fitted to the 
distribution of all responses throughout the task (instead of fitting each response individually), 
such implementation of a varying mean of the likelihood allows us to capture the amount of 
sensory variability without knowing the exact mean of the internal likelihood on any given trial. 
 
We then hypothesized that participants acquired priors (pprior (θ)) that approximated the bimodal 
distribution of the stimulus statistics. Therefore, the acquired priors (pprior (θ)) were 
parameterized as the sum of two von Mises circular normal distributions, centred on motion 
directions θp and −θp, each with variance σp: 
          pprior(θ) = 
1
2
 [V (−θp, σp) + V (θp, σp)]                                (3) 
 
Combining the prior and the likelihood gives us the posterior probability that the stimulus is 
moving in a direction θ: 
 pposterior(θ|θs) ∝ plikelihood(θs|θ) · pprior (θ)                            (4) 
 
The perceived direction, θperc, was taken to be the mean of the posterior distribution (almost 
identical results would be obtained by using the maximum instead).  
 
Finally, we accounted for motor noise (i.e. inaccuracies when aligning and clicking the mouse) 
and lapse estimations, such that:  
 
p(θest|θperc) = (1 − αp) · V (θperc, σm) + αp · [pprior(θ) ∗ V (0, σm)]            (5) 
 
where the asterisk (∗) denotes convolution, σm is the motor noise and αp is the proportion of 
prior-based lapse estimations on each trial (i.e. lapse estimations that follow the participants’ 
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acquired expectations – pprior(θ)). We called this model ‘BAYES_P’ for Bayes with Prior-based 
lapses. 
 
We also tested a simpler variant of this model which assumed that the lapse estimations (Eq. 
(5)) were not made based to the acquired prior but instead were completely random (model 
‘BAYES’). Furthermore, to account for the possibility that in addition to the acquisition of the 
prior there might also be adaptations in the sensory likelihood itself (e.g.,Sato and Körding, 
2014), we tested two other variants of this model: ’BAYES_var’ where the sensory precision 
varied with the stimulus direction (i.e. it took five different values for each of   the angles: 0°, 
±16°, ±32°, ±48°, ±64°) and ’BAYES_varmin’ where sensory precision was  allowed to be 
different for  ±32°  but was the same for all other directions. BAYES_P and BAYES had a total 
of 4 free parameters, while BAYES_varmin and BAYES_var had 5 and 8, respectively.  
 
Note that in our previous work on ASD traits (Karvelis et al., 2018), we did not test BAYES_P 
model and our winning model was BAYES. However, the results of that study – a negative 
correlation between AQ and sensory uncertainty – remains unchanged when BAYES_P model 
is fit to the data (Supplementary Fig. 6). Furthermore, ADDr family of models presented here 
is also slightly different from that used in Karvelis et al. (2018). These models still implement 
the same ideas but following recent work by Laquitaine & Gardner (2018) they were 
parameterized more parsimoniously (hence the added letter ‘r’ for ‘reduced’), rendering the 






A predefined performance criterion of at least 70% detection and a root mean square error of 
30 or less on high contrast trials was used as an indicator of adequate task performance. Two 
ASD participants scored below this criterion (Supplementary Fig. 1) and were therefore 
excluded from all subsequent analyses. One more ASD participant was excluded due to 
exceptionally poor performance on low contrast trials (detection < 30%). The characteristics of 
the included participants are summarised in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Participant Characteristics (standard deviation in parentheses) 
 ASD 
(n = 17) 
CTR 
(n = 30) 
Statistic p 
Age (years) 32.00 (13.87) 34.52 (11.12) Z = 1.08 .28 
Gender (M:F) 7:10 19:11 χ2 = 2.15 .14 
Full-scale IQ 119.18 (9.07) 118.38 (7.21) Z = -0.32 .75 
Performance IQ 116.44 (12.07) 118.35 (9.55) Z = 0.09  .93 
Verbal IQ 116.33 (11.25) 114.65 (9.13) Z = -0.61 .54 
GAF 58.53 (9.35) 74.79 (10.70) Z = 4.23 <.001 
AQ 36.35 (6.50) 13.37 (8.86) Z = -4.79 <.001 
ASRS 40.71 (11.09) 29.79 (10.49) Z = -2.62 .01 
Note. ASD = Autism-Spectrum Disorders; CTR = Controls; GAF = Global Assessment of 
Functioning (potential range 1-100; higher is better); AQ = Autism-Spectrum Quotient 
(potential range 0-50); ASRS = Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale (motential range 0-72). Group 
comparisons were done using Wilcoxon rank-sum test and Chi square test (for gender).  
 
Detection performance and contrast levels 
 
To ensure that the stimulus was equally ambiguous for each participant despite the individual 
differences in contrast sensitivity, the stimulus contrast adjusted based on the detection 
performance during the task.  Using 2/1 and 4/1 staircases, we ensured that the individual 
detection performances would converge to 70.4% and 84.1% respectively (Levitt, 1971).  
 
Contrast staircases converged to stable luminance levels after about 100 trials for both groups 
and the reached levels did not differ between the groups (Supplementary Fig. 2). Controls 
converged to 0.38 cd/m2 (±0.03) for 2/1 staircase and 0.41 cd/m2 (±0.03) for 4/1 staircase while 
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Statistical learning 
 
First, we investigated whether participants acquired the statistics of the stimulus. We looked at 
measures suggestive of statistical learning in each group, namely: attractive biases towards the 
most frequent directions, decreased variability, decreased reaction times, improved detection 





To investigate whether the participants’ perceived motion directions were biased, we measured 
the difference between the presented and reported motion directions. Fig. 3A displays the 
average estimation bias plotted against the presented motion direction for each group. Overall, 
there was a significant effect of motion direction on the estimation bias (F(2.51, 191.60) = 12.62, 
p < 0.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.219, Greenhouse-Geisser correction ε = 0.628), but no differences between 
the groups (group main effect: F(1, 45) = 0.44, p = 0.511, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.010; BF01 = 4.60); and no 
group*angle interaction (F(2.51, 191.60) = 1.12, p = 0.342, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  0.024). Pairwise comparisons 
(with Bonferroni correction) revealed that there was an attractive bias towards ±32° at ±64° (MD 
= 13.45, p < 0.001) and at ±48° (MD = 7.80, p < 0.001). Together, these results suggest that 
both groups were similarly biased towards most frequently presented directions, consistent with 
having acquired the priors that approximate the statistics of the stimulus. 
 
Next, we analysed how acquired priors affected variability of motion estimations.  (Fig. 3B). 
We found a significant main effect of motion direction (F(2.95, 132.83) = 8.80, p < 0.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
0.164,Greenhouse-Geisser correction ε = 0.738), but no conclusive group effects (main effect 
of group: F(1, 345) = 3.85, p = 0.056, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.079; BF01 = 0.80); and no group*angle interaction 
F(2.95, 132.83) = 1.23, p = 0.302, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  0.027). Pairwise comparisons (with Bonferroni 
correction) revealed that the main effects of motion direction were driven by the variability at 
±32° being lower than at 0° (MD = 7.08, p < 0.001), at ±64° (MD = 4.60, p = 0.001) and at ±16° 
(MD = 3.48, p = 0.02). This result is also consistent with the participants having acquired the 
priors that approximate the statistics of the stimulus, but points to possible differences between 
groups in overall perceptual variability 
4. Perceptual Bayesian inference in people with ASD diagnosis 123
Reaction times and detection  
 
We also examined whether participants’ acquired expectations reduced the reaction times at the 
expected motion directions (Fig. 3D). There was a significant main effect of motion direction 
on estimation reaction (F(3.58, 161.16) = 10.11, p < 0.001 𝜂𝑝
2= 0.184, Huynh-Feldt correction ε 
= 0.895). This was driven by decreased reaction times at the most frequent directions as revealed 
by pairwise comparisons: reaction time at ±32° was significantly shorter than at 0° (MD = 0.86, 
p = 0.005) at ±64° (MD = 0.12, p < 0.001) and at ±48° (MD = 0.45, p = 0.044). Furthermore, 
ASD participants were significantly faster than controls (F(1, 45) = 8.30, p = 0.006, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.156), 
but there was no interaction between group and motion direction (F(3.58, 161.16) = 1.78, p = 
0.141, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.038).  
 
We then analysed whether the acquired expectations improved detection at the expected motion 
directions (Fig. 3E). The detection of stimulus had a significant main effect of motion direction 
(F(2.38, 107.28) = 7.69, p < 0.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.146, Greenhouse-Geisser correction ε = 0.596), with 
stimulus at ±32° being the most frequently detected direction as shown by pairwise comparisons: 
detection at ±32° was significantly better than at all other directions (0°, MD = 7.71, p = 0.004; 
±16°, MD = 4.65, p = 0.003;  ±48°, MD = 6.75, p < 0.001; ±64°, MD = 9.43, p < 0.001). The 
main group effect for detection could not be present because using 1/2 and 1/4 contrast staircases 
guarantees that everyone has the same average detection rate, while group*motion direction 
interaction was non-significant: F(2.38, 107.28) = 1.43, p = 0.243 𝜂𝑝




Finally, we investigated whether the acquired priors of the motion directions affected the 
participants’ perception on trials where no stimulus was presented, but where participants 
reported both a motion direction (in estimation part) and seeing a stimulus (in detection part). 
We refer to this effect as hallucinations. To quantify whether participants were more likely to 
hallucinate motion stimulus around the most frequently presented motion directions, we 
multiplied the probability that participants estimated within 16° of these motion directions by 
the total number of bins: 
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𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 𝑝(𝜃𝑒𝑠𝑡 = ±32(±16)°) ∙ 𝑁𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑠                (6) 
 
This probability ratio would be equal to 1 if participants were equally likely to estimate within 
16° of ±32° as they were to estimate within the other bins of equal size.  
We found that the median value of ‘pratio’ was significantly greater than 1 for both ASD and 
control participants (median(𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ) = 2.92, p = 0.001 and median(𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ) = 3.00, p < 0.001, 
respectively; two-tailed signed-rank test), indicating that both groups hallucinated significantly 
more around the most frequent motion directions as opposed to all other directions (Fig. 3F). 
Bayesian statistical analysis provided anecdotal evidence for the groups being the same in this 
measure (BF01 = 2.52). Next, we also tested whether ASD participants differed from controls in 
the number of total hallucinations experienced in the task, but no differences were found (p = 
0.535, two-tailed rank-sum test; BF01 = 2.93).  
 
Figure 3. Performance on (A-E) low contrast trials and (F) no stimulus trials by control (blue 
lines) and ASD (yellow lines) participants. (A) Mean estimation bias (B) estimation standard 
deviation (i.e. variability) (C) lapse estimations, (D) reaction times during the estimation task, 
(E) the fraction of trials in which the stimulus was detected, (F) the fraction of no stimulus trials 
in which the stimulus was hallucinated. The error bars and shaded areas represent within-subject 
standard error. The vertical dashed lines correspond to the most frequently presented motion 
directions (i.e. ±32°). 
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ADOS, AQ and behaviour 
 
Next, we performed an exploratory analysis of the relationship between ASD severity and the 
main measures of interest: bias, variability and hallucinations. While all of participants in the 
ASD group had a previous diagnosis, not all of them scored above threshold when assessed with 
ADOS at the time of testing. We investigated whether ADOS positive vs ADOS negative group 
assignment was associated with performance differences and we also performed correlational 
analysis using total ADOS scores. Together, these results showed substantial evidence for 
ADOS having no effect on bias and variability, while for hallucinations the results remained 
inconclusive (Supplementary Fig. 4). 
 
We also investigated whether the negative relationship between AQ and the measures of bias, 
variability and hallucinations reported in Karvelis et al., (2018) was present in this sample. We 
examined this in each group separately, as well as pooling the data across the groups. The results 
converged to a substantial evidence for the null hypothesis for bias and variability, while for 





We fitted the models to the behavioral data and computed the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC). For robustness, we performed both fixed effects model comparison (summed BIC across 
individuals for each model) and random effects Bayesian model selection. Both analyses 
selected BAYES_P model (Fig. 2) as the winning model for both groups (Fig. 4). Model fits to 
the data also showed that BAYES_P was much better at fitting lapse estimations, confirming 
that such estimations followed the acquired prior distribution instead of being random (Fig. 5C 
and G).  
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Figure 4. Model comparison and selection. (A, B) Fixed effects model selection using Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC). X-axis measures the relative difference between BIC of each model 
(as indicated on Y-axis) and BIC of BAYES_P (winning model) summed across participants. 
Smaller BIC indicate a better model. For both groups BAYES_P provided the best model 
evidence. (C, D) Random effect Bayesian model selection. Higher protected exceedance 
probability indicates a model having a higher likelihood of being more frequent among the 
subjects. For both groups BAYES_P was the most likely model.  
 
 
Finally, we compared patients with controls on the basis of BAYES_P parameters (Fig. 4I-L). 
Consistent with the behavioral data results, none of the parameters were found to be different 
between the groups: the mode of the prior (p = 0.213, BF01 = 1.71) precision of the prior (p = 
0.939; BF01 = 3.28), precision of sensory likelihood (p = 0.197, BF01 = 2.10) and prior-based 
lapse estimations (p = 0.974, BF01 = 3.63). However, ASD group was less variable in the mode 
of the learnt prior (F(29,16) = 3.28, p = 0.015).  
 
4. Perceptual Bayesian inference in people with ASD diagnosis 127
 
Figure 5. Model fits and parameter estimates. (A-H) Model fits for the best fitting model 
BAYES_P (orange) and the second-best model BAYES (green), to the behavioral data (black). 
(A-D) Controls and (E-H) ASD participants. (A, E) Estimation bias, (B, F) estimation 
variability, (C, G) estimation lapse rate, (D, H) prior expectations of each individual (thin orange 
lines) and group average (thick orange line) as estimated via BAYES_P model. The vertical 
dashed lines correspond to the most frequently presented motion directions (i.e. ±32°). The error 
bars and shaded areas represent within-subject standard error. (I-L) Comparison of BAYES_P 
model parameter values for controls and ASD participants; jittered dots denote individual 
participants, colored areas represent density of the data points. (I) θp – the mean of acquired 
prior (p = 0.213, BF01 = 1.71), (J) σp – the uncertainty in the acquired prior (p = 0.939; BF01 = 
3.28), (K) σs – the uncertainty of sensory likelihood (p = 0.197, BF01 = 2.10), (L) αp – prior-





This study was motivated by the hypothesis that ASD is associated with a systematic imbalance 
in uncertainty inherent in sensory evidence (‘likelihood’) and prior expectations (‘prior’) 
(Pellicano & Burr, 2012; Brock, 2012; Lawson et al., 2014; Van de Cruys et al., 2014). More 
specifically, we sought to investigate whether the proposed imbalance arises from the likelihood 
or the prior, and if it is the latter, how it relates to rapid prior acquisition. We used a visual 
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motion estimation task (Chalk et al., 2010) in which priors are induced implicitly by presenting 
two of the motion directions more frequently. Importantly, the design of this task and the use of 
computational modelling enabled us to disentangle and quantitatively assess both priors and 
likelihoods.  
 
We found that ASD group showed no deficits in acquiring motion direction priors and exhibited 
comparable estimation biases and variability. Modelling results confirmed that ASD group did 
not exhibit any imbalances in weighting priors and likelihoods. At first glance, this stands in 
contradiction to our previous work using this same experimental design in the general population 
where we found that autistic traits - measured with Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) - were 
associated with more precise sensory likelihoods, which was expressed in reduced estimation 
biases and variability (Karvelis et al., 2018).  
 
One factor to consider for explaining such inconsistency would be our ASD sample. While all 
of participants in the ASD group had a previous diagnosis, it is worth noting that only 4 out of 
11 assessed with ADOS at the time of testing scored above the threshold. This raises a possibility 
that our negative result might be due to the ASD sample being unrepresentative of the ASD 
population. However, an exploratory analysis of ADOS and performance did not show any clear 
trends to support such idea (Supplementary Fig. 4). 
 
Another factor to consider for explaining the null finding is the assumption of continuity 
between autistic traits in the general population and ASD diagnosis. Using autistic traits to 
investigate hypotheses about ASD population is widespread and is justified by multiple studies 
reporting consistent effects along autistic traits and in clinical ASD: in abnormal sensory 
experiences (Horder et al., 2014; Robertson & Simmons, 2013) and in a variety of experimental 
tasks such as global dot motion (Grinter et al., 2009), visual search (Grinter et al., 2009; Almeida 
et al. 2010; Brock et al. 2011), block design test (Stewart et al. 2009) and emotion recognition 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).  While it is not surprising that findings in clinical ASD might not 
always generalize to autistic traits in neurotypicals (e.g., due to diminishing effects), it is much 
more difficult to explain why effects present along autistic traits would not be seen in the ASD 
population. Nonetheless, our study is not the only one in this regard. For instance, Ewbank et al. 
(2014, 2017) found reduced repetition suppression along autistic traits for faces, scenes and 
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simple shapes, while in a clinical ASD sample the effect was found only for faces but not shapes. 
A recent study by Lawson et al. (2018) investigating adaptation to social and non-social stimuli 
found autistic traits to be associated with reduced adaptation across both stimulus types, while 
adults with ASD diagnosis showed reduced adaptation only for the social eye-gaze stimulus. A 
possible explanation might be that factors other than the autistic endophenotype – such as 
generalized anxiety disorder (Ashwood et al., 2016) – contribute to autistic traits scores and are 
responsible for the observed inconsistencies (e.g., see Gregory & Plaisted-Grant, 2016, for 
discussion). Thus, while plenty of evidence supports continuum between autistic traits in 
neurotypicals and clinical ASD, caution should be taken when drawing conclusions about ASD 
based on the effects found along autistic traits.  
 
It is also worth noting that in the current controls group we did not replicate previous findings 
(Karvelis et al., 2018) of the negative relationship between AQ and sensory uncertainty as 
estimated via model fitting, nor with the associated behavioural measures of bias, variability and 
hallucinations (Supplementary Fig. 5). Pooling the data across the groups also showed 
evidence against the negative relationship between AQ and sensory uncertainty and the 
associated behavioural measures (Supplementary Fig. 5).  
 
Our findings of intact acquisition of motion direction priors, together with mixed findings of 
previous studies (intact priors: Spanò et al., 2016, Pell et al., 2016; Croydon et al., 2017; Van de 
Cruys et al., 2018; Utzerath et al., 2019; weaker priors: Powell et al., 2016; Skewes et al., 2015; 
Karaminis et al., 2016), speak against the idea that reduced reliance on prior in ASD is a general 
impairment. Further evidence against this idea comes from studies investigating individual 
differences in prior influence across different tasks and stimuli. Tulver et al. (2019) assessed 
prior effects in four different tasks within the same sample of participants: Kanizsa’s square 
illusion, detection of blurred words/non-words, two-tone (Mooney) face recognition and 
representational momentum task. Autistic traits were not found to modulate the strength of prior 
effects in any of the tasks. Furthermore, while correlations were found between some of the 
tasks, no common factor was found to explain the variability in prior effects across all tasks. 
Even within the domain of perceptual illusions alone such factor (whether mediated via autistic 
phenotype or not) does not show any signs of existing. Chouinard et al. (2016) used a battery of 
13 perceptual illusions and found reduced susceptibility along autistic traits to only 2 (Shepard’s 
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table-tops and Square-diamond). Similarly, Grzeczkowski et al. (2017, 2018) used a battery of 
7 perceptual illusions and found no correlations in illusion magnitude among most of the 
illusions, again suggesting no common factor for reliance on priors. All in all, these findings 
suggest that individual and ASD population differences in ‘reliance on priors’ do not generalize 
across different tasks and stimuli, even when the latter are very similar (e.g., in the case of similar 
perceptual illusions).   
 
More recent and more refined versions of the Bayesian accounts of ASD move beyond the 
simple idea of chronic prior and sensory precision imbalance and suggest this imbalance to be 
dependent on the hierarchical organization of environmental features and their (in)stability over 
time, i.e. volatility (for a review see Palmer et al., 2017). This would reformulate the hypothesis 
in terms of aberrant context-sensitive precision modulation in ASD. While no model-based 
experimental studies of hierarchical inference of environmental features have yet been reported, 
a couple of studies have deployed Hierarchical Gaussian Filter (HGF) (Mathys et al., 2014) to 
study inference and learning in ASD in changing environments. Sevgi et al. (2016) used HGF 
to analyse learning along non-clinical autistic traits in a reward-based learning task with social 
and non-social cues, reliability of which varied throughout the task. No differences in the 
hierarchical estimation of volatility was found, however autistic traits were associated with 
decreased reliance on the social cue at the decision-making stage. Lawson et al. (2017) used 
HGF to study adults with ASD in audio-visual associative learning task. ASD group was found 
to have higher meta-volatility estimates, which lead to smaller adjustments of their learning rate 
about stimuli contingencies when transitioning from stable to volatile phases of the task, while 
on average the learning rates were not found to be different. 
 
Another important step for ASD models in addition to incorporating the hierarchy of features 
and volatility would be to include the coupling between perception and action, i.e., active 
inference - this would account for differences in how information is sampled, which could 
underlie different learning trajectories and different inferences. While plenty of findings exist to 
motivate the development of models that integrate all of these elements (for a discussion see 
Palmer et al., 2017), they are yet to be developed and tested in the ASD population. 
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Supplementary Material 
 
Power analysis  
 
To determine the minimal sample size, we performed an a-priori power analysis. To estimate 
the effect size we would expect to find in the ASD population, we relied on our previous findings 
on ASD traits in the general population using the same task design (Karvelis et al., 2018). To 
obtain Cohen’s d from the correlational effects found in Karvelis et al. (2018), we dichotomized 
the data along Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) and compared ~25% lowest scores with ~25% 
highest scores: 20 participants within 0-15 AQ score vs. 23 participants within 25-41 AQ score, 
respectively. This resulted in the group AQ means being different by ~20 points, which is also 
the AQ difference found between the general population and ASD population (Ruzich et al., 
2015). We estimated effect sizes for two measures: 1) estimation variability, which was the 
strongest effect expressed behaviourally, and 2) sensory precision, which was derived from 
fitting a generative Bayesian model. For estimation variability Cohen’s d was found to be 1.01, 
while for sensory precision it was 0.81. 
 
We calculated that for 80% power and type I error rate of 5%, 14 participants in each group 
would suffice to detect behavioural effects in estimation variability, while for sensory precision 
we would need 21 participants per group, or alternatively, 16 ASD participants for a sample of 
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Supplementary Figure 1. Performance on high contrast trials: (A) detection rate and (B) rms 
error (right). Dashed lines indicate the exclusion criteria (70% detection and 30° RMS error). 
Participants who did not satisfy at least one of these criteria are denoted with a cross marker and 
were excluded from further analysis. In addition, one more participant was excluded (circled) 
due to poor detection performance on low stimulus trials (<30%). This resulted in 30 controls 
(CTR), 17 autism spectrum disorder (ASD) participants suitable for further data analysis.  
 
 
4. Perceptual Bayesian inference in people with ASD diagnosis 136
 
Supplementary Figure 2. 2/1 and 4/1 staircase contrast levels throughout the task. (A) Controls, 
(B) ASD participants. Both groups were found to reach convergence contrast levels after around 
100 trials. These trials were removed from further data analysis The groups did not differ in the 
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Emergence of prior effects 
 
We investigated at which point in the task the acquired expectations started to have a significant 
effect on performance and whether this was different for patients. To do so, we computed 
cumulative moving averages at every 55 trials for different measures of interest and tested for 
significance of the prior effects (Supplementary Fig. 3). In the order presented, we tested when 
the estimation reaction times (RT) at ±32° became shorter than at all other directions, when the 
detection at ±32° became higher than at all other directions, when the bias at ±64°   become more  
negative then  bias at ±32° and when the probability of hallucinating within 16° of ±32° became 
larger than at other directions (p_ratio; Eq. (6)). For all of these measures we performed one-
tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test pooling data across the groups to test for the effects of the prior, 
and two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test for comparing the groups at each step of 55 trials.  
 
We found that the effects of the acquired priors became significant within 110 trials for all 
measures, while there were no group differences in any measure at any point in the task 
(Supplementary Fig. 3). 
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Supplementary Figure 3: Emergence of prior effects in controls (blue boxplots) and ASD 
participants (yellow boxplots). Cumulative moving averages of median differences between (A) 
estimation RTs at ±32° and RTs at all other directions, (B) fraction of detected stimuli at ±32° 
and fraction detected at all other directions, (C) bias at ±64° with respect to bias at ±32°, and 
(D) cumulative moving averages of the probability ratio of hallucinating predominantly around   
±32 on no-stimulus trials. The boxplots indicate 25th and 75th percentiles, the black dash in 
between indicates the median. The significant effects of prior are indicated above each of the 
plots (one-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test), while significant group differences are indicated 
within the plots (two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test).  *, ** and *** denote significance levels 
at p<0.05, p<0.01, p<0.001 respectively.  
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Supplementary Figure 4: Exploratory analysis of ADOS vs the main measures of interest:  
(A, D) estimation bias, (B, E) estimation variability, (C, F) the number of hallucinations. (A-C) 
Comparing ADOS negative (orange) and ADOS positive (yellow) subgroups with controls 
(blue). Statistics reported on each panel are Bayesian Factors for the null hypothesis (BF01) based 
on one-sided U test: testing the hypothesis that controls show higher values for a given measure. 
(D-F) Correlational analysis using total ADOS score. p-values and BF01 denote one-sided 
Kendal’s Tau-b correlation: testing the hypothesis of a negative correlation between ADOS and 
behavioural measures. Together, the results provide substantial evidence against the hypothesis 
of a negative relationship between ADOS and the estimation measures of bias and variability. 
The evidence for a relationship between ADOS and the number of hallucinations, on the other 
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Supplementary Figure 5: Correlational analysis of AQ and the main variables of interest. 
Behavioural measures: (A) estimation bias, (B) estimation variability, (C) the number of 
hallucinations. BAYES_P model parameters of interest: (D) prior uncertainty, (E) sensory 
uncertainty, (F) prior-based lapse rate.  Kendal’s Tau-b correlation results are reported on each 
panel for controls (blue) and ASD group (yellow) separately as well as for pooled data (black). 
For bias, variability, hallucinations and sensory uncertainty the tests were one-tailed while for 




Supplementary Figure 6: Re-analysis of Karvelis et al. (2018) results using BAYES_P model. 
(A) prior mean, (B) prior uncertainty, (C) sensory uncertainty, (D) prior-based lapse rate. 
Kendal’s Tau-b correlation results and two-sided p-values are reported above each plot. The 
correlation between AQ and sensory uncertainty is significant (𝜏𝑏 = -0.164, p = 0.031). This 
replicates the main finding of Karvelis et al. (2018) that was based on analysing model 
‘BAYES’. The latter model assumed uniformly distributed lapse estimations, while in 
BAYES_P lapse estimations followed the acquired prior distribution.  
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Modelling 
 
          
Response strategy models (‘ADD’) 
 
We controlled for the possibility that the task behaviour might be explained by simple 
behavioural strategies that do not involve Bayesian integration (Laquitaine & Gardner, 2018). 
This class of models assumed that participants did not combine their expectations with sensory 
information but relied on either of them alone on any given trial.  
  
The first model, ‘ADD1r’, assumed that estimations derived from prior expectations were 
simply sampled from a learnt prior distribution, pprior(θ), which was parameterized as in Eq (4) 
- a symmetrical bimodal distribution with nodes at θp and -θp and widths of σp. However, on 
trials when participants did perceive motion direction, it was based solely on the sensory input, 
plikelihood(θs|θact) = V (θact, σs).  
 
Putting together the estimations derived from sensory input and the ones derived from learnt 
expectations, and the possibility of random estimations, the average distribution of estimation 
responses for a single participant is: 
  
p(θest|θact) = (1 − α)· [(1 − a) · plikelihood(θs|θact) + a · pprior(θ)] ∗V(0,σm) + α,                                             (9) 
  
where the asterisk (∗) denotes convolution and ‘a’ is the probability that on any given trial the 
sample will be drawn from the prior; following the winning ‘Switching Observer Model’ model 




2). Just like BAYES and BAYES_P, the resulting ‘ADD1r’ model had 4 free 
parameters (θp, σp, σs and α).  
 
The second model, ‘ADD2r’, was the same as ‘ADD1r’ except that it had more complex strategy 
for trials when participants relied on the prior: instead of sampling from the complete acquired 
prior distribution ranging from −180◦ to +180◦ (Eq.  (4)), they sampled only from the negative 
(−180° to 0°) or the positive (0° to +180°) half, depending on which side of the distribution the 
actual stimulus occurred on: 
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ppriorN (θ) = V (−θp, σp)                                (10) 
ppriorP (θ) = V (θp, σp)                                        (11) 
  
Incorporating this into the distribution of estimation responses results in: 
 
p(θest|θact) = (1 − α) · [(1 − a ) · plikelihood(θs|θact)  
  + a · ((1 – b(θ)) ppriorN (θ) + b(θ) · ppriorP (θ)]  
  ∗ V(0,σm) + α ,     (12) 
  
where asterisk (∗) denotes convolution; b (θ) determines the proportion of trials in which 
participants sample from either negative or positive parts of the prior distribution, respectively; 
‘b’ could take different values for each of the 5 angles: 0◦, ±16◦, ±32◦, ±48◦, ±64◦). The resulting 
model had 9 parameters.  
 
Finally, we also considered two variations of the ‘ADD1r’ and ‘ADD2r’ models. These were 
identical to ‘ADD1r’ and ‘ADD2r’ except from setting σp to zero (i.e. no uncertainty in 
expectations); that is, on trials when perceptual estimates were derived only from expectations, 
they were equal to the mode of the learnt distribution. This also meant that ‘a’ was now estimated 
as a free parameter. These models are referred to as ‘ADD1r_m’ and ‘ADD2r_m’.  
 
Note that in our previous publications (Chalk et al., 2010; Karvelis et al., 2018, Valton et al., 
2019) ‘a’ was an angle-dependent free parameter which could take different values for each of 
the 5 angles: 0◦, ±16◦, ±32◦, ±48◦, ±64◦), effectively adding 5 extra parameters to each of the 
ADD* models. The reduced versions of these models (hence the letter ‘r’) presented in this paper 
were found to outperform the previous versions of the models and for conciseness the old 




We used the performance in trials with the highest contrast level to estimate motor noise, σm, 
for each individual. We assumed that at this level sensory uncertainty was close to zero (σs ≈ 0). 
To account for lapse estimations, the motor noise was determined by fitting estimation responses 
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at the highest contrast level to the distribution in Eq. (2) using the actual motion direction, θact, 
as the mean. The estimated motor noise of each individual was used in all the subsequent model 
fitting as a fixed parameter. 
 
The free parameters of each model were estimated by fitting the response data from the two 
staircased contrast levels (~200 trials per participant). For each model with a set of free 
parameters M, we computed the probability distribution p(θest | θact ; M) of making an estimate 
θest given the actual stimulus direction θact. For the response strategy models, by definition, the 
p(θest | θact ; M) corresponds to average behaviour in the task (Equations 9 and 12). Bayesian 
models, on the other hand, explicitly model trial-to-trial variability in the posterior estimate, 
which in our case is the mean of the posterior (Eq. (6)). To relate this to the behavioural data we 
built a distribution of 1,000 samples for each presented angle (where each sample is the mean 
of the posterior obtained via Eq. (6) and perturbed by motor noise via Eq. (7) or (8)). 
 
The parameters were estimated by maximizing the fit of the log likelihood function for the 
experimental data for each participant individually: 
 
   𝑀 =  argmax
𝑀
[∑ log (p(𝜃𝑒𝑠𝑡  =  𝜃𝑖,𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎|𝜃𝑖))
𝑛
𝑖 ] ,                  (13) 
  
where θi,data  is participant’s estimation response, θi is the actual presented motion direction  on  
the  ith trial and n is the number of trials. The maximum likelihood was found using 
fminsearchbnd function in Matlab, by minimizing negative log-likelihood. Parameters α, a and 
b were bounded between 0 and 1, while θp, σp and σs were bounded from 0 to ∞. To reduce the 
possibility of convergence at local maxima we performed 20 different initializations with 
parameter values randomly sampled from the range that we found in our previous work (Chalk 




To compare the model fits we used Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), which approximates 
the log of model evidence (e.g., see Burnham and Anderson, 2004): 
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  −2 · log(P (D|M )) ≈ BIC = −2 · log(P (D|M, Θ)) + k · log(n)   ,                 (14) 
 
where M is model, D is observed data and P (D|M, Θ) is the likelihood of generating the 
experimental data given the most likely set of parameters, Θ; k is the number of model 
parameters and n is the number of data points (or equivalently, the number of trials). BIC 
evaluates the model by balancing the goodness of fit with model complexity (i.e. the number of 
model parameters) to avoid over-fitting. Lower BIC score indicates a better model. We also 
performed a random effect Bayesian model selection analysis (Rigoux et al., 2014). For this, we 
used the VBA Matlab toolbox (Daunizeau et al., 2014), and used participant-level BIC as an 





To test the reliability of the parameter estimates of our winning BAYES_P model we performed 
parameter recovery. The details of this analysis have already been reported in Valton et al. 
(2019). We found that the winning BAYES_P model recovered parameters very well, which 
was reflected in the coefficient of determination (R2) for all recovered parameters being R2 ≥ 
0.84: prior mean, R2 = 0.96, prior precision, R2 = 0.89, sensory precision, R2 = 0.84, prior-based 

















Burnham, K.P. and Anderson, D.R., 2004. Multimodel inference: understanding AIC and 
BIC in model selection. Sociological methods & research, 33(2), 261-304. 
Chalk, M., Seitz, A.R., Seriès, P., 2010. Rapidly learned stimulus expectations alter 
perception of motion. Journal of Vision 10, 2. 
Daunizeau, J., Adam, V. and Rigoux, L., 2014. VBA: a probabilistic treatment of 
nonlinear models for neurobiological and behavioural data. PLoS Computational 
Biology, 10(1), p.e1003441 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.-G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G*Power 3: A flexible 
statistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. 
Behavior Research Methods, 39, 175-191 
Rigoux, L., Stephan, K.E., Friston, K.J. and Daunizeau, J., 2014. Bayesian model 
selection for group studies—revisited. Neuroimage, 84, pp.971-985. 
Ruzich, E., Allison, C., Smith, P., Watson, P., Auyeung, B., Ring, H., & Baron-Cohen, 
S. (2015). Measuring autistic traits in the general population: a systematic review of 
the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) in a nonclinical population sample of 6,900 
typical adult males and females. Molecular autism, 6(1), 2. 
Karvelis, P., Seitz, A. R., Lawrie, S. M., & Seriès, P. (2018). Autistic traits, but not 
schizotypy, predict increased weighting of sensory information in Bayesian visual 
integration. eLife, 7, e34115. 
Laquitaine, S., & Gardner, J. L. (2018). A Switching Observer for Human Perceptual 
Estimation. Neuron, 97(2), 462–474.  
 
 
4. Perceptual Bayesian inference in people with ASD diagnosis 146
Part II




Repulsive biases in the Moving
Dots task
5.1 Introduction
In all of the analyses presented in the first part of the thesis, as well as in all other
previous studies using the same task (Chalk et al., 2010; Gekas et al., 2013), par-
ticipants exhibited non-zero biases at the most frequent directions. As a result,
the modes of the recovered priors also showed a systematic shift away from the
most frequent directions (e.g., see Fig. 6b and 6d in Karvelis et al., 2018),
suggesting that the recovered priors were capturing additional effects to those of
induced expectations for the most frequent directions. This exemplifies one of the
main dangers of Bayesian models: any non-Bayesian task effects will inevitably
be explained by the prior if not explicitly accounted for (e.g., see Bowers and
Davis, 2012). The goal of this chapter is to account for these effects and reassess
the individual and group differences in our data.
We speculated that these additional effects might originate from other pre-
existing priors, possibly relating to the global coordinates. In our task, the stimuli
148
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motion directions are set relative to the central reference angle, which is randomly
chosen for each individual. Randomizing this angle is meant to ensure that any
potential effects arising from the global coordinates - i.e., with respect to the
cardinals (horizontal and vertical directions) - are averaged out when analysing
group data. However, this might not completely work. The two most frequent
directions divide the 360˝ circle into two unequal regions: one of 64˝ and another
of 296˝. This means that despite selecting the central reference angle randomly,
the cardinal directions are more likely to fall within the larger region thus exert-
ing more effects in this region when averaging across individuals.
This, however, still does not explain how the cardinal directions are affecting
performance in our task. One possibility could be that people have a prior for car-
dinal directions. One of the classical examples of perceptual priors is the prior for
cardinal orientations (Tomassini et al., 2010; Girshick et al., 2011). These studies
showed that the biases that people exhibit when making perceptual judgements
about Gabor stimuli orientation can be well explained by a prior for cardinal di-
rections. Furthermore, they showed that such prior corresponds to natural scene
statistics. While these reports are constrained to orientation judgements only, we
might expect to find similar priors in motion direction judgements.
Another possibility might relate to what is known as reference repulsion.
Rauber and Treue (1998) studied motion direction judgements using random-
dot patterns (RDPs) and found repulsive biases (of up to 9˝) from the cardinal
directions - which were not explicitly marked in any way. Similarly, in a different
condition the authors used an explicit cue - a line segment oriented to a particular
direction - presented together with the stimuli and found repulsive biases from
this cue too. This suggested an interpretation that cardinal directions are used
as implicit reference directions.
5. Repulsive biases in the Moving Dots task 150
While the exact mechanism via which reference repulsion arises is still not
completely understood, a few accounts have been put forward. Jazayeri and
Movshon (2007) investigated reference repulsion using an explicit cue and pro-
posed a non-Bayesian model where the repulsion originates at the decoding stage
via a non-uniform read-out profile of the sensory likelihood, which gives higher
weight to more informative neuron populations. Wei and Stocker (2015) pre-
sented a Bayesian model in which the repulsion originates from the encoding
stage via efficient coding of the sensory likelihood. Contrary to Wei and Stocker
model, however, Zamboni et al. (2016) demonstrated reference repulsion to be
a post-perceptual bias. Zamboni and colleagues examined reference repulsion in
two conditions: 1) when the the reference cue was present during both stimulus
presentation and estimation stage and 2) when the cue was only present during
stimulus presentation but not during the estimation. The repulsive biases were
observed only in the first condition suggesting that reference repulsion happens
at the decision-making stage and is not perceptual. However, Luu and Stocker
(2018) re-analyzed this data with their proposed model and found that reference
repulsion, while much weaker, was still present in the second condition. In Luu
and Stocker model the repulsion arises from a post-decision self-consistency prin-
ciple applied to perceptual inference. According to this principle, when stimulus
estimation is preceded by a discrimination/categorical judgement (either explicit
or implicit), it truncates the part of the posterior distribution that extends out-
side of the selected category (i.e. setting the posterior probability to zero in that
region). Such truncation effectively shifts the mean of the posterior, giving rise to
repulsive biases. Fritsche and de Lange (2019) performed a series of experiments
that further elaborated on such mechanisms. Their results suggested that the
preceding discrimination judgement leads to repulsion effects via working mem-
ory representations, thus further supporting the idea of reference repulsion being
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of non-perceptual nature (although see Kuang (2019) for an alternative view).
In what is presented below, we incorporate the above ideas and models in
trying to explain the unaccounted biases observed in our data. Note, however,
that most of these studies investigated reference repulsion by using explicit refer-
ence cues, while in our task only implicit reference directions are possible. This
adds an additional element of uncertainty as to what mechanism we might ex-
pect to underlie the effects observed in our task. For that reason we aimed to
be comprehensive and did not rule out any of these proposals a priori. Apart
from finding a model that fits the data well we placed a particular focus on: 1)
examining whether the results of this new model changes the interpretation of
our previous analyses and 2) assessing individual and group differences in relation
to the additional effects captured by the model.
5.2 Methods
5.2.1 Behavioral data analysis
Before any modelling, we re-examined the behavioral data to gain insight into
what these additional effects might be. We remapped the behavioral data from
the relative coordinates as it had been in all of the analysis thus far - i.e. coor-
dinates relative to the central reference angle - into the absolute coordinates. To
achieve this, we binned the response data by dividing the 360˝ circle into 45 bins
of size 8˝. This meant that for any given bin only „ 36% of participants had any
data for it - that is because each participant was tested within a range of 128˝
around their central reference angle (between ´64˝ and 64˝), which is „ 36% of
the whole range. This also meant that the group averages were „ 3 times noisier
than in our previous analysis. Nevertheless, this averaged out the effects of the
acquired priors and left us with the effects arising from the absolute coordinates.
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5.2.2 Models
Our modelling approach started with establishing a baseline model. For that, we
wanted a model in which the prior reflected only the acquired prior for the two
most frequent directions (˘32˝). Since our previous winning model BAYES_P
already captured not only the prior for ˘32˝ but the combined influence of all the
other effects that were at play, it was not suitable for this purpose. Instead, we
constructed a reduced version of BAYES_P, where we fixed the mean of the prior
to be at ˘32˝, because that is where we would expect the mean of the acquired
prior to be in the absence of any other effects. We abbreviated this model BP-A
(i.e. BAYES_P - Acquired prior only). In all other respects the implementation
of BP-A was the same as BAYES_P, the full details of which can be found in
Chapter 4. For clarity and ease of reference, however, a brief description of the
model implementation is provided below.
The prior in BP-A was parameterised as two von Mises distributions with
modes fixed at ˘32˝ and with widths of σp:
ppriorpθq “
1
2rV p´32,σpq`V p32,σpqs , (5.1)
As in the previous models, the likelihood was parameterised as a von Mises
distribution with width σs:
plikelihoodpθs|θq “ V pθs,σsq , (5.2)
where θs was drawn from another von Mises distribution centred on the ac-
tual presented motion direction θact with the same variance σs (i.e. V pθact,σsq)
to account for trial-to-trial variability.
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The posterior of the stimulus motion direction, θ, was then be computed via:
pposteriorpθ|θsq 9 ppriorpθq ¨plikelihoodpθs|θq . (5.3)




θ ¨pposteriorpθ|θsq dθ (5.4)
Finally, by accounting for motor noise, σm, and prior-based lapse estimations,
αp, the probability distribution of estimation responses, θest, was obtained via:
ppθest|θpercq “ p1´αpq ¨V pθperc,σmq`αp . (5.5)
BP-A had a total of 3 free parameters: σp - prior uncertainty, σs - sensory
uncertainty and αp - prior-based lapse rate. Next, we considered a variety of
models that built on top of BP-A, to account for the additional effects.
5.2.2.1 Efficient coding model: BP-AEC
First, we augmented BP-A by considering efficient coding of the sensory repre-
sentations as proposed by Wei and Stocker (2015). Efficient coding in this case is
assumed to be achieved by maximizing mutual information between the stimulus
variable and its sensory representation. Under this constrain, the square root of
Fisher information can be shown to be proportional to the prior distribution of
the stimulus (
a
Jpθq 9 ppθq). We can then map stimulus space to sensory space
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where we use a uniform prior and use notation θ̃“ F pθq to denote the sensory
space variable. We then perform inverse mapping, θ “ F´1pθ̃q, back to the stim-
ulus space using the prior distribution that a participant had in our task. This
results in sensory representations that are asymmetric, with a longer tail away
from the most expected directions (Fig. 5.1) - which sets the stage for repulsive
biases.
Figure 5.1: An example of the transformation of sensory representations following
efficient coding. (A) Sensory likelihoods for different presented motion directions
in the sensory space or under the assumption of a uniform prior distribution (B).
(C) Sensory likelihoods for different motion directions in the stimulus space after
transformation using the prior in our task (D) - which was assumed to be the
combined prior of the most frequent and cardinal directions. The dashed lines
indicate the two most frequent directions, while the dotted lines indicate the
cardinal directions.
The transformations were performed according to a combined prior which was
a product of the acquired prior and the cardinal prior. The assumption of the
cardinal prior for this model was necessary so as to make it possible to account
for the repulsive biases with respect to the cardinals seen in the behavioral data.
The cardinal prior was parameterised as 4 von Mises distributions centered on
-90, 0, 90 and 180:
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pcardinalpθq “
1
4rV p´90´ zr, σcq`V p0´ zr, σcq
`V p90´ zr, σcq`V p180´ zr,σcqs ,
(5.7)
where the width around each peak is a free parameter σc, and zr is the central
reference angle (unique to each participant), which here serves to convert the
cardinal prior from absolute to relative coordinates. The combined prior was
simply:
pcombinedpθq “ ppriorpθqpcardinalpθq , (5.8)






Apart from this transformation, and replacing Eq. 5.3 with Eq. 5.9, the
implementation of this model was exactly the same as BP-A and it had one addi-
tional free parameter - the width of the cardinal prior, σc. We termed this model
BP-AEC.
5.2.2.2 Self-consistency models: BP-ASC4 and BP-ASC40
Another model we tested was based on the self-consistency principle proposed by
Luu and Stocker (2018). We reasoned that in our task, before making a precise
estimate of the stimulus motion direction direction, participants might be first
making an implicit categorical judgement, C P tc1, c2, c3, c4u, about the quadrant
of the motion direction - the boundaries of these quadrants being at the cardinal
directions. This preceding judgement would truncate the part of the posterior dis-
tribution that falls outside of the judged quadrant. The truncation would result
in the mean of the posterior shifting away from the boundary of that quadrant,
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giving rise to repulsive biases (Fig. 5.2).
Figure 5.2: An illustration of how truncation of the posterior affects its mean
estimate. Blue line - the untruncated posterior. Red - posterior truncated at
the boundaries of the judged quadrant. Yellow line - posterior truncated at the
boundaries of the quadrant and at the central reference angle. The colored dashed
vertical lines indicate the means of the corresponding distributions. The dotted
lines indicate cardinal directions.
In computational terms, a categorical judgement, Ĉ, has to be made based on
a noisy sensory estimate θs of the actual motion direction θact. For a symmetric
loss function, this means choosing the category with the highest posterior proba-
bility; as we assumed the prior ppCq to be uniform, it was equivalent to choosing










where ppθs|θq was defined as in the previous models as a von Mises distribution
with a mean θ and variance σs. ppθ|Cq was defined as a boxcar function which
is uniform within an interval that spans a given category and is zero outside of
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this interval.
The posterior of motion direction on a given trial is then conditioned on the
categorical judgement:
ppθ|θs, Ĉq 9 ppθ|θsq ¨ΠĈpθq , (5.12)
where ΠĈ is a boxcar function with boundaries determined by the estimated
category Ĉ.
Apart from the categorical dependence described here, and replacing Eq. 5.3
with Eq. 5.12, the model was implemented in the same way as BP-A and it
had the same 3 free parameters. We termed this model BP-ASC4 for a self-
consistency principle stemming from the 4 cardinal directions.
Since our initial analysis showed that the effects of truncation at cardinals
were insufficient to account for the additional biases around the central reference
angle, we hypothesised that participants might be making an additional cate-
gorical judgement, C 1 P tc´, c`u, for the stimulus being counterclockwise, c´, or
clockwise, c`, from the central reference angle, leading to further truncation of
the posterior (Fig. 5.2). In mathematical notation this can be expressed as:
ppθ|θs, Ĉ, Ĉ 1q 9 ppθ|θsq ¨ΠĈpθq ¨ΠĈ1pθq , (5.13)
where we assumed the estimate of the category, Ĉ 1, to be made in the same
way as described in Eq. 5.10. Thus, the final model, BP-ASC40, truncated the
posterior both at the boundaries of the quadrant and at the central reference
angle. BP-ASC40 had the same 3 free parameters as BP-A.
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5.2.2.3 Non-mechanistic repulsion models: BP-AR4 and BP-AR40
Finally, as the models considered above did not account for the repulsive effects
well (see Section A.2 in Appendix), we resorted to implementing models that
are agnostic to the mechanisms producing repulsive biases, but instead model
them explicitly. Such models, again, were equivalent to BP-A, but had a repulsive
bias added at the post-perceptual stage. First, we considered repulsive biases
from the cardinal directions. This was implemented as a periodic linear function


































p1´ 4π pθ`πqqr4 if ´180ă θ ă´90
p1´ 4π pθ`
π
2 qqr4 if ´90ă θ ă 0
p1´ 4π θqr4 if 0ă θ ă 90
p1´ 4π pθ´
π
2 qqr4 if 90ă θ ă 180
0 if θ P t180, 90, 0, ´90u
(5.14)
where r4 is a free parameter that captures the amplitude of repulsive bias
from the cardinals. These effects entered the model at Eq. 5.5, resulting in:
ppθest|θpercq “ p1´αpq ¨V pθperc` b4pθact` zrq,σmq`αp , (5.15)
where the central reference angle, zr, again serves to convert the effects from
absolute to relative coordinates. In all other aspects this model was implemented
as BP-A. It had one additional free parameter, r4. We termed this model BP-
AR4.
Similarly to BP-ASC40, we also considered a model where in addition to
repulsion from the cardinals, there was a repulsion from the central reference
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Figure 5.3: An illustration of post-perceptual repulsive biases functions from
the cardinals (b4; blue line; Eq. 5.14) and from the central reference angle (b0,
red line; Eq. 5.16) that were used for models BP-AR4 (only b4) and BP-AR40
(both b4 and b0). r4 and r0 control the amplitude of each function (b4 and b0,
respectively) and were included in the models as free parameters.
angle. This was also implemented as a linear function of motion direction. For
simplicity, we assumed the slope of this function to be such that the bias would

















´p1` θ 16π45 qr0 if θ ă 0
p1´ θ 16π45 qr0 if θ ą 0
0 if θ “ 0
(5.16)
with an additional parameter, r0, to capture the amplitude of the bias from
the central reference angle. The distribution of estimated motion directions was
then obtained by replacing Eq. 5.5 with:
ppθest|θpercq “ p1´αpq ¨V pθperc` b4pθact` zrq` b0pθactq,σmq`αp , (5.17)
This model was termed BP-AR40, and it had a total of 5 free parameters. All
models are summarized in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Summary of all repulsion models and their relationships. Parameter
meanings: σp - prior uncertainty, σs - sensory uncertainty, αp - prior-based lapses,
σc - cardinal prior uncertainty, r4 - amplitude of repulsion from the cardinals, r0
- amplitude of repulsion from the central reference angle
Model Descrption Free parameters
BP-A A baseline model with the acquired prior only: identical toBAYES_P but with prior mean fixed at 32˝ σp, σs, αp
BP-AEC Like BP-A, but with an added cardinal prior and efficientcoding of sensory likelihood (Wei and Stocker, 2015) σp, σs, αp, σc
BP-ASC4
Like BP-A, but with truncation of the posterior distribution
at cardinal directions following the self-consistency
principle (Luu and Stocker, 2018)
σp, σs, αp
BP-ASC40 Like BP-ASC4, but with an additional truncation of theposterior distribution at the central reference angle σp, σs, αp
BP-AR4 Like BP-A, but with a repulsive bias from the cardinalsadded at the post-perceptual stage σp, σs, αp, r4
BP-AR40 Like BP-AR4, but with an additional repulsive bias fromthe central reference angle added at the post-perceptual stage σp, σs, αp, r4, r0
5.2.3 Model fitting
Model fitting followed the same procedure as for the Bayesian models in the pre-
vious chapters. The models were fit by maximizing the log likelihood function
for the motion estimation data for each participant individually. The maximum
likelihood was found using fminsearchbnd function in Matlab, by minimizing neg-
ative log-likelihood. αp was bounded between 0 and 1, while σp, σs, r4 and r0
were bounded from 0 to 8. To reduce the possibility of convergence at local
maxima we performed 20 different initializations with parameter values sampled
randomly within a range found in previous studies (Karvelis et al., 2018; Valton
et al., 2019) for parameters αp, σp and σs, while for r4 and r0 the range was [0 25]
and [0 10], respectively. The latter were based on the maximum range determined
after an initial unconstrained exploration of the parameter space.
5.2.4 Model comparison
As in the previous chapters, to compute the log of model evidence we used
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) approximation:
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logpP pD|Mqq « ´BIC2 “ logpP pD|M,Θ̂qq`k ¨ logpnq (5.18)
where M is model, D is observed data and P (D|M,Θ̂) is the likelihood of
generating the experimental data given a set of parameters,Θ̂; k is the number of
model parameters and n is the number of data points (i.e. trials). To compare the
models we performed a random-effect Bayesian model selection (BMS) analysis
(Stephan et al., 2009b) using VBA Matlab toolbox (Daunizeau et al., 2014). In
random-effect BMS, model comparison is based on exceedance probability (EP),
which expresses the likelihood that any given model is more frequent than all
other models. Correcting for chance variations in model frequencies (Rigoux





where subscript k denotes kth model from the total of K models being com-
pared; BOR is Bayesian Omnibus Risk, which quantifies the chance likelihood of





where y contains log model evidences (as computed in Eq. 5.18) of all sub-
jects and all models, H0 assumes that model frequencies are all the same and H1
assumes that at least one of the models is more frequent. Thus, the higher the
BOR estimate, the less differences there will be in PEP of different models.
Since random-effects BMS was often inconclusive, we also performed fixed-
effects model comparison. For this we summed the BIC across all participants and
used this sum to compare the models. Unlike random-effects model comparison,
this assumes that all participants in the group are best fit by the same model.
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5.2.5 Model and parameter recovery
Modelling results, and their robustness, can be affected by many factors, such as
parameterisation of models, amount of data used for model fitting, chosen model
fitting methods, etc. A general way to account for these factors and to assess the
overall reliability of modelling results is to perform model and parameter recovery
(e.g., see Palminteri et al., 2017). Given the constraints of the mentioned factors,
model recovery shows the distinguishability of models, while parameter recovery
shows reliability of parameter estimates.
For each model, we generated 100 sets of parameters (100 synthetic individ-
uals), by sampling the distributions of parameter values found in our general
population sample. We then simulated 200 responses for each synthetic partici-
pant (just as we had „200 responses per participant in our data). Every model
was then fitted to every simulated dataset following the same model fitting proce-
dure as described in the previous section. We then performed model comparison
for every simulated dataset, also as described in the previous section.
We also analysed how well the parameters were recovered by the winning
model. This was done by comparing parameters that simulated the data (’actual
parameters’) with the parameters estimated from the simulated data (’recovered
parameters’) using the coefficient of determination (R2) obtained from regress
function in Matlab.
5.2.6 Datasets
The behavioral data analysis of repulsion effects and most of the modelling analy-
sis was done using the general population data (N “ 83) from Chapter 2, as this
was our largest sample. Then we used the same modelling approach to investigate
SCZ sample (from Chapter 3) and ASD sample (from Chapter 4).
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5.2.7 Statistical tests
The behavioral performance effects with respect to the absolute coordinates were
tested using a linear mixed model in SPSS version 25. Whenever there was peri-
odicity in the effects, the data was folded accordingly to reduce the noise before
running the test: e.g., folding the data with respect to 0˝ would mean averaging
data points at an equal absolute distance from the 0˝ angle. Due to the presence
of outliers and non-normalities in the data, correlation analysis of personality
traits and model parameters was done using Kendall’s Tau-b correlation. Wher-
ever relevant, the evidence for the null hypothesis was evaluated by computing
Bayes factors (BF01) using JASP version 0.10 (JASP Team, 2019), with the de-
fault Cauchy prior of scale 0.707. Bayes factor below 3 is generally considered
inconclusive, above 3 is considered moderate evidence, above 10 is strong evidence
and above 30 is very strong evidence (Kass and Raftery, 1995).
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Behavioral results
Analyzing estimation biases with respect to the absolute coordinates revealed
strong biases (up to „ 10˝) that exhibited periodicity tied to the cardinal direc-
tions (Fig. 5.4). These effects were highly significant (the main effect of absolute
motion direction: F p11,83.04q “ 10.10, pă 10´5) and suggested repulsive biases
from the cardinal directions.
5.3.2 Modelling results
We fitted and compared five models that built on top of our baseline model
BP-A. We computed log model evidence using BIC approximation and used
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Figure 5.4: Average group (N “ 83) biases on low contrast trials. (A) Biases
calculated with respect to the central reference angle that was randomly selected
for each individual. The vertical dashed lines indicate the two most frequently
presented motion directions. (B) Biases calculated with respect to the absolute
coordinates. The vertical dashed lines indicate the cardinal directions. The error
bars represent within-subject standard error. For other behavioral measures with
respect to absolute motion direction coordinates see Section A.1 in Appendix.
both random-effects BMS analysis and fixed-effect analysis to compare the mod-
els. Random-effects BMS was not completely conclusive, with the best model,
BP-AR40, having PEP = 0.21 (Fig. 5.5A); before BOR correction, however,
BP-AR40 was chosen with EP = 0.74. Furthermore, fixed-effects analysis also
favoured BP-AR40 model, it being better than the next best model (BP-AR4)
by 96 BIC units (Fig. 5.5B).
Comparing the fits of the two best-fitting models BP-AR4 and BP-AR40, and
the baseline model BP-A, we can observe that while repulsion from the cardinals
was fully accounted for by BP-AR4 (orange line, Fig. 5.5D), these effects only
partially accounted for the repulsive biases observed relative to the central ref-
erence angle (orange line, Fig. 5.5B). An additional repulsion from the central
reference angle - model BP-AR40 - provided a much better fit to the biases in
these coordinates (purple line, Fig. 5.5C) while accounting for repulsion from
the cardinals just as well (purple line, Fig. 5.5D).
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Figure 5.5: Model comparison and model fits for repulsion analysis. (A) Random-
effects Bayesian model selection results; PEP - protected exceedance probability.
(B) Fixed-effects model comparison. Note that the plot shows the difference
between the model with the lowest BIC and the remaining models. BP-AR40
had the lowest BIC with 96 units lead. (C) Model predictions of bias relative
to the central reference angle by the two best fitting models (BP-AR40 and BP-
AR4) and the baseline model (BP-A). The vertical dashed lines indicate the two
most frequently presented motion directions. (D) Predictions of the same models
for biases relative to the absolute coordinates.The vertical dashed lines indicate
the cardinal directions. The error bars represent within-subject standard error.
See Section A.2 in Appendix for complete model fits of all models.
5.3.2.1 BP-AR40 parameters vs traits
Next, we studied how variation in BP-AR40 model parameters related to autistic
(AQ) and schizotypy (SPQ and RISC) traits. AQ scores were found to negatively
correlate with sensory uncertainty (τb “´0.184,p“ .015; Fig. 5.6A) - in agree-
ment with our previous modelling analysis using BAYES_P, which ignored the
repulsion effects. However, BP-AR40 also suggested a significant negative rela-
tionship between AQ and prior-based lapses (τb “´0.155,p“ .041; Fig. 5.6B),
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which had not reached significance in BAYES_P model (p“ 0.083; see Supple-
mentary Fig. 6 in Chapter 4). No other correlations with AQ were significant
(prior uncertainty, σp : τb “ 0.07, BF01 “ 4.6; repulsion from cardinals, r4 : τb “
´0.002, BF01 “ 6.9; and central reference angle, r0 : τb “´0.038, BF01 “ 6.1).
Figure 5.6: Significant results of BP-AR40 model parameter analysis. (A) σs -
uncertainty of the prior distribution vs AQ. (B) αp - prior-based lapse rate vs AQ.
(C) r0 - repulsion from the central reference angle vs RISC (D) r0 - repulsion
from the central reference angle vs SPQ (N=39). Two-tailed Kendall’s Tau-b
correlations are reported above each panel.
For schizotypy traits we found a negative correlation with the repulsion from
the central reference angle. This correlation was found using both RISC (N=83;
τb “ ´0.194, p “ .01; Fig. 5.6C) and SPQ (N=39; τb “ ´0.281, p “ .013;
Fig. 5.6D) measures. No other correlations were significant for both RISC
(prior uncertainty, σp : τb “ 0.001, BF01 “ 6.9; sensory uncertainty, σs : τb “
0.071, BF01 “ 4.5; prior-based lapses, αp : τb “ 0.124, BF01 “ 1.8, p “ .1; re-
pulsion from cardinals, r4 : τb “ 0.047, BF01 “ 5.8) and SPQ (prior uncertainty,
σp : τb “ 0.098, BF01 “ 3.3; sensory uncertainty, σs : τb “ ´0.035, BF01 “ 4.6;
prior-based lapses, αp : τb “ ´0.046, BF01 “ 4.4; repulsion from cardinals, r4 :
τb “ 0.145, BF01 “ 2.1, p“ .2).
5.3.2.2 Model comparison for SCZ and ASD groups
We also fitted the models to our other datasets: SCZ (described in Chapter 3)
and ASD (described in Chapter 4) to analyze group differences between controls
and clinical groups. Random-effect BMS results were mostly inconclusive for the
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patient groups with BOR being 0.99 in SCZ and 0.96 in ASD - meaning that
differences in model frequencies were likely due to chance, hence, PEP was very
similar for all models. For controls, however, BP-AR40 (PEP = 0.40) and BP-
AR4 (PEP = 0.33) showed a clear advantage over other models (Fig. 5.7A-C).
Figure 5.7: Model comparison for patient groups. (A-C) Random-effects
Bayesian model selection; PEP - protected exceedance probability. (D-F) Fixed-
effects model comparison. Note that the plots show the difference between the
model with the lowest BIC and the remaining models. (A,D) Controls, (B,E)
participants with schizophrenia, (C,F) participants with ASD. Fixed effects anal-
ysis showed BP-AR40 to be the winning model in the control group (with 73 BIC
units difference from the next best fitting model) while for the patient groups the
winning model was BP-AR4, winning by 31 BIC units in SCZ group and 65 BIC
units in ASD group.
Due to the inconclusive results with random-effects BMS, we performed fixed-
effects model comparison by summing BIC across participants (Fig. 5.7D-E).
In the control group, BP-AR40 was found to be the winning model, with 38
BIC units difference from the next best model. In SCZ and ASD groups, a
simpler model BP-AR4 won the model comparison by 23 and 121 BIC units lead,
respectively. Note that anything above 10 BIC units difference is considered very
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strong, decisive evidence (Kass and Raftery, 1995). These results suggest that
while controls exhibited repulsion from both cardinal directions and the central
reference angle, patient groups showed only repulsion from the cardinals. For
SCZ group this is in agreement with reduced repulsion from the central reference
angle along schizotypy traits in the general population.
5.3.2.3 Model and parameter recovery
Model recovery results showed that most models can be reliably recovered (Fig.
5.8). However, the winning model in our analysis, BP-AR40, which assumed
repulsion from the cardinals and repulsion from the central reference angle was
not recovered perfectly (with PEP = 0.21); the data generated by this model
was better explained by a simpler BP-AR4 model, which assumed only repulsion
from the cardinals. This suggests, that the assumed repulsion from the central
reference angle was not strong enough for most individuals to justify BP-AR40
model. Using fixed-effects model comparison, however, we find BP-AR40 to be
recovered well, having 140 BIC units less than BP-AR4.
Figure 5.8: Model recovery based on protected exceedance probability. X-axis -
models that simulated the data, Y-axis - models that were fitted to the simulated
data.
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To investigate if the repulsion from the central reference angle would be better
captured with more data, we performed the same modelling analysis on an in-
dependent dataset (N=12) from Chalk et al. (2010), where each participant had
„700 trials available for model fitting („3 times more than in our data). While
fixed-effects model comparison again favoured BP-AR40, increasing confidence in
the result that repulsion from the central angle is significant in the general popula-
tion, random-effects BMS was still inconclusive (see Section A.3 in Appendix).
To assess the reliability of BP-AR40 model results, we performed parameter
recovery. All parameters were recovered well, with R2 ą 0.55 (Fig. 5.9).
Figure 5.9: Parameter recovery for BP-AR40 model. (A) σp - uncertainty of
the prior distribution, (B) σs - uncertainty of the sensory likelihood, (C) αp -
prior-based lapse rate, (D) r4 - maximum repulsion from the cardinals, (E) r0 -
maximum repulsion from the central reference angle. X-axes – actual parameters
used for simulating the data (superscript ‘act’); Y-axes – recovered parameters
(superscript ‘rec’) after fitting the model to the simulated data. The dashed diag-
onal line is a reference line indicating perfect parameter recovery. The coefficient
of determination is reported above each panel.
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5.4 Discussion
In this chapter we sought to investigate the repulsive biases present in our data,
which had been ignored in the previous analyses. Reanalysing the motion estima-
tion data with respect to the absolute coordinates showed strong repulsion from
the cardinals (up to „ 10˝). Our aims were: 1) to construct a model that captures
these repulsive biases well, 2) to determine if after accounting for these effects
the results are consistent to our previous analyses and 3) to assess individual
and group differences in relation to the additional effects captured by the model.
To this end, we constructed and tested a range of models. BP-AEC model as-
sumed that repulsive biases arise from efficient coding of sensory likelihood (Wei
and Stocker, 2015), while BP-ASC models assumed repulsive biases to arise from
truncation of the stimulus direction posterior distribution due to a preceding im-
plicit categorization of the stimulus with respect to reference directions (Luu and
Stocker, 2018). We found that while these models did produce repulsion effects,
they could not account for the magnitude of the effects observed in our data and
thus did not provide a good fit (see Section A.2 in Appendix), suggesting that
more research is needed for understanding the mechanisms of reference repulsion
effects.
To further investigate the role of repulsive biases in our task, we constructed
a model (BP-AR4) which was agnostic to the mechanisms producing the repul-
sive cardinal biases, but aimed to capture them explicitly. While this model did
account for the biases with respect to the cardinals, these effects proved to not
fully account for the non-zero biases at the most frequently presented motion
directions. To fully account for the latter biases we had to assume an additional
repulsive bias from the central reference angle - model BP-AR40. Note that
the central reference angle is not cued explicitly and would have to be inferred
based on the statistics of the presented motion directions. Apart from that, we
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can only speculate what mechanisms are responsible for the emergence of such
effects. Noteworthily, our model selection is based on fixed-effects model compar-
ison, which favoured BP-AR40 model, while random-effects BMS analysis was
less conclusive. Model recovery analysis also showed that the data generated
by BP-AR40 model was more frequently better recovered by BP-AR4 model.
Together, this suggests that while there is evidence on the group level for the
repulsion from the central reference angle, for many participants this repulsion
might be not strong enough to justify BP-AR40 model. However, performing the
same analysis on an independent dataset from Chalk et al. (2010), we again found
BP-AR40 model to be the winning model, which provided additional confidence
in the result that repulsion from the central reference angle has a significant effect
in healthy controls (see Section A.3 in Appendix).
We found that BP-AR40 preserved the negative relationship between AQ and
sensory uncertainty found in the previous analyses, confirming that this relation-
ship was not confounded by the hitherto unaccounted repulsive biases. However,
BP-AR40 results also suggested some additional effects to be present. AQ was
found to be negatively correlated with prior-based lapse rate (τb “ ´0.155,p “
.041) - which had not reached significance in the previous BAYES_P model
analysis (p“ 0.083; see Supplementary Fig. 6 in Chapter 4). Reduced prior-
based lapses would be consistent with the reduced number of hallucinations found
along AQ - which is the same relationship that was found in patients with SCZ
(in Chapter 3).
Intriguingly, along schizotypy traits - that had shown no effects in the previous
BAYES_P analysis - we found the repulsion from the central reference angle to
be reduced. This relationship was found using both RISC and SPQ measures. In
line with this, we found that SCZ group was best fit by BP-AR4 model, meaning
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that repulsion from the central reference angle was negligible in this group. Inter-
estingly, BP-AR4 model was also found to be the winning model in ASD group.
Together, this presents an interesting result that might relate to transdiagnostic
features of ASD and SCZ and which also extends to schizoptypy traits in the
general population. The meaning and significance of this finding, however, is dif-
ficult to gauge. Not only are the mechanisms producing repulsive biases not well
understood (e.g, see Kuang, 2019), repulsion from an arbitrary implicit reference
direction (in our case, the central reference angle), has not been reported before.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the effects of repulsion from the central
reference angle are quite subtle to begin with, as evidenced by the analysis of an
independent dataset from Chalk et al. (2010), where each participant had „ 3
times as much data, but random-effects BMS was still inconclusive (see Section
A.3 in Appendix).
6
Within-trial dynamics in the
Moving Dots task
6.1 Introduction
In all of our analysis thus far we have been treating each trial as a durationless
instant, ignoring the duration of exposure to stimulus. In our task, exposure
duration is controlled by reaction times - a trial terminates once a response is
made (within a window of 3 seconds). Intuitively, we might expect that the more
time is spent accumulating sensory evidence, the less biases we would see. For
instance, in the context of visual illusions - which are typical examples of per-
ceptual Bayesian inference - it has been shown that illusion strength varies as
a function of exposure duration (Calvert and Harris, 1988) and might mediate
individual differences in susceptibility to illusions (Bressan and Kramer, 2013).
Importantly, in our data, we find SCZ group to be slower and ASD group to be
faster than controls, while showing no differences in biases of motion direction
estimation. Thus, the differences in reaction times might be a potential confound
for the lack of differences in biases. This warrants a reanalysis of task perfor-
mance within the framework of within-trial evidence accumulation. Interestingly,
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the effects of within-trial dynamics on the observed Bayesian biases have not been
accounted for in any of the recent studies investigating SCZ and ASD (see studies
summarized in Table 1.1 and Table 1.2), which might be a factor contribut-
ing to the mixed findings. More generally, experimental work exploring the link
between within-trial evidence accumulation and Bayesian biases is sparse, moti-
vating a more general analysis of how the effects observed within each of these
frameworks relate to each other.
Accumulation of noisy sensory evidence has been most widely studied using
2-alternative forced choice (2AFC) tasks, modelling this process as a directed ran-
dom walk to a bound - Drift-Diffusion Model (DDM; Ratcliff, 1978; for a review
see Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008). DDM has been shown to be an optimal mecha-
nism for 2AFC decision making (e.g., Bogacz et al., 2006), and has been directly
linked to Bayesian inference (Bitzer et al., 2014; Fard et al., 2017). In DDM
the decision-making process is summarized by: 1) drift rate, which captures how
quickly the sensory evidence is accumulated, 2) decision boundary, which captures
how much sensory evidence is needed for a choice to be made, and 3) non-decision
time, which captures an additional time that is required for neural encoding and
motor response. When there is bias or preference for one of the choices, this can
be accounted for by including a starting point parameter, which corresponds to
a displacement towards one of the boundaries at the beginning of a trial. DDM
has been successfully applied for studying decision making in a whole range of
different tasks, from simple motion perception, to memory retrieval, to lexical de-
cision tasks (e.g., see Voss et al., 2013; Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008, for reviews).
Furthermore, the latent variables captured by the model parameters have been
associated with distinct brain networks in fMRI human studies (see Mulder et al.,
2014, for a review), while the sensory accumulation process itself has been linked
to the build-up of activity in single-cell recordings in monkeys and rats (Hanes
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and Schall, 1996; for a review see Smith and Ratcliff, 2004).
Various task conditions and individual differences have been associated with
different DDM parameters. Drift rate has been shown to have an inverse relation-
ship with task difficulty (Voss et al., 2004) and a direct relationship with fluid
intelligence and working memory capacity (Schmiedek et al., 2007), as well as
motivation (Spaniol et al., 2011). In our task, difficulty is dependent on sensory
uncertainty, which depends on stimulus contrast levels. Thus, we would expect
drift rate to be directly related to sensory precision in a Bayesian model. Decision
boundary is considered to represent caution and has been shown to increase with
age (Ratcliff et al., 2010) and in response to task instructions that emphasize
accuracy over speed (Voss et al., 2004). Non-decision time has also been posi-
tively associated with age (e.g., Ratcliff et al., 2006) and negatively associated
with task readiness (Schmitz and Voss, 2012). Finally, starting point has been
shown to capture bias towards more rewarding or more likely outcomes (Mulder
et al., 2012; Summerfield and Koechlin, 2010; Voss et al., 2004). Thus, we would
expect starting point to relate to prior precision in a Bayesian model.
In schizophrenia (SCZ), despite the slower processing speed and decreased
accuracy being well-documented (e.g., Schatz, 1998), very few studies have inves-
tigated these effects within the DDM framework. Heathcote et al. (2015) stud-
ied patients with schizophrenia in left-vs-right motion discrimination task with
random-dot kinematogram (RDK) stimuli and reported larger decision bound-
aries compared to controls. This was interpreted as a compensatory strategy
to reduce inaccuracy arising from poorer sensory sensitivity. In a probabilistic
reward and punishment learning task, Moustafa et al. (2015) also found SCZ to
exhibit larger decision boundaries, but also longer non-decision times. Mathias
et al. (2017) tested patients with schizophrenia in a processing-speed digit-symbol
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coding task and found no differences in decision boundaries, but patients showed
increased non-decision time and decreased drift rate.
In autism spectrum disorders (ASD), alterations in the temporal features of
sensory processing have been found across multiple tasks (see Robertson and
Baron-Cohen, 2017, for a review), but DDM has not been applied to study these
effects until recently. In an orientation discrimination task with Gabor patches,
Pirrone et al. (2017) found adults with ASD to exhibit increased decision bound-
ary and increased non-decision time, while drift rate was comparable to that of
controls. However, these effects were not found to extend to autistic traits in
the general population (Pirrone et al., 2018). Another study (Karalunas et al.,
2018) reported children with ASD to have increased decision boundary and de-
creased drift rate on go trials from the Stop Signal task. Finally, Powell et al.
(2019) applied DDM to study face recognition and gaze discrimination in ado-
lescents with ASD and reported reduced decision boundary and reduced drift
rate across both tasks, but only when excluding participants with IQ below 85
(when including all participants, reduced decision boundary was found only for
face recognition, while reduced drift rate was found only for gaze discrimination).
While these findings conflict with the other two studies, it could be reconciled by
the fact that here the stimuli were social and relatively complex, while Pirrone
et al. (2017) and Karalunas et al. (2018) used simple stimuli; people with ASD
are known to exhibit differential performance depending on the complexity of
stimulus (Bertone et al., 2005). Furthermore, Karalunas et al. (2018) used a task
that involves response inhibition, which might also be capturing effects that are
specific to this domain.
To add to this body of research we investigated the effects of within-trial
dynamics in the Moving Dots task, which we hitherto have largely ignored. We
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wanted to know how within-trial dynamics were related to the strength of the
Bayesian effects as well as to the individual and group differences found in our
previous analysis. Unlike the studies discussed above, which used 2AFC tasks,
in our task responses were not on a binary but on an interval scale. While in
recent years various extensions of DDM have been proposed, including DDMs for
multiple choice tasks (see Forstmann et al., 2016, for a review), full DDMs for
continuous scale responses have not been introduced (although see Smith, 2016,
for an analytic derivation of continuous response DDM for tasks with no bias).
We therefore constructed and validated Continuous Choice Drift-Diffusion Model
(CDM), which can incorporate bias terms of various complexity (including non-
unimodal priors, such as bimodal prior used in our task) as well as trial-to-trial
variability in any of the model parameter values.
6.2 Methods
6.2.1 Behavioral data analysis
To assess the association between reaction time and other performance measures
in our task, we analyzed both within-subject and between-subject reaction time
(RT) effects. Both of these effects were tested by fitting a linear mixed model in
SPSS version 25. For the between-subject effects, stimulus direction was included
as a repeated-measures factor and the mean RT at each stimulus direction was
included as a covariate. We tested for the main effects of stimulus direction and
RT as well as their interaction. Note that for illustration purposes we separated
individuals into ’fast’ and ’slow’ groups by ordering all individuals based on their
median RT and selecting 30 fastest and 30 slowest individuals. The linear mixed
model described above, however, was fit to all individuals.
For analysing within-subject effects, we obtained ’fast’ and ’slow’ trials by
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splitting each participant’s trials based on their median reaction time and remov-
ing 30% of the trials around the median to maximize the differences between ’fast’
and ’slow’. In the linear mixed model, this was included as a repeated-measures
factor that had two values (’fast’/’slow’). Together, this model included the main
effects of both stimulus direction and RT category as well as their interaction.
6.2.2 Models
6.2.2.1 Continuous Choice Drift-Diffusion model: CDM
To construct Continuous Choice Drift-Diffusion Model (CDM), the classical DDM
had to be extended from one space dimension to two. In addition, the model had
to capture the bimodality of the prior acquired in our task - this was achieved by
having two particles drifting simultaneously (Fig. 6.1):
~Xnpt`dtq “ ~Xnptq`v ¨dt ¨ ûpθact, ~Xnptqq`~η (6.1)
~Xppt`dtq “ ~Xpptq`v ¨dt ¨ ûpθact, ~Xpptqq`~η (6.2)
where ~Xn “ rxn, yns and ~Xp “ rxp, yps are the coordinates of negative and
positive particles, respectively, t is time, dt is a time step, v is the mean drift
rate, and ~η is random Gaussian noise:





where s is a scaling parameter for the diffusion process; it was set to 0.1 by
convention.
û“ rux,uys in Eq. 6.1 and 6.2 is a unit vector of drifting direction with respect
to the current position of a particle, ~Xptq “ rxptq, yptqs, and depending on the
stimulus motion direction, θact; û was computed via:
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Figure 6.1: CDM schema. (A) A cylinder illustrating CDM with a stimulus
motion direction θact “ 48˝. On a given trial, two particles drift in two space
dimensions until one of them reaches the circular boundary (or until 3 seconds
elapse). a - the radius of the circular boundary, ~zn and ~zp - the starting points of
the two particles, v - the mean drift rate, ûn and ûp - unit vectors of the drifting
direction for each particle (see Eq. 6.4 and 6.5), Tnd - non-decision time (the
shaded area); t denotes the time dimension indicated with the dashed arrow. (B)
Flattened out view of the cylinder showing the distribution of reaction times and
estimated motion directions produced by running 2,000 simulations. The red
dashed lines indicate the most frequently presented motion directions (˘32˝),
while the green dashed line indicates stimulus motion direction on the current
trial (48˝).
θdrift “ atan2pa ¨ sinpθactq´yptq, a ¨ cospθactq´xptqq (6.4)
û“ rcospθdriftq, sinpθdriftqs (6.5)
where θdrift is the direction of drift in radians and a is the distance from the
origin to the boundary - i.e. the radius of the cylinder.
The locations of the particles at the beginning of a trial are determined by
the starting points:
~Xnpt“ 0q “ ~zn; ~Xppt“ 0q “ ~zp (6.6)
In line with our previous modelling, the starting points ~zn and ~zp were con-
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strained to be symmetrical around the central reference angle such that:
~zn “ rzd, ´zθs; ~zp “ rzd, zθs , (6.7)
where zd is the distance from the origin and zθ is the direction with respect
to the origin.
The stimulus encoding time (a brief period between the start of a trial and
the beginning of the drift-diffusion process) and motor response time (the time
taken to make a response after the drift-diffusion process ends) were accounted for
by including a non-decision time parameter, Tnd, which captured the combined
duration of the two aforementioned processes. Incorporating Tnd, the reaction
time then becomes:
RT “ t`Tnd (6.8)
where t is the time elapsed in the drift-diffusion process.
With the time step dt “ 0.01 the locations of the particles were recursively
updated via Eq. 6.1 and 6.2 until 3 seconds had elapsed (RT ě 3) or the decision
boundary was reached by one of the particles: | ~Xnptq| ě a or | ~Xpptq| ě a. The
location rxa,yas at which a particle touched the boundary corresponded to the
perceived motion direction, θperc:
θperc “ atan2pya,xaq . (6.9)
The estimated motion direction, θest, can then be obtained by accounting for
motor noise:
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ppθest|θpercq “ V pθperc,σmq . (6.10)
The joint probability distribution of reaction times and estimated motion di-
rections, for a given motion direction, pkpRT,θest|θactq, was obtained by running
2,000 simulations. To minimize the effects of random fluctuations in this distri-
bution, instead of building a histogram, we computed bivariate kernel density
estimate using ksdensity function in Matlab. Finally, to account for a possibility
of random responses, we introduced an additional parameter α:
ppRT,θest|θactq “ p1´αq ¨pkpRT,θest|θactq`α ¨UpRT,θestq , (6.11)
where UpRT,θestq is a bivariate uniform distribution, reflecting the assump-
tion that lapse responses are distributed uniformly in time and direction.
6.2.2.2 Variants of CDM
In the standard DDM model, across-trial variability in model parameter values is
often found it to be necessary to account for features in empirical data (e.g., Rat-
cliff, 2013; Ratcliff et al., 2016). Thus, we also considered more complex variants
of CDM model, by allowing for trial-to-trial variability in model parameters. We
reasoned that there might be a considerable variation in the drift rate (CDMv)
or non-decision time (CDMt) due to the variation in stimulus contrast (arising
from contrast staircases). We also considered that prior effects might not be com-
pletely fixed throughout the task, and therefore we constructed a model where
the distance of the starting points, zd, varied from trial to trial (CDMz). Finally,
we also built a model to test variability in the decision boundary (CDMa) to
account for a possibility of changes in speed-accuracy trade-off strategy during
the task.
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All of these models were implemented by introducing an additional free param-
eter (σv, σt, σz or σa for models CDMv, CDMt, CDMz and CDMa, respectively),
which captured the standard deviation from the mean value of a given parameter.
Using these summary statistics, a new value of a given parameter was sampled
for each of the 2,000 trials in the model simulation.
6.2.3 Model fitting
The models were fit by maximizing the log likelihood function for the joint prob-
ability of motion estimation and reaction time data for each participant indi-
vidually. The maximum likelihood was found using fminsearchbnd function in
Matlab, by minimizing negative log-likelihood. First we performed a wide explo-
ration of the parameter space to determine the full range of values that each of
the parameters can take. For CDM this established the following range of values:
a P r0.2, 0.7s, v P r0.05, 0.3s, zd P r0, a{1.2s, zθ P r0, 360s, Tnd P r0, 1.2s, α P
r0, 0.2s. For other models, the range of each parameter was determined to be:
σa P ra{10, as for CDMa, σv P rv{10, vs for CDMv, σT P rTnd{10, Tnds for CDMt
and σz P rzd{10, zds for CDMz. Then, to reduce the possibility of convergence
at local maxima, the main model fitting procedure was performed by running 20
different initializations with parameter values sampled randomly from the ranges
defined above.
6.2.4 Model comparison
As in the previous chapters, to compute the log of model evidence we used
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) approximation:
logpP pD|Mqq « ´BIC2 “ logpP pD|M,Θ̂qq`k ¨ logpnq (6.12)
where M is model, D is observed data and P (D|M,Θ̂) is the likelihood of
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generating the experimental data given a set of parameters,Θ̂; k is the number of
model parameters and n is the number of data points (i.e. trials). To compare the
models we performed a random-effect Bayesian model selection (BMS) analysis
(Stephan et al., 2009b) using VBA Matlab toolbox (Daunizeau et al., 2014). In
random-effect BMS, model comparison is based on exceedance probability (EP),
which expresses the likelihood that any given model is more frequent than all
other models. Correcting for chance variations in model frequencies (Rigoux





where subscript k denotes kth model from the total of K models being com-
pared; BOR is Bayesian Omnibus Risk, which quantifies the chance likelihood of





where y contains log model evidences of all subjects and all models, H0 as-
sumes that model frequencies are all the same and H1 assumes that at least one
of the models is more frequent. Thus, the higher the BOR estimate, the less
differences there will be in PEP of different models.
As random-effects BMS was not always conclusive, we also performed fixed-
effects model comparison. For this we summed the BIC across all participants and
used this sum to compare the models. Unlike random-effects model comparison,
this assumes that all participants in the group are best described by the same
model.
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6.2.5 Model and parameter recovery
Modelling results, and their robustness, can be affected by many factors, such as
parameterisation of models, amount of data used for model fitting, chosen model
fitting methods, etc. A general way to account for these factors and to assess the
overall reliability of modelling results is to perform model and parameter recovery
(e.g., see Palminteri et al., 2017). Given the constraints of the mentioned factors,
model recovery shows the distinguishability of models, while parameter recovery
shows reliability of parameter estimates.
For each model, we generated 100 sets of parameters (100 synthetic individ-
uals), by sampling the distributions of parameter values found in our general
population sample. We then simulated 200 responses for each synthetic partici-
pant (just as we had „200 responses per participant in our data). Every model
was then fitted to every simulated dataset following the same model fitting proce-
dure as described in the previous section. We then performed model comparison
for every simulated dataset, also as described in the previous section.
We also analysed how well the parameters were recovered for the winning
model. This was done by comparing parameters that simulated the data (’actual
parameters’) with the parameters estimated from the simulated data (’recovered
parameters’) using the coefficient of determination (R2) obtained from regress
function in Matlab.
6.2.6 Datasets
The behavioral data analysis of within- and between-subject effects, as well as
most of the modelling analysis was done using our largest general population data
sample (N “ 83; Chapter 2). Then we used the same modelling approach to
investigate SCZ (from Chapter 3) and ASD sample (from Chapter 4).
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6.2.7 Statistical tests
Due to outliers and non-normalities being common in our data, we used non-
parametric tests as a default in our analysis. For correlation we used Kendall’s
Tau-b, while for group differences we used Mann-Whitney U test. Wherever rel-
evant, the evidence for the null hypothesis was evaluated by computing Bayes
factors (BF01) using JASP version 0.10 (JASP Team, 2019), with the default
Cauchy prior of scale 0.707. Bayes factor below 3 is generally considered incon-
clusive, above 3 is considered moderate evidence, above 10 is strong evidence and
above 30 is very trong evidence (Kass and Raftery, 1995).
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Behavioral Results
To assess the associations between reaction time and other performance mea-
sures in our task, we investigated both between-subject and within-subject ef-
fects (Fig. 6.2). Analyzing reaction time effects across participants (between-
subject effects), faster individuals were found to be associated with more lapse
estimations (Fig. 6.2C; F p1,605.8q “ 6.9, p “ .009), more estimation vari-
ability (Fig. 6.2B; F p1,631.2q “ 15.9, p ă .001) and more positive bias (Fig.
6.2A; F p1,516.2q “ 5.1, p “ .025). The latter finding is quite unexpected and
suggests faster individuals to exhibit a clockwise bias. No interaction effects
between RT and motion direction were found for any of the above measures
(bias: F p8,153.1q “ 0.5, p“ .819; variability: F p8,132.7q “ 0.6, p“ .796; lapses:
F p8,139.4q “ 0.6, p“ .738).
Examining reaction time effects across trials (within-subject effects), we found
faster responses to be associated with increased bias (Fig. 6.2E; motion di-
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Figure 6.2: The relationships between reaction time and estimation performance
measures. (A-D) between-subject effects: fast vs slow participants (30 fastest vs
30 slowest participants), (E-H) within-subject effects: fast vs slow trials (35%
fastest and 35% slowest trials for each individual).(A,E) Estimation bias, (B,F)
estimation variability, (C,G) lapse estimations, (D,H) reaction time. The verti-
cal dashed lines correspond to the two most frequently presented motion direc-
tions (˘32˝). Error bars represent within-subject standard error.
rection*RT: F p8,269.3q “ 3.1, p “ .002), while there were no clockwise or anti-
clockwise biases (main RT effect: F p1,803.1q “ 0.6, p “ .449). Faster responses
were also not associated with any differences in response variability (Fig. 6.2F;
main effect: F p1,1299.4q “ 1.7, p “ .196; motion direction*RT: F p8,286.3q “
1.1, p “ .399) or lapse estimations (Fig. 6.2G; main effect: F p1,1163.1q “
0.4, p“ .551; motion direction*RT: F p8,286.7q “ 0.5, p“ .827).
6.3.2 Modelling results
To better understand the within-trial dynamics in our task, we fitted and com-
pared five different CDM variants. We computed log model evidence using BIC
approximation and used random-effects Bayesian model selection analysis to com-
pare the models. We found the simplest model CDM, which did not assume any
trial-to-trial variability in model parameters, to be the best model with protected
exceedance probability of 1 (Fig. 6.3A). In the context of within-subject ef-
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fects discussed in the previous section, this means that faster and more biased
responses on some of the trials did not arise from trial-to-trial parameter variabil-
ity, but simply arose from noise due to chance. In other words, on trials where
noise coincided with the direction of expectations, this lead to faster and more
biased responses. The reaction time within-subject effects on bias can also be
explicitly shown to be predicted by the model (see Section B.1 in Appendix).
CDM provided a good fit to the data both on the individual level (Fig. 6.3B-
J) and on the group level (Fig. 6.3K-N). On the individual level, the most no-
table feature that the model captured was the prior-based lapses: the occasional
estimations around the most frequent directions even when the presented motion
direction was far away from it (Fig. 6.3B-J). It is worth noting that prior-based
lapses were not included in the model explicitly, but arose naturally from having
two drifting particles representing the acquired bimodal prior. On the group level,
CDM captured the characteristic shape of the bias curve (Fig. 6.3K), reduced
variability and reaction time around the most frequent directions (Fig. 6.3L,N),
and the level of lapse estimations (Fig. 6.3M). The only notable discrepancy is
the overestimation of variability by CDM (Fig. 6.3L). The source of this overes-
timation remains unclear, but it is interesting to note that the Bayesian models
analyzed in the previous chapters exhibited similar overestimation of variability
(e.g., see Fig. 6B,F in Chapter 3).
6.3.2.1 Model and parameter recovery results
To further analyze the robustness of modelling results, we performed model and
parameter recovery. We found that most models were recovered reasonably well
(Fig. 6.4), with CDM and CDMv showing a perfect recovery, while CDMa and
CDMt were recovered half the time, with CDM providing a better fit for the
other half. Finally, CDMz showed the poorest recovery with CDM providing
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Figure 6.3: Modelling results and CDM fits to the data. (A) Random-effects
Bayesian model selection showing CDM to be the most likely model with pro-
tected exceedance probability (PEP) equal to 1. (B-J) CDM fits across different
stimulus motion directions for a single individual. Black data points represent
behavioral data. Contour lines denote joint probability distributions predicted
by the model. Green dashed lines indicate presented motion direction (in the
presented order: ´64˝, ´48˝, ´32˝, ´16˝, 0˝, 16˝, 32˝, 48˝, 64˝). Red dashed
lines correspond to the most frequently presented directions (˘32˝). (K-N) CDM
fits averaged across all participants and across all responses for a given motion
direction. (K) Estimation bias, (L) estimation variability, (M) lapse estimations,
(N) estimation reaction time. The vertical dashed lines denote the two most fre-
quently presented directions. Error bars represent within-subject standard error.
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consistently better fit to the data generated by CDMz. Non-perfect model recov-
ery for models with the trial-to-trial variability parameters is not too surprising.
We have to keep in mind that CDM was nested in all other models and that the
variability parameter for each model was based on what was empirically found by
fitting that model to behavioral data. Thus, if participants did not exhibit large
trial-to-trial variability to begin with, these effects would also be small in the
simulated data, thus allowing CDM to provide a more parsimonious explanation
of the simulated data.
Figure 6.4: Model recovery based on protected exceedance probability. X-axis -
models that simulated the data, Y-axis - models that were fitted to the simulated
data.
Another possibility is that we did not have enough data to capture trial-
to-trial variability in model parameters. The classical one-dimensional DDM
requires „250 to reliably capture trial-to-trial variability in model parameters
(e.g., Ratcliff and Tuerlinckx, 2002), while our model was two-dimensional and
we had „ 200 trials per participant. To examine the possibility that more data
would reveal a different winning model, we performed model selection on an in-
dependent dataset from Chalk et al. (2010), where each participant had „700
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trials of data. CDM was still found to be the winning model (see Section B.3
in Appendix).
For the winning model, CDM, we found that most parameters were recov-
ered well (Fig. 6.5) with R2 “ 0.80 for drift rate v, R2 “ 0.67 for non-decision
time Tnd, R2 “ 0.66 for lapse estimations α, R2 “ 0.53 for starting point distance
zd, R2 “ 0.44 for decision boundary a; starting point orientation, zθ, showed the
worst parameter recovery with R2 “ 0.31, but this was also affected by a few out-
liers (removing outliers that were more than 3 median absolute deviations away
from the median resulted in R2 “ 0.40).
Figure 6.5: Parameter recovery for CDM. (A) a - decision boundary, (B) v -
mean drift rate, (C) zθ - starting point angle, (D) zd - starting point distance,
(E) Tnd - non-decision time, (F) α - random lapse responses. X-axes – actual
parameters used for simulating the data (denoted with the superscript ‘act’);
Y-axes – recovered parameters (denoted with the superscript ‘rec’) after fitting
the model to the simulated data. The dashed diagonal line is a reference line
indicating perfect parameter recovery. The coefficient of determination is reported
above each panel.
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6.3.2.2 CDM simulations
To gain intuition about the effects of different parameters on task performance, we
ran model simulations by manipulating each parameter separately. We used the
average parameter values found in our sample as a baseline (a = 0.48, v = 0.19,
zd = 0.28, Tnd = 0.8, α = 0.06) and simulated data by increasing and reducing
the value of each model parameter by 30% (Fig. 6.6). Decision boundary and
drift rate were both negatively associated with the strength of interaction effects
(between a given measure and presented motion direction) for bias, variability and
lapse estimations, but had different effects on reaction time, with larger decision
boundary leading to longer mean reaction times, and larger drift rate leading
to shorter mean reaction times. It is also interesting to note that compared
to decision boundary, drift rate had smaller effect on reaction times, while for
the other measures the effects were comparable. Starting point distance was
positively associated with the strength of interaction effects for all of the measures
and negatively associated with mean reaction times. Finally, non-decision time
only affected mean reaction times, while random lapse parameter only affected
lapse estimations.
6.3.2.3 CDM parameters vs personality traits
Next, we studied how variation in CDM model parameters related to autis-
tic (AQ) and schizotypy (SPQ and RISC) traits. AQ scores were found to
positively correlate with mean drift rate (τb “ 0.157,p “ .039; Fig. 6.7B),
suggesting that increased sensory precision found in BAYES_P model might
be underlied by faster sensory accumulation. No other parameters were in-
fluenced by AQ (Fig. 6.7): decision boundary a (τb “ ´0.004, BF01 “ 7.0),
starting point direction zθ (τb “ 0.108, BF01 “ 2.5), starting point distance zd
(τb “´0.040, BF01 “ 6.1; starting point distance relative to the boundary, zd{a :
τb “ ´0.084, BF01 “ 3.8), non-decision time Tnd (τb “ 0.040, BF01 “ 6.1), lapse
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Figure 6.6: CDM simulations with different parameter settings. Black line -
baseline performance (a = 0.48, v = 0.19, zd = 0.28, Tnd = 0.8, α = 0.06),
blue line - 30% decrease in a given parameter value, red line - 30% increase in a
given parameter value. Each column corresponds to manipulation of a different
parameter (indicated at the top). a - decision boundary, v - mean drift rate, zd -
starting point distance, Tnd - non-decision time, α - random lapse responses. The
vertical dashed lines denote the two most frequently presented directions.
estimations α (τb “´0.044, BF01 “ 5.9).
Schizotypy traits were found to be not associated with any of the CDM
parameters: decision boundary a (RISC: τb “ 0.018, BF01 “ 6.8; SPQ: τb “
0.136, BF01 “ 2.3), mean drift rate v (RISC: τb “ ´0.055, BF01 “ 5.4; SPQ:
τb “ 0.082, BF01 “ 3.7), starting point direction zθ (RISC: τb “´0.149, BF01 “
1.0; SPQ: τb “ ´0.033, BF01 “ 4.6), starting point distance zd (RISC: τb “
0.044, BF01 “ 5.8; SPQ: τb “´0.022, BF01 “ 4.7), non-decision time Tnd (RISC:
τb “ ´0.142, BF01 “ 1.2; SPQ: τb “ 0.025, BF01 “ 4.7), lapse estimations α
(RISC: τb “ 0.083, BF01 “ 3.8; SPQ: τb “ 0.063, BF01 “ 4.1).
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Figure 6.7: CDM parameters vs AQ traits. (A) a - decision boundary, (B) v -
mean drift rate, (C) zθ - starting point angle, (D) zd - starting point distance,
(E) Tnd - non-decision time, (F) α - random lapse responses. Two-tailed Kendal’s
Tau-b correlation results are reported above each panel. For non-significant cor-
relations Bayesian Factors for the null hypothesis (BF01) are presented.
6.3.2.4 Modelling results in SCZ and ASD groups
To investigate group differences in within-trial dynamics we performed the same
modelling analysis in SCZ (described in Chapter 3) and ASD (described in
Chapter 4) groups. Random-effects BMS and fixed-effects model comparison
both indicated CDM to be the winning model in all of the groups Fig. 6.8):
PEP = 0.998 and 67 BIC units lead in CTR, PEP = 0.832 and 15 BIC units lead
in SCZ; in ASD group, while less definitively, CDM was still the most favoured
model with PEP = 0.354 and 11 BIC units lead. Note that anything above 10 BIC
units difference is considered very strong, decisive evidence (Kass and Raftery,
1995).
Next, we compared the groups in terms of their CDM parameter values. In
SCZ (Fig. 6.9), we found increased decision boundary (p “ .012; Fig. 6.9A),
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Figure 6.8: Model comparison for patient groups. (A-C) Random-effects
Bayesian model selection; PEP - protected exceedance probability (D-F) Fixed-
effects model comparison. Note that the plots show the difference between the
model with the lowest BIC and the remaining models. (A,D) Controls, (B,E)
participants with schizophrenia, (C,F) participants with ASD. Both approaches
show CDM to be the winning model in each group. For model fits to the data
see Section B.4 in Appendix.
which would explain why we see longer reaction times and less prior-based lapses
in patients. Other model parameters showed no differences but were also in-
conclusive, with BF01 ă 3 (Fig. 6.9B-F), except for starting point direction
(BF01 “ 3.2; Fig. 6.9C). Starting point distance relative to the boundary, zd{a,
was also not different in SCZ (BF01 “ 3.4).
In ASD group, despite them exhibiting faster RTs in the behavioral data, we
found no significant differences in any of the parameters (Fig. 6.10), including
starting point distance relative to the boundary, zd{a (BF01 “ 2.8). However,
some of the parameters did not have strong support for the null hypothesis either:
decision boundary (BF01 “ 1.4; Fig. 6.10A), starting point distance (BF01 “
1.8; Fig. 6.10D) and non-decision time (BF01 “ 2.7; Fig. 6.10E), making them
likely to be implicated in the observed RT differences.
6. Within-trial dynamics in the Moving Dots task 195
Figure 6.9: CDM parameter comparison between controls (CTR) and patients
with schizophrenia (SCZ). (A) a - decision boundary, (B) v - mean drift rate,
(C) zθ - starting point angle, (D) zd - starting point distance, (E) Tnd - non-
decision time, (F) α - random lapse responses. Two-tailed Mann-Whitney U
test results are reported with each panel. Significant differences are reported
in p-values, while for non-significant differences Bayesian Factors for the null
hypothesis (BF01) are presented.
6.4 Discussion
In this chapter we sought to analyse the performance in the Moving Dots task
within a framework that accounts for within-trial dynamics. To this end, we first
investigated within- and between-subject effects of reaction time with respect to
the performance measures of motion estimation. Secondly, to gain a more mech-
anistic insight into these effects, we constructed and analysed Continuous Choice
Drift Diffusion Model (CDM).
We found that faster responses were associated with increased biases (within-
subject effects). Model comparison, which showed CDM to be a better model than
its variants that assumed trial-to-trial parameter variability, suggested that the
observed within-subject effects were a consequence of random noise and chance.
In other words, on trials when sensory noise happened to coincide with the di-
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Figure 6.10: CDM parameter comparison between controls (CTR) and partici-
pants with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). (A) a - decision boundary, (B) v -
mean drift rate, (C) zθ - starting point angle, (D) zd - starting point distance,
(E) Tnd - non-decision time, (F) α - random lapse responses. Two-tailed Mann-
Whitney U test results are reported with each panel. As no differences were
statistically significant, only Bayesian Factors for the null hypothesis (BF01) are
shown.
rection of the prior expectations, this lead to faster responses and more bias.
Analysing between-subject effects, we found faster participants to exhibit
more lapse responses and more variability. CDM parameter analysis showed
these effects to be mediated by a combination of reduced decision boundary
and increased random lapse responses (see Section B.2 in Appendix), sug-
gesting the observed between-subject effects might have been driven by motiva-
tion (with less motivated participants trading off accuracy for speed and making
more random responses). While faster individuals did not differ in the total
amount of bias, the results showed an additional clockwise bias in their esti-
mation responses. The latter result is rather surprising, but might relate to
perceptual-motor clockwise/anti-clockwise bias reported in the literature (Karim
et al., 2016). However, on the whole group level we observed no clockwise or
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anti-clockwise bias.
Analysing CDM parameters with respect to autistic traits in the general pop-
ulation sample, we found higher AQ scores to be associated with faster drift
rates, while for other parameters we found strong evidence for the null hypoth-
esis. This means that the increased sensory precision in the previous Bayesian
model analysis can be thought of as being underlied by faster accumulation of
sensory evidence. Note that faster drift rate would also be consistent with re-
duced number of hallucinations and reduced prior-based lapses found along AQ
after accounting for repulsive biases (in Chapter 5), even though the relation-
ship with prior-based lapses was only trending in the original BAYES_P analysis
(Chapter 4). Schizotypy traits were not associated with any of the CDM pa-
rameters, consistent with no behavioral effects.
Finally, we performed the same analysis on SCZ and ASD samples. Just as
controls, both groups were best fitted by the simplest CDM model with no trial-
to-trial variability in model parameter values. Parameter comparison showed
SCZ group to have increased decision boundary, which explains longer reaction
times and reduced hallucinations observed in this group. Most other parameter
comparisons, while not significant, showed weak evidence for the null (BF01 ă 3
for most parameters), not allowing to accept the null hypothesis. In ASD group
we found no differences in any of the CDM parameters, which means that the
observed faster reaction times were not underlied by a single parameter. Decision
boundary, starting point distance and non-decision time, however, did not have
strong evidence for the null (BF01 “ 1.4, BF01 “ 1.8 and BF01 “ 2.7, respec-
tively), and might have collectively contributed to faster performance. Unlike
autistic traits in the general population, ASD group showed no increase in the
drift rate (BF01 “ 3.2).
6. Within-trial dynamics in the Moving Dots task 198
Our finding of increased drift rate along AQ contrasts with the previous re-
ports using DDM to study ASD. In an orientation discrimination task, Pirrone
et al. (2017) reported no differences in drift rate, but increased decision boundary
and increased non-decision time. This, however, was found in adults with ASD,
while along autistic traits in the general population no effects were found at all
(Pirrone et al., 2018). In contrast to that, here we found no effects in adults with
ASD. In face-related sensory processing, Powell et al. (2019) reported reduced
decision boundary and reduced drift rate in adolescents with ASD. It is difficult
to reconcile these findings within the general framework of sensory processing.
It is possible that these findings are task-, stimuli- and/or sample-specific (see
Introduction section of this chapter for more detailed discussion). Difficulties
in finding robust task effects in ASD has long been one of the main hurdles in
ASD research (see Robertson and Baron-Cohen, 2017, for a recent review). These
problems could be largely overcome by having larger ASD samples that are strat-
ified based on individual symptom profiles and are tested on a battery of different
tasks and different stimuli within a single study.
Our finding of increased decision boundary in schizophrenia is in agreement
with Heathcote et al. (2015), who also found decision boundary to be increased
in schizophrenia in left-vs-right motion discrimination task. Furthermore, just
like Heathcote et al. (2015) we interpreted this result as a compensatory strategy
in response to poorer sensory sensitivity (in our sample poorer sensory sensi-
tivity was indicated by SCZ converging to higher stimulus contrast levels; see
Chapter 3). Another study (Moustafa et al., 2015), using a probabilistic reward
and punishment learning task, also found SCZ to exhibit larger decision bound-
aries. In addition, Moustafa et al. (2015) found slower drift rates on punishment
trials and longer non-decision times. This is in agreement with another recent
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study using a processing-speed digit-symbol coding task (Mathias et al., 2017),
where patients with schizophrenia also showed decreased drift rates and increased
non-decision times. It is important to keep in mind, however, that most studies
mentioned above, as well as our own study, tested chronically ill patients that
had been medicated for a long time with antipsychotics (mainly dopamine antag-
onists) and this might affect the observed results (e.g., see Hutton et al., 2002).
For example, increasing dopamine signaling pharmacologically has been shown
to selectively and positively affect drift rates in the left-vs-right motion discrimi-
nation task in healthy controls (Beste et al., 2018). Furthermore, in Parkinson’s
disease, which is underlied by a dopaminergic hypofunction (Iversen and Iversen,
2007), a recent study has reported slower drift rates in Attention Network Task
(O’Callaghan et al., 2017). This emphasizes the importance of stratifying patients
based on their disease stage and conducting longitudinal studies to account for




In this thesis we investigated possible computational basis of schizophrenia (SCZ)
and autism spectrum disorder (ASD). In particular, we experimentally tested the
hypothesis that SCZ and ASD are associated with impairments in Bayesian in-
ference. To this end, we studied schizotypy and autistic traits in the general
population as well as patient groups with SCZ and ASD diagnosis in a visual
motion estimation task that induces perceptual priors (Chalk et al., 2010). We
performed extensive computational modelling analysis to account for task be-
havior and to characterise individual and group differences. In this chapter we
will summarize our main findings in the context of other recent work, discuss
limitations and will provide some ideas for future research.
7.1 Operationalization of priors and underlying
neural mechanisms
Across autistic and schizotypy traits in the general population (Chapter 2) as
well as SCZ (Chapter 3) and ASD groups (Chapter 4) we found intact ability
to rapidly acquire perceptual priors about motion direction of visual stimuli and
we observed no systematic differences in the acquired priors across all these traits
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and groups. Together with many other negative findings reported in the literature
(summarised in Table 1.2 and Table 1.1 in Chapter 1), these results speak
against the idea of a general impairment in prior acquisition and/or chronically
weaker priors in SCZ and ASD.
One major contribution of this thesis is the idea that operationalization of
priors should not rely on biases alone, as that confounds prior and likelihood
effects. To disentangle prior and likelihood effects one needs to use task designs
that allow for estimation of perceptual variability. Furthermore, to quantify prior
and likelihood effects and to control for other confounds such as motor noise, it
is important to fit generative models to the data. In Chapter 2, this led us
to the finding of increased sensory precision along autistic traits in the general
population, which was expressed in reduced biases and reduced response variabil-
ity in motion estimation task. Interestingly, in Chapter 3 we found that while
patients with SCZ showed no differences in estimation performance - and thus
no differences in motion direction priors or sensory likelihoods - they exhibited
reduced number of prior-based hallucinations in the detection task. Within the
Bayesian framework this could be interpreted as a result of weaker priors for
stimulus presence. However, in Chapter 6 we show that these effects can be
explained by increased caution in SCZ patients (discussed in more detail in the
last section of this chapter). The latter result only re-emphasizes the importance
of fitting generative models in order to explicitly show that the observed effects
are indeed driven by priors.
Most experimental studies operationalize the prior by measuring only a single
variable (such as response bias or change in reaction time) induced by manip-
ulation of context and do not provide generative models that could account for
the observed effects (see Table 1.2 and Table 1.1 in Chapter 1). While these
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effects are often reported under an umbrella term as ‘prior effects’, the actual
mechanisms producing these effects are not always clear. For example, a few
studies have reported reduced adaptation aftereffects in ASD as supporting the
hypothesis of weaker influence of perceptual priors (Turi et al., 2015, 2016; Lawson
et al., 2018). However, within the Bayesian framework, adaptation aftereffects
(i.e., repulsive biases after a prolonged exposure to a stimulus) are more con-
sistent with changes in sensory likelihood representations rather than in priors
(Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006b; Clifford et al., 2007). Some other studies have
investigated prior effects in SCZ and ASD using ambiguous (Mooney) images
(Teufel et al., 2015; Davies et al., 2018; Van de Cruys et al., 2018; Król and Król,
2019), where disambiguation of two-tone images is facilitated by a single presen-
tation of the natural source image. While these effects are often explained within
the Bayesian framework with the natural source image acting as a prior, it is not
clear what information such prior encodes and how it could be represented in
a computational model. Other studies have investigated the effects of naturally
existing long-term priors that are thought to underlie various perceptual illusions
(Powell et al., 2016; Pell et al., 2016; Croydon et al., 2017; Laeng et al., 2018;
Grzeczkowski et al., 2018; Utzerath et al., 2019; Kaliuzhna et al., 2019; Sandhu
et al., 2020). While detailed Bayesian models have been put forward for some of
the illusions (e.g., Weiss et al., 2002; Shams et al., 2005; Dimova and Denham,
2010; Brown and Friston, 2012), the exact mechanisms underlying most classi-
cal illusions remain unclear. Furthermore, multiple studies have found illusory
magnitude to be uncorrelated across most illusions (Yang et al., 2013; Chouinard
et al., 2016; Grzeczkowski et al., 2017; Cretenoud et al., 2019), which suggests
that different illusions are underlied by different mechanisms and their strength
cannot be explained by a common factor such as ‘reliance on priors’.
Future research would benefit from a more rigorous operationalization of pri-
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ors and from more explicit links to the underlying mechanisms that are thought to
implement such priors. For example, one mechanism that can implement context-
dependent modulation is divisive normalization, where the neural response of a
given neuron is normalized by the activity of the neuronal population in which
the neuron is embedded (e.g., Carandini and Heeger, 2012; Louie et al., 2013).
Following recent Bayesian accounts of ASD, it has been proposed that weaker
priors could manifest as reduced divisive normalization (Rosenberg et al., 2015).
However, recent experimental studies have reported intact divisive normalization
in ASD in low-level vision (Van de Cruys et al., 2018; Sandhu et al., 2020), sug-
gesting that the potential impairments might arise at higher levels of processing.
While divisive normalization describes a specific computation that is performed
across the brain, it can nevertheless be implemented by different neurobiologi-
cal mechanisms at different levels of processing (Carandini and Heeger, 2012).
More distal contextual modulation, on the other hand, has been associated with
different neuromodulatory systems (Friston, 2008; Iglesias et al., 2017) and can
thus provide a more direct link to the neurobiology. For instance, in a relatively
recent study, Lawson et al. (2017) showed a relationship between increased nora-
drenergic response (based on pupillometry measures), increased (model-derived)
surprise about environmental volatility and reduced behavioral surprise in ASD -
demonstrating how differences in behavior, model-derived quantities and neuro-
biology can be interrelated in a single experiment. Theoretical work has also ar-
gued for the importance of oxytocin in explaining context-dependent modulation
deficits in ASD (Quattrocki and Friston, 2014); while some evidence also exists
for NDMA (Lee et al., 2015) and dopamine (Pavăl, 2017) dysfunction, but no
experimental work has investigated these deficits within the Bayesian framework.
In SCZ, while abnormalities in dopaminergic, NMDA receptor and GABAergic
systems are well documented and play an important role in supporting Bayesian
accounts of the disorder (reviewed in Valton et al., 2017), the involvement of these
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systems in the tasks used to test Bayesian accounts is rarely made explicit (see
studies in Table 1.1 in Chapter 1), with the exception of a few studies (Jardri
et al., 2017; Cassidy et al., 2018; Adams et al., 2018).
Careful consideration of the underlying neural mechanisms was also absent in
our choice of the Moving Dots task. Reflecting on it post hoc, the most impor-
tant feature of our task was the low-contrast motion stimulus. In the brain, such
stimulus would primarily be transmitted via magnocellular pathway projecting
to the dorsal visual stream (Merigan et al., 1991). Interestingly, magnocellular
pathway has been implicated in SCZ (e.g., Butler et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2006).
Magnocellular deficits in SCZ are reflected in patients showing higher contrast,
motion speed and direction thresholds. This could be explained by NMDA hy-
pofunction in the magnocellular pathway, where NMDA plays an important role
in gain control, amplifying weak signals resulting from low-contrast stimulus and
amplifying lateral inhibition effects (e.g., Butler et al., 2008). This would also
be in line with our finding of increased contrast thresholds in SCZ group (see
Chapter 3). Some evidence exists that magnocellular pathway abnormalities
feature in ASD too, with some studies reporting impaired magnocellular path-
way function (e.g., Sutherland and Crewther, 2010) and some reporting enhanced
function (McCleery et al., 2007). Our findings of increased sensory precision along
AQ might reflect enhanced magnocellular functioning expressed as a better dis-
crimination of motion direction, possibly via increased lateral inhibition effects.
Considering the possibility that our findings are specific to magnocellular path-
way abnormalities, one has to be careful generalizing them to other contexts and
tasks that can be explained within the Bayesian inference framework, but which
target different neural circuits.
One powerful approach for identifying mechanisms that are impaired without
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necessarily having a detailed a priori understanding of them is to use a battery of
tasks within a single study and investigate their inter-correlations. Applied in the
context of ASD and SCZ, this might help avoid over-generalization of findings and
would directly test the relationship between effects observed in different tasks.
For example, reduced susceptibility to illusions is often cited as a feature of both
SCZ and ASD, by selectively referring to studies with positive findings. However,
studies that have systematically investigated response to illusions using batteries
of different illusions, have found that in both SCZ and ASD reduced susceptibility
to illusions is more of an exception than a rule. For instance, Grzeczkowski et al.
(2018) used a battery of 10 classical illusions and found SCZ patients to show
reduced susceptibility to only one: Simultaneous Contrast illusion. Similarly, in
Yang et al. (2013) study, out of 5 tested illusions only Simultaneous Contrast
illusion was found to be reduced in SCZ, while in Tibber et al. (2013) study, out
of 4 tested illusions, only illusions defined by contrast and size were found to be
weaker in SCZ. In ASD literature, Chouinard et al. (2016) tested 13 illusions in the
general population and found only two, Square-diamond and Shepard’s tabletops
illusions to be reduced as a function of autistic traits. In clinical ASD, Ropar
and Mitchell (1999) tested 4 illusions and found no reduced susceptibility. In
another study, using a battery of visuospatial tasks in which ASD show enhanced
performance, Ropar and Mitchell (2001) also found it to be not predictive of
susceptibility to these visual illusions. While providing mostly negative results so
far, such studies are important for directly testing whether task effects that share
the same theoretical explanation are actually underlied by the same mechanisms.
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7.2 Traits, diagnostic categories and symptom
profiles
One important inconsistency in our findings concerns increased sensory preci-
sion along autistic traits in the general population (Chapter 2), while in people
with ASD diagnosis we found sensory precision to be not different from that
of controls (Chapter 4). There are several potential explanations that can be
entertained to explain this inconsistency. For example, it might relate to the
heterogeneity of the ASD population (e.g., see Masi et al., 2017) combined with
the fact that our sample was rather small (N=17) and consisted only of high-
functioning adults. Another possible explanation might concern the relationship
between autistic traits in the general population and clinical ASD. While there is
plenty of research supporting the continuity between sub-clinical autistic traits -
as measured by Autism Quotient (AQ) questionnaire - and clinical ASD diagno-
sis (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Horder et al., 2014; Mayer, 2017), there are
also multiple studies reporting divergent findings (e.g., see Ewbank et al., 2014,
2017; Lawson et al., 2018, for recent studies in the context of Bayesian frame-
work), with some scholars suggesting that the traits captured by AQ might not
always be underlied by the ASD endophenotype, leading to the inconsistencies in
findings (Gregory and Plaisted-Grant, 2016). The latter might also explain why
we did not replicate the finding of increased sensory precision along AQ in our
control group in Chapter 4. In fact, we found substantial evidence against the
positive relationship between AQ and sensory precision (BF01 “ 4.4 for controls,
and BF01 “ 9.6 pooling data across controls and ASD). This suggests that more
comprehensive assessment of autistic traits might be needed in future studies.
Our findings of intact prior acquisition and reduced hallucinations in patients
with SCZ (Chapter 3) require similar considerations related to the symptom
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profiles of the tested patients. Our sample consisted of chronic patients that had
been medicated for a long time and did not have strong positive symptoms at
the time of testing. Therefore, it is unclear if our results would generalize to
more acute SCZ. Most other studies reporting positive findings reported effects
associated with either hallucinations or delusions (see Table 1.1 in Chapter 1).
Related to that, the observed effects might also vary based on SCZ phase, with
prodromal and recovery phases likely to be linked with weaker priors, while acute
phase (when the positive symptoms are strongest) is more likely to be linked
with stronger priors (e.g., Adams et al., 2013; Diaconescu et al., 2019). Reduced
prior-based hallucinations found in our sample (in recovery phase) are in line
with this view. Studying larger samples of patients, stratified based on the above
mentioned factors, might further clarify how the inference mechanism changes
during different phases of illness and in response to treatment.
7.3 Exploratory models
In the second part of this thesis (Chapters 5 and 6), we performed exploratory
modelling analysis to account for additional effects present in our data. In Chap-
ter 5 we found that in addition to the attractive Bayesian biases induced via
stimulus statistics, participants exhibited repulsive biases. One source of repul-
sive biases was the cardinal directions. While not well understood, repulsion from
cardinals has been documented in the literature (Rauber and Treue, 1998), and is
thought to be an instance of a more general phenomenon referred to as reference
repulsion (for a review, see Kuang, 2019) - where repulsive biases are observed
with respect to a reference direction, which is either cued, or is implicit (as in the
case of cardinal directions). In addition to repulsion from the cardinals, we found
evidence for repulsion from the central reference angle. In our task, the central
reference angle is selected randomly (between 0˝ and 360˝) for each participant;
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and the presented stimulus (between ´64˝ and 64˝) is organized around this an-
gle. This means that this central reference angle would need to be inferred from
the statistics of the stimulus. We are not aware of any other work showing that
reference repulsion could be induced in such an indirect way. Furthermore, the
support for this effect in our analysis came from fixed-effects model comparison,
while random-effects BMS was inconclusive. Therefore, replication studies would
be needed to verify the existence of such an effect.
Interestingly, however, we found repulsion from the central reference angle to
be reduced along schizotypy traits in the general population as well as in SCZ
and ASD groups. While an exciting finding in its consistency across traits and
clinical groups, its significance for the Bayesian accounts of these disorders is
hard to gauge due to there not being an established Bayesian explanation of
these effects. However, as we reasoned above, the central reference angle could
only be inferred from accurate estimation of stimulus statistics and thus could
relate to differences in prior acquisition, even though no differences in the priors
themselves were found.
In Chapter 6, to better understand the effects of reaction time (and exposure
to stimulus duration) on the observed Bayesian effects, we devised a Continuous
Choice Drift Diffusion Model (CDM). We found that increased sensory precision
found along autistic traits in the Bayesian model was underlied by faster accu-
mulation of sensory evidence, while slower reaction times and less hallucinations
in SCZ were a result of increased decision boundary. However, no single model
parameter was found to be responsible for faster reaction times in ASD group,
and was likely a collective effect of decision boundary, starting point distance and
non-decision time, as none of these parameters had a strong support for the null
hypothesis (BF01 “ 1.4, BF01 “ 1.8 and BF01 “ 2.7, respectively).
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More generally, our within-trial dynamics analysis demonstrates the impor-
tance of accounting for exposure to stimulus time when studying Bayesian biases.
Our model simulations showed that all parameters that affect bias, (decision
boundary, drift rate and starting point distance) also affect reaction times. Thus,
if reaction times or exposure to stimulus duration are not accounted for, it might
lead to confounded results. In different tasks used to study ASD and SCZ, ex-
posure to stimulus duration varies from 200ms (Lawson et al., 2018), to 13.6s
(Utzerath et al., 2019), while in studies that have tested batteries of illusions
in SCZ (Grzeczkowski et al., 2018; Yang et al., 2013) and in ASD (Chouinard
et al., 2016; Ropar and Mitchell, 2001), unlimited time is usually given to re-
spond on each trial. Meanwhile, it has been shown that the magnitude of visual
illusions can vary as a function of exposure time (Calvert and Harris, 1988) and
that reduced illusion effects along schizotypy traits can be explained by increased
reaction times (Bressan and Kramer, 2013). In general, only a handful of stud-
ies have investigated within-trial dynamics in ASD and SCZ (in ASD: Pirrone
et al., 2017, 2018; Karalunas et al., 2018; Powell et al., 2019; in SCZ: Heathcote
et al., 2015; Moustafa et al., 2015; Mathias et al., 2017), despite the differences in
processing speed being commonly reported in both SCZ (Schatz, 1998) and ASD
(Robertson and Baron-Cohen, 2017). Thus, investigating within-trial dynamics
within the context of Bayesian inference is a promising direction for future re-
search in SCZ and ASD.
Finally, it is worth noting that some recent Bayesian studies of SCZ and ASD
have investigated the dynamics of how sensory evidence is integrated over time,
but instead of within-trial dynamics they focused on across-trial dynamics, with
an emphasis on prior updating. This would include studies discussed throughout
this thesis using sequential sampling tasks (Cassidy et al., 2018; Adams et al.,
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2018; Baker et al., 2019), and associative learning under volatile conditions (Pow-
ers et al., 2017; Lawson et al., 2017). In our task, the priors were acquired rela-
tively quickly (within 100-170 trials) and stayed relatively stable throughout the
rest of the task (e.g., see Supplementary Fig. 3 in Chapter 4), preventing
the possibility of studying individual and group differences in the dynamics of




A.1 Behavioral measures in absolute motion di-
rection coordinates
To gain a better insight into how cardinal directions were affecting performance in
our task, in addition to analysing estimation biases (presented in the main text in
Chapter 5), we also analysed all other behavioral measures in absolute motion di-
rection coordinates. While the effects on estimation bias showed clear periodicity
every 90˝ (Fig. A.1A), most other measures were not significantly affected by the
cardinals: variability (main motion direction effect: F p22,48.82q “ 1.32, p“ .205;
Fig. A.1B), lapse estimations (F p22,15.59q “ 1.08, p “ .445; Fig. A.1C),
reaction times (F p22,50.43q “ 1.32, p “ .203; Fig. A.1D) and hallucinations
(F p22,1886q “ 0.96, p“ .518; Fig. A.1F). Only detection rate was significantly
affected by the cardinals (F p22,47.13q “ 6.81, p ă .001; Fig. A.1E), with the
detection being better for horizontal directions (around ´90˝ and 90˝) compared
to performance at vertical directions (around 0˝ and ˘180˝). We are unaware
of any previous literature reporting better detection for horizontal than vertical
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directions and it is unclear how it might relate to the observed repulsive biases,
as our models did not explicitly account for the detection performance.
Figure A.1: Behavioral measures in absolute motion direction coordinates for
the general population sample (N “ 83) on low-contrast trials (A-E) and no-
stimulus trials (F). (A) Estimation bias, (B) estimation variability, (C) lapse
estimations, (D) estimation reaction time, (E) detection rate on low-contrast
trials, (F) hallucination rate on no-stimulus trials. Black line represents data
across the whole range of motion directions, blue line represents the same data
but folded with respect to 0˝ (averaging points at an equal absolute distance
from the 0˝ angle). The vertical dashed lines indicate the cardinal directions.
The error bars and shaded areas represent within-subject standard error.
Most of the research on the effects of the cardinal directions in motion per-
ception, has focused on the effects in discrimination (as opposed to detection)
performance. Here, the effects of cardinals have been shown to be expressed as
an advantage in discriminating cardinal vs oblique directions (the oblique effect)
(e.g., see Gros et al., 1998; Dakin et al., 2005b; Greenwood and Edwards, 2007);
while more recently, improved discrimination has also been reported for horizon-
tal vs vertical motion directions (Pilz and Papadaki, 2019). We do not see these
effects in our data (as suggested by no significant effects in estimation variabil-
ity). One possible explanation for this discrepancy might lie in the distinction
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between stimulus noise (i.e., sensory ambiguity induced by reduced coherence of
motion), which was used by studies investigating the oblique effect, and sensory
noise (i.e. sensory ambiguity induced by reduced contrast or presentation time),
which was used in our studies. For example, Wei and Stocker (2015) have shown
that under the assumption of efficient coding, stimulus noise would lead to at-
tractive biases towards the cardinals, while sensory noise would lead to repulsive
biases from the cardinals. In our data we do observe repulsive biases, in line with
Wei and Stocker results. While these differential effects were only demonstrated
for biases, we might speculate it to be relevant for explaining the lack of effects
in estimation variability in our data. More generally, such results also emphasize
the importance of recognizing different sources of uncertainty and considering the
possibility that it might have different roles in the computations performed by
the brain.
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A.2 Complete model fits for repulsion analysis
Figure A.2: BP-AR40, BP-AR4 and BP-A models’ fits for all estimation perfor-
mance measures in relative motion direction (A-C) and absolute motion direction
coordinates (D-F). (A,D) Estimation bias, (B,E) estimation variability, (C,F)
lapse estimations. The vertical dashed lines in A-C indicate the two most fre-
quently presented directions, while in D-F they indicate the cardinal directions.
The error bars represent within-subject standard error.
Figure A.3: BP-AEC, BP-ASC4 and BP-ASC40 models’ fits for all estimation
performance measures in relative motion direction (A-C) and absolute motion
direction coordinates (D-F). (A,D) Estimation bias, (B,E) estimation variabil-
ity, (C,F) lapse estimations. The vertical dashed lines in A-C indicate the two
most frequently presented directions, while in D-F they indicate the cardinal
directions. The error bars represent within-subject standard error.
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A.3 Repulsion effects in Chalk et al. (2010) data
Figure A.4: Model comparison for repulsion analysis with Chalk et al. (2010)
data. (A) Random-effects Bayesian model selection results; PEP - protected
exceedance probability. (B) Fixed-effects model comparison. Note that the plot
shows the difference between the model with the lowest BIC and the remaining




B.1 Reaction time within-subject effects by CDM
CDM predicted reaction time effect found in behavioral data, with faster trials
being associated with more bias (Fig. B.1A). However, the model also predicted
more lapse estimations for faster trials (Fig. B.1C), which we did not see in
behavioral data.
Figure B.1: Reaction time within-subject effects predicted by CDM: fast vs slow
trials (35% fastest and 35% slowest trials for each individual). (A) Estimation
bias, (B) estimation variability, (C) lapse estimations, (D) reaction time. The
vertical dashed lines correspond to the two most frequently presented motion
directions (˘32˝). Error bars represent within-subject standard error.
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B.2 CDM parameter differences between fast
and slow participants
Analysing CDM parameter difference between 30 fastest and 30 slowest individu-
als revealed that faster individuals had smaller decision boundary and more lapse
estimations (Fig. B.2). Together, this can be interpreted as faster individuals
being less cautious when performing the task.
Figure B.2: CDM parameter comparison between 30 fastest and 30 slowest par-
ticipants. (A) a - decision boundary, (B) v - mean drift rate, (C) zθ - starting
point angle, (D) zd - starting point distance, (E) Tnd - non-decision time, (F) α
- random lapse responses. Two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test results are reported
with each panel. Asterisks indicate statistical significance: * - p < .05, ** - p <
.01.
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B.3 Within-trial dynamics in Chalk et al. (2010)
data
Figure B.3: Model comparison for repulsion analysis with data from Chalk et al.
(2010). (A) Random-effects Bayesian model selection results; PEP - protected
exceedance probability. (B) Fixed-effects model comparison. Note that the plot
shows the difference between the model with the lowest BIC and the remaining
models. Both methods indicate CDM to be the best model.
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B.4 CDM fits to SCZ and ASD patient groups
Figure B.4: CDM fits to data for controls (A-D), patients with schiziphrenia (E-
H) and patients with ASD (I-L). (A, E, I) Estimation bias, (B, F, J) estimation
variability, (C, G, K) lapse estimations, (D, H, L) estimation reaction time. The
vertical dashed lines denote the two most frequently presented directions. Error
bars represent within-subject standard error.
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